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Abstract 
This thesis exammes the system of intellectual property (IP) protection In 
contemporary China. The IP system has undergone a series of dramatic reforms in recent 
years, particularly as a result of China's accession to the World Trade Organisation. 
From December 2001, China is now committed to comply with the WTO Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). However, despite 
implementing TRIPS provisions into domestic legislation, infringements are still 
prevalent and criticism of the IP system continues. 
Therefore, this study aims to analyse China's compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement in more detail using theories of compliance originating in international law 
and international relations, in order to understand this gap between implementation and 
compliance. Specifically, this study applies a comprehensive model of compliance 
previously applied to international environmental accords. This model incorporates 
consideration of the international IP environment and the TRIPS Agreement itself, as 
well as China-specific factors affecting TRIPS compliance. 
The model was tested using a combination of qualitative techniques, including an 
initial bilingual questionnaire, detailed follow-up interviews and analysis of a wide range 
of primary documents such as WTO papers, laws and regulations and case reports. 
Respondents participating in the study included legal and business professionals, both 
international and Chinese, with experience of the IP system in China. The qualitative 
data was coded and analysed using NVivo software and a model of TRIPS compliance in 
China created. 
1 
The study concludes that preVIOUS studies of compliance with international 
obligations have been too narrow in scope and that a more inclusive approach to relevant 
factors is necessary. In terms of policy implications, this thesis will also suggest that 
external pressure alone will not achieve long-term changes in the IP system and that more 
cooperative initiatives are necessary in order to increase China's capacity, as well as 
intention, to fully comply with the TRIPS Agreement. 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to justify the focus 0 f my research on the assessment 0 f China's 
compliance with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) and, in order to do so, will fIrst outline the nature of intellectual property 
rights in general and explain the defmition used in this study. Then, the background of 
the development of intellectual property rights will be briefly described in order to 
illustrate the significance of the establishment of the TRIPS Agreement in the context of 
international IP protection. Thirdly, a brief overview of the role of the law and the 
relationship between the law and the state in China will be provided and then, the 
development of intellectual property protection in China and China's engagement with 
the GATT IWTO international trading system will be summarised in order to evaluate the 
importance of the TRIPS Agreement for IP protection in China specifically. Finally, key 
research questions and the overall structure of the remaining chapters will be introduced. 
1.1 Intellectual Property: Definitions and Context 
According to the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), intellectual 
property "refers to creations of the mind: inventions, literary and artistic works, and 
symbols, names, images, and designs used in commerce." 1 This is similar to the 
defmition used by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which states that: "Intellectual 
property rights are the rights given to persons over the creations of their minds. They 
usually give the creator an exclusive right over the use of his/her creation for a certain 
1 WIPO, "What is Intellectual Property?" http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/enJ, accessed May 15th 2005. 
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period of time.,,2 These definitions emphasise the origins of intellectual property in the 
mind of the creator or inventor. 
It is clear that intellectual property can include various categories of rights, apart 
from the traditional protection for copyright, trademark and patent. Indeed the TRIPS 
Agreement is exhaustive in its approach to the IP rights covered by the Agreement. 
TRIPS Article 1(2) provides that "for the purposes of this Agreement, the term 
'intellectual property' refers to all categories of intellectual property that are the subject 
of Sections 1 through 7 of Part 11.,,3 Therefore, the TRIPS Agreement covers a total of 
seven areas of intellectual property: 
• Copyright and related rights (Part II(1)); 
• Trademarks (Part II(2)); 
• Geographical Indications (Part II(3)); 
• Industrial Designs (Part II( 4)); 
• Patents (Part II(5)); 
• Layout-designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits (Part II(6)); 
• Protection of Undisclosed Information (Part II (7)). 
Consequently, for the sake of brevity, intellectual property or IP shall be referred 
to throughout this study, but it should be borne in mind that the defmition of intellectual 
property that is used is the broad defmition above, as used in the TRIPS Agreement. 
1.1.1 The Origins of Intellectual Property Rights 
In order to appreciate the significance of the TRIPS Agreement in terms of 
international intellectual property protection, it is necessary to first understand the origins 
2 World Trade Organisation, "What are Intellectual Property Rights?" 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripselintelle.htm. accessed May 13th 2005. 
3 World Trade Organisation, "Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights", 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/27-trips.pdf, accessed May 30th 2004. 
2 
of intellectual property rights. Intellectual property protection began around the time of 
widespread industrialisation across Europe, although the recognition of marks of 
ownership clearly existed long before this period. Indeed, one of the ftrst known 
references to intellectual property protection dates from 500 BC when chefs were granted 
year-long monopolies for creating culinary delights in the Greek colony of Sybaris. 4 
However, a recognized system of intellectual property protection was not formally 
introduced until much later. Patents came into existence in Venice around 1500 and had 
spread to most of the main European powers by 1550.5 The frrst formal patent system in 
Venice was highly significant as "for the frrst time a legal and institutional form of 
intellectual property rights established the ownership of knowledge and was explicitly 
utilized to promote innovation.,,6 
The origins of copyright, on the other hand, trace to the establishment of printing; 
copyright emerged from a concern to control this new technology. This concern led to 
the world's frrst copyright act, the Statute of Anne in 1710, entitled "An Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or 
Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned." 7 Furthermore, early 
legislative developments in Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries covering 
intellectual property are frequently seen as the dawn of modem intellectual property law. 8 
4 Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property and Information Control: Philosophic Foundations and 
Contemporary Issues, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2001): 9. 
5 Robert L. Ostergard, The Development Dilemma: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights 
in the International System, (New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC, 2003): 12. 
6 Christopher May and Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History, (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2006): 58. 
7 Paul Goldstein, International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001): 5. 
8 May and Sell, Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History, 73. 
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Various countries enacted intellectual property laws over the next century, but it 
was not until the late nineteenth century that international intellectual property protection 
was considered necessary. This need "became evident when foreign exhibitors refused to 
attend the International Exhibition of Inventions in Vienna in 1873 because they were 
afraid their ideas would be stolen and exploited commercially in other countries.,,9 This 
led to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883, which was 
the first international agreement to deal with IP rights. This was followed by the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886, which dealt 
specifically with creative works such as books, plays and music. 10 
These two international conventions originally had few signatories, but included a 
secretariat from the outset. The Paris Convention had 14 initial member countries when 
it came into force in 188411 and the Berne Convention had 8 original members in 1887. 
The respective secretariats merged in 1893 and eventually became the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) in 1967, which then became part of the UN system of 
specialized agencies in 1974. 12 Hence, intellectual property has a long history of 
protection at an international level, but the WIPO-administered system was widely 
criticised as insufficient as IP began to grow in importance in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, 
it was proposed that intellectual property protection be incorporated into the existing 
9 WIPO, "WIPO Treaties- General Information", http://www.wipo.intltreaties/enlgenerall, accessed January 
5th 2006. 
10 "Paris Convention for the Protection oflndustrial Property", 
http://www.wipo.intltreaties/enlip/paris/trtdocs wo020.htrnl, accessed January 25th 2005, "Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works ", 
http://www.wipo.intltreaties/eniipiberne/trtdocs woOOl.html, accessed January 25th 2005. Other relevant 
international intellectual property conventions are also available via the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation website at http://www. wipo.intl 
11 WIPO, "WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use", available at 
http://www.wipo.intlabout-ip/enliprmlindex.htm. accessed January 14th 2007, 24l. 
12 Ibid. 5. 
4 
multilateral trading system under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
1947. 
Therefore, the development of intellectual property protection could be said to 
have three distinct phases: national, from the fifteenth to the late nineteenth century; 
international, from the passing of the Paris and Berne Conventions in the 1880s until the 
final decades of the twentieth century; and global, from the inclusion of IP in the 
multilateral trading system with the establishment of the TRIPS framework in 1994. 
Thus, the TRIPS Agreement can be seen as highly significant from the perspective of the 
historical evolution of IP protection as it began a new phase of development, that of 
global protection. 
Although the Paris and Berne Conventions were significant at the time they were 
agreed for embodying the principles of non-discrimination and national treatment, they 
"neither created new substantive law nor imposed new laws on member states; rather, 
they reflected a consensus among member states that was legitimated by domestic laws 
already in place." 13 Accordingly, the Conventions allowed wide variation in the IP 
protection offered by signatories and recognised that different countries may require 
different levels of IP protection according to their different levels of economic 
development. As the TRIPS Agreement downplays this inherent flexibility in favour of 
the promotion of universality, it is indeed a significant step in the progression of IP 
protection and its inclusion in the GATTIWTO system will now be examined in more 
detail. 
13 Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 10-11. 
5 
1.2 IP in the International Trading System 
Although the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the forerunner to 
the WTO, was not established until 1948, consideration of the benefits of multilateral 
trade agreements had begun as early as the 1930s. Due to the Great Depression, import 
tariffs and other discriminatory barriers were raised. However, as: 
"many large economies became protectionist simultaneously or in retaliation, 
so more rather than less suffering resulted from these policies ... Hence the 
belief that there must be gains from getting together to sign a multilateral 
trade agreement to prevent such destructive trade policy lapses in the 
future.,,14 
After the Second World War, the desire to establish an international trade 
organisation grew stronger. Although the primary aim of such an agreement was 
economic, there was also the issue of political stability to consider. Therefore, initially 
countries wanted to establish a trading organisation for reasons of political stability as 
well as economic gains. IS Subsequently, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) came into being in January 1948, with 23 initial contracting parties, which 
included China. 
In tenns of intellectual property, the provisions of GATT were very limited with 
scant mention ofIP protection, as the primary focus of GATT, at least initially, was tariff 
reduction. However, GATT Article XX(d) did allow contracting parties a general 
exception to the rules on trade barriers to allow signatories to adopt or enforce measures 
"necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with 
14 Kym Anderson, "Why the World Needs the GATTIWTO", Anderson, Strengthening the Global Trading 
System: From GATT to WTO, (Adelaide, Australia: Centre for International Economic Studies, University 
of Adelaide, 1996). 
15 Indeed, prevention of military conflict by channelling trade disputes into the WTO's dispute settlement 
process is still one of the stated aims ofthe WTO. World Trade Organisation, "The WTO ... in Brief', 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/inbrief e/inbrOO e.htrn, accessed February 1st 2005. 
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the provisions of this Agreement, including ... the protection of patents, trade marks and 
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices.,,16 This Article was invoked in two 
disputes under the GATT dispute settlement process; in the first from 1983, the panel 
held that patent protection was an area in which a contracting party could take action 
which did not otherwise conform to their GATT obligations. In the second case from 
1989, the panel held that although domestic patent law could not be challenged, the 
contracting parties had an obligation to try to enforce their intellectual property 
legislation in accordance with their GATT commitments. I7 
Therefore, although GATT 1947 did mention intellectual property protection in 
brief, it was not a major concern of the multilateral trading system until the 1970s. The 
complex drafting history of the TRIPS Agreement and negotiations that took place during 
the Uruguay Round from 1986-1994 will be further detailed in Chapter 4 below, as the 
characteristics of the TRIPS Agreement are discussed in the context of their possible 
impact upon compliance. It is important to note that IP protection is now one of the 
major issues in the international trading system, particularly in the past few decades as 
the emphasis has shifted from tariff barriers to trade to non-tariff barriers, such as 
inappropriate IP protection. As a result, compliance with the TRIPS Agreement is a 
matter of great concern for many WTO Members. 
1.3 An Overview of the Law and the State in China 
-
In order to fully comprehend the current IP system in China, it is necessary to fIrst 
grasp an appreciation for the complex interplay between the state and the law in China 
16 "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)", 
http://www.wto.orglEnglishidocs e/legal e/gatt47 01 e.htm accessed January 24th 2004. 
17 Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: A Drafting History, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003): 7. 
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and how this relationship has developed. Firstly, China could be said to have only 
benefited from an independent legal system since 1912; in Imperial China, all power was 
vested in the emperor and the legal codes that did exist were aimed at protecting the 
state's interests rather than individual rights. Moreover, many legal matters were dealt 
with informally by local groups without recourse to formal legal structures. 18 
Furthermore, since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the formal legal 
framework has also periodically been sidelined in favour of extrajudicial mechanisms, 
particularly during the Cultural Revolution. 19 As the contemporary legal framework of 
courts and personnel has only been established for around thirty years, since the start of 
the reform period, the juvenile nature of the legal system still has its legacy in the current 
IP system, particularly in the lack of experience of key personnel, an issue compounded 
by the fact that specialised IP courts were only established in 1994. In addition, although 
the legal system has been subject to sweeping reforms in the past decades, these changes 
cannot be considered in iso lation. 
"Regardless of how much legislation is promulgated and how many judges 
are trained and installed in the courts, legality will not grow unless the Party-
state fosters and maintains a commitment to it and alters the allocation of 
power between the courts and the rest of the Party-state. ,,20 
In other words, consideration of the legal system necessarily incorporates 
discussion of the political system in China as well. The legal system in China is also 
subject to lingering suspicions that, despite committing to establishing a rule of law state 
in a constitutional amendment of 1999, it is still subject to the policy whims of the 
18 Jerome Cohen, "The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China: An Introduction", Harvard 
Law Review, 79 (3), 470. 
19 James C. F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall International, 1995): 132. 
20 Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao, (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1999): 299. 
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Party. 21 Indeed, China's legal system is frequently judged to be following an 
instrumentalist model of the law, whereby law is merely the vehicle by which policy 
goals are achieved, whether they be social control, class emancipation or economic 
development. This instrumentalist model could be seen as originating in the traditional 
Chinese legal system, but also as arising from adoption of a Marxist legal modeL 22 
The instrumentalist nature of the legal system in China has several implications 
for the current IP system. It is certainly true that legislation is often drafted to be 
"intentionally ambiguous,,,23 in order to allow for shifts in policy emphasis and with 
detailed regulations issued later to fill the gaps. This could also be a consequence of the 
traditional preference in China for bureaucratic discretion over legislative certainty. In 
addition, there is a traditional preference in China for informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as mediation which leads to a continued dominance of public 
enforcement mechanisms in the legal system generally.24 
The obvious corollary of this is the corresponding weakness in the judicial system. 
Although the principle of judicial independence (shenpan duli) is officially accepted, the 
interpretation of this principle refers to the elimination of direct interference in individual 
cases rather than a wider separation of powers recognised as central to judicial 
independence in other jurisdictions.25 Finally, the decentralisation that has taken place in 
the reform era as China has moved away from a centrally planned command economy 
21 Liu Peixue, "Tan tan «yao fazhi bu yao renzhi» de kouhao" (Discussing the slogan 'Rule oflaw not 
rule of man"', Neibu Wengao (Internal Manuscripts), 7: 7-8. 
22 Yu Xingzhong, "Legal Pragmatism in the People's Republic of China", Keller, Chinese Law and Legal 
Theory, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001): 72. 
23 Pitman B. Potter, The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal Culture, (London: 
Routledge, 2001): 11. 
24 As considered below at page 165. 
25 Ronald C. Keith, China's Struggle for the Rule of Law, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1994): 18. 
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has conversely led to problems in the legal system; as provinces are now more powerful, 
local protectionism cannot be easily confronted as local interests are deeply entrenched. 26 
In terms of the IP system specifically, there are a number of official agencies 
charged with administering the current IP system in China, as represented in Figure 1-1. 
Apart from the Supreme People's Court, these organisations are directly responsible to 
the State Council. The Supreme People's Court is overseen by the National People's 
Congress (NPC) and its permanent Standing Committee. According to Article 67 of the 
PRC constitution,27 it is also the role of the NPC's standing committee to oversee the 
work of the State Council. Thus, the main IP agencies are not subordinate to a particular 
ministry. However, as they are powerful bodies reporting directly to the State Council, 
they are highly resistant to any attempts to merge them or delegate their powers to other 
bodies. As a result, the IP system is often accused of lacking coordination between these 
multiple channels. 28 
Therefore, the role of the law and of the state ill China and the developing 
relationship between the two has a variety of implications for the current system of IP 
protection. These consequences will be discussed further in this thesis as analysis of the 
current IP system develops. The following section will now examine the development of 
IP in China. 
26 Discussed in more detail below at page 171. 
27 Full text of the Constitution available at: "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa" (Constitution of the 
PRC), available at: http://www.gov.cn/ziliaolflfg/2005-06/14/content 631O.htm accessed August 30th 2005. 
28 Andrew Mertha, The Politics oj Piracy: Intellectual Property in Contemporary China, (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2005): 111. 
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1.4 The Development of IP in China 
China's WTO entry in December 2001 and associated obligations under the 
TRIPS Agreement had a significant impact on the IP system in China and, to appreciate 
this full impact, it is necessary to first understand the development of intellectual property 
protection from imperial China until the reform era. The development of intellectual 
property protection in China can be divided into four stages: frrstly, the initial steps 
towards IP protection taken in the fmal years of the Qing Dynasty under pressure from 
Western powers; secondly, the early IP laws enacted by the Nationalist government in the 
period from 1912 to the 1940s to try to modernise the law; next, the preliminary 
Communist law reforms in the early years of the PRC; and finally, the extensive period of 
law refonn which has taken place since the refonn and opening up period began in the 
late 1970s. These four stages of development will be outlined below in order to place the 
significance of China's accession to the TRIPS regime in context. 
1.4.1 IP Protection in Imperial China 
It is widely accepted that there was "no comprehensive, centrally promulgated, 
formal legal protection for either proprietary symbols or inventions" in imperial China, 
despite some evidence of limited protection of brand names and controls regarding 
pUblications.29 On the contrary, these feeble efforts made to protect intellectual property 
were regarded as solely aimed at maintaining the state's authority by controlling the 
dissemination of ideas. 30 It is also undeniable that several commentators have been 
29 William P. Alford, To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese 
Civilization, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1996): 15. 
30 Peter Yu, "The Second Coming ofIntellectual Property Rights in China", Occasional Papers in 
Intellectual Property from Benjamin N Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, Number 11: 5. 
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bemused by the lack of rudimentary intellectual property protection in imperial China, 
given China's advances in science and technology.31 
Furthermore, despite some evidence suggesting that the concept of intellectual 
property was engrained in imperial society, the written legal codes do not reflect the 
private proprietary rights of intellectual property. In the Qing dynasty, the Code "dealt 
with almost all aspects of a citizen's and an official's life", but all "in penal form and 
China had no other (civil) code of law.,,32 In fact, "the law was only secondarily 
interested in defending the rights- especially the economic rights- of one individual or 
group against another individual or group and not at all in defending such rights against 
the state. ,,33 This concurs with the finding that the scant intellectual property protection 
that did exist in imperial China was not concerned "with the rights of individuals or their 
claims for their own sake, but with the social order and the interests of the State. ,,34 In 
other words, Qing legal codes did not cover individual rights such as IPR. 
In the late Qing dynasty, international pressure to introduce protection for 
intellectual property in China began to gain momentum in the late nineteenth century 
following the Paris Convention on Industrial Property (1883) and the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886), as discussed above at page 4. 
Pressure on China from Western powers to improve intellectual property protection also 
increased at this time as many Chinese traders used foreign trademarks in order to avoid 
31 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1900): 38. 
32 Alice Erh-Soon Tay, "Law in Communist China- Part I", Sydney Law Review, 6 (2), 160. 
33 Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1967): 4. 
34 Tay, "Law in Communist China- Part I", 161. 
taxes to which Chinese, but not foreign, goods were subject. 35 By the tum of the 
twentieth century, there were some efforts within the treaty ports to register marks 
belonging to foreign nationals, but without effective enforcement powers, these efforts 
proved worthless. 36 Furthermore, treaties concluded with Britain, Japan and the U.S in 
the early twentieth century 37 included clauses on intellectual property, but these 
provisions were unclear and contradictory. 
China did make some effort at this time to bring Chinese law into line with 
Western jurisprudence in order to escape from the extraterritorial regime, specifically by 
establishing a Law Codification Commission in 1904.38 This process of westernization 
focused on Japan as a recommended model for reform. 39 China also attempted to 
introduce some basic intellectual property laws during the fmal years of the Qing 
Dynasty, such as the Law of Authorship of 1910, but the short life of this law meant that 
evidence of its implementation is absent. 40 Thus, despite this period of ''unprecedented 
international attention to intellectual property,,,41 no effective measures were instituted to 
protect intellectual property in imperial China. 
35 Gregory S. Feder, "Enforcement ofIntellectual Property Rights in China: You Can Lead a Horse to 
Water But You Can't Make it Drink", Virginia Journal of International Law, 37 (1), (1996), 233. 
36 Alford, To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization, 35. 
37 The texts of the Great Britain & China Treaty 1902, US-China Treaty 1903 and the Japan- China Treaty 
1903 are all available in: John V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China 
1894-1919, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921),342-352,411-415,423-432. 
38 Luke T. Lee, China and International Agreements: A Study of Compliance, (Lei den, The Netherlands: A. 
W. S ijth off, 1969): Appendix 1, 136. 
39 Jianfu Chen, "Coming Full-Circle: Law-Making in the PRC from a Historical Perspective", Otto, Polak, 
Chen and Li, Law-Making in the People's Republic of China, (The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000): 22. 
40 Sanqiang Qu, Copyright in China, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2002): 22. 
41 Alford, To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization, 34. 
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1.4.2 Reforms in IP Protection under the Kuomintang 
Following the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, China experienced several years 
of political upheaval before the country was largely united under the government of the 
Nationalist Kuomintang Party in 1927. When the Kuomintang (KMT) ftrst came to 
power, efforts were made to stimulate invention and creativity. The Kuomintang carried 
out an extensive program of legislation both soon after the end of the Qing Dynasty and 
further, more extensive, reforms after 1927. For example, soon after the fall of the Qing 
dynasty, the KMT announced the Temporary Statute on Technology Reward of 1912. 
The Kuomintang also introduced a Trademark Law which saw 50,000 trademark 
registrations by 1948, a detailed Copyright Law and the ftrst Patent Law in Chinese 
h' 42 Istory, 
The fIrst Copyright Law was passed in 1928, which borrowed extensively from 
the German model via the Japanese version and was amended in 1944 to grant more 
equal treatment to both Chinese and foreign authors,43 A comprehensive Trademark Law 
was passed in 1931 which was still in force when the Communists came to power in 1949; 
according to some sources, this law was again transplanted from the Continent via 
Japan. 44 The Patent Law drafted in 1944 formalised the system previously established by 
the Measures to Encourage Industrial Arts of 1932. These laws could be seen as the frrst 
introduction of formal IP protection to China. 
Nevertheless, despite the promulgation of these landmark intellectual property 
laws, "these laws failed to achieve their stated objectives because they presumed a legal 
42 Deli Yang, "The development of the intellectual property in China", Working Paper Series, Bradford 
University School of Management, Working Paper 02124 (October 2002),6. 
43 Qu, Copyright in China, 26. 
44 Connie Carter, Fighting Fakes in China: The Legal Protection of Trade Marks and Brands in the 
People's Republic of China, (London: The Intellectual Property Institute, 1996): 11, fu. 37. 
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structure, and indeed, a legal consciousness, that did not then exist in China and, most 
likely, could not have flourished there at that time." 45 These IP laws called for 
administration through well-organised central agencies and modem courts, which simply 
weren't present in China at this time. As a result, despite detailed legislation being 
adopted, there were very little changes in Chinese IP practice during KMT rule. 
1.4.3 Development of IP Protection in the PRe 
After the establishment of the People's Republic of China ill 1949, all 
Kuomintang laws and decrees were abolished as they were seen as tools for the 
repression of the masses.46 Consequently, the preliminary intellectual property protection 
system that had been established by the Kuomintang was dismantled and the new PRC 
government began to consider a Communist alternative. The dismantling of the 
Kuomintang legal system and codes for ideological reasons clearly left a legal vacuum.47 
Therefore, the question became how could these inventions and outstanding works be 
encouraged and rewarded in a way which was consistent with Communist ideology? 
The Provisional Regulations on the Guarantee of Invention Rights and Patent 
Rights which were promulgated on August 11th 1950 were the fIrst regulations passed to 
fIll this legal vacuum. These Provisional Regulations from 1950, "closely paralleled 
western patent laws in granting exclusive rights of exploitation of the patented device to 
the patentee. ,,48 It is also significant that rights granted under these Regulations were 
45 Alford, To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization, 53. 
46 Albert P. Blaustein, Fundamental Legal Documents of Communist China, (South Hackensack, New 
Jersey: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1962),41. 
47 Chen, "Coming Full-Circle: Law-Making in the PRC from a Historical Perspective", 30. 
48 Barden N. Gale, "The Concept of Intellectual Property in the People's Republic of China: Inventors and 
Inventions", The China Quarterly, 74 (June 1978), 336. 
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inheritable and transferable under Article 7, as these rights reflect Western notions of 
personal property rights. 
However, the relatively liberal 1950 Provisional Regulations were amended by 
the Provisional Regulations on Awards for Inventions, Technical Improvements and 
Rationalization Proposals Concerning Production, approved on May 6th 1954. 49 These 
Regulations provided for monetary awards for improvements to the production process, 
calculated according to the money saved in the twelve months after the invention. 
However, in these revised regulations, "patents as such were ignored. ,,50 The focus of 
these Regulations on monetary awards rather than the granting of property rights 
reinforces the notion that Communist legislation at this time was fIrmly aimed at 
promoting the states interests and not at promoting individual proprietary rights. 
This supports the proposition that early intellectual property legislation was 
patterned on the Soviet model, with just a few modifIcations to allow for the gap in 
development between the Chinese and Soviet economies. The abandonment of personal 
property rights in the limited rewards offered to inventors also reflects classic Marxist 
thought. 51 Thus, under Communist ideology, the notion of privately owned property 
rights effectively became meaningless. 52 
The patent system was further amended by the 1963 Regulations on Awards for 
Inventions and the separately published Regulations on Awards for Technical 
Improvements, which permanently eliminated the certificate of ownership in favour of a 
49 Full text available from: Blaustein, Fundamental Legal Documents of Communist China, 523-533. 
50 Gale, "The Concept of Intellectual Property in the People's Republic of China: Inventors and Inventions", 
337. 
51 Karl Marx, Early Writings, (London: Watts & Co., 1963): 157. 
52 Tao-Tai Hsia and Kathryn A. Haun, "Laws of the People's Republic of China on Individual and 
Intellectual Property", Law and Contemporary Problems, 38: 280. 
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lump-sum payment system. As a result, the 1963 Regulations were even more radical 
than the previous system in operation, with much fewer rewards and legal rights for 
inventors. This more radical approach is also reflected in a People's Daily editorial from 
1963 which emphasised the position of inventions as collective property and added: 
"This is totally different from the old society ... it is not necessary for us to 
regard the inventions and technical improvements of a certain individual or a 
certain unit as personal property which deserves "protection." This is 
different in nature from the so-called "patent rights" under the capitalistic 
system. ,,53 
The trademark system could also be considered to be fairly radical compared to 
that established in the Soviet Union. Trademarks were not retained in order to assist 
businesses, but rather to assist the consumer, individual or collective, to identify the 
quality of a product. Thus, they were predominantly used on products made for export.54 
In contrast to the Regulations passed to govern patents and trademarks, the PRC 
did not enact any statute on copyright following the abolition of the KMT Copyright Law 
from 1928, amended in 1944; indeed the only protection available to Chinese authors was 
in the form of model contracts from 1957. 55 This lack of copyright protection 
exemplifies attitudes to intellectual property in the early years of the PRC; patent law was 
codified in order to encourage industrial innovation, much needed to stimulate economic 
growth, trademark law was tolerated in order to promote consumer interests, but 
copyright law did not promote any public interest and thus was simply at odds with 
Communist ideology. 
53 Editorial, "Encourage Inventions and Technical Improvements by Rewards In Order to Promote 
Development of Our Production and Construction", Renrnin Ribao, 2 December 1963, in Survey afChina 
Mainland Press, No. 3117, 11 December 1963, 15, cited by Gale, "The Concept oflntellectual Property in 
the People's Republic of China: Inventors and Inventions", 341. 
54 Hsia and Haun, "Laws of the People's Republic of China on Individual and Intellectual Property", 285-6. 
55 Ibid. 289. 
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Overall, the provisional IP regulations and reward systems put in place from 1949 
to the 1970s did not succeed in promoting innovation and steadily moved away from the 
initial position of recognising an individual's IP rights to a more radical socialist 
approach that views IP as collective property. The Soviet intellectual property laws were 
also quite influential in the early IP regulations adopted in the 1950s, although the Soviet 
model was not always appropriate due to the differences in industrialisation between the 
Soviet Union and China. Furthermore, during the Cultural Revolution, even the system 
of lump sum bonuses was abolished in favour of a strict policy that all inventions and 
creations were national assets. 56 As a result, the research and development system was 
virtually paralysed throughout much of the pre-reform years of the PRC, with many 
individuals reluctant to acknowledge their role in a creation or invention, for fear of the 
stigma that would be attached to them. As China began to face the post-Mao era, it was 
clear that the existing intellectual property system was inadequate to stimulate the 
necessary economic development and foreign investment. 
1.4.4 Development of IP Protection in the Reform Era 
As the reform era began in 1978 and China began to open up to the outside world, 
intellectual property protection was in a parlous state. Despite the lack of formal 
functioning intellectual property laws, indeed the perceived lack of the entire concept of 
intellectual property, protection of intellectual property was soon prioritised in China's 
dealings with its trade partners. The China-US Agreement on Trade Relations of July 7th 
56 Gregory S. Kolton, "Copyright Law and the People's Courts in the People's Republic of China: A ~ e v i e w w
and Critique of China's Intellectual Property Courts", University of Pennsylvania Journal of InternatIOnal 
Economic Law, 17 (1), (Spring 1996), 416. 
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1979 committed China to implementing intellectual property protection. 57 In effect, this 
committed China to introducing laws and regulations that offered the same high level of 
protection as the equivalent laws in the US 
Although intellectual property laws took several years to be drafted and 
promulgated, new regulations were passed in 1978 to encourage innovation,58 which 
shows the early recognition of the importance of innovation to economic development. 
As a result, in the early 1980s, China did attempt to draft and adopt several intellectual 
property laws to replace the outdated provisional regulations passed in the 1950s. 
However, the introduction of such laws was no easy task, as they raised difficult 
questions about the future of Chinese socialism. For example, advocates of a new Patent 
Law argued that reform was necessary to stimulate industrial innovation and foreign 
investment. Conversely, opponents of the new Patent Law argued that rewarding 
inventors was contrary to key socialist principles and that a liberal patent system "would 
allow foreign enterprises to control and dominate Chinese technology.,,59 
Consequently, the new statutes reflected the government's unease with the 
introduction of private property rights and still had socialist principles at their core.60 
Notwithstanding these ideological difficulties, China did push ahead with intellectual 
property reform, joining the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) in 1980 
and the Paris Convention on Industrial Property in 1984, as well as passing the 
Trademark Law 1982 and the aforementioned Patent Law in 1984. Copyright protection 
57 The full text of the Trade Agreement is available online "China- US Agreement on Trade Relations", 
http://www.fas.usda.govlitp/agreements/chintra.html, accessed May 2004. 
58 Victor F. S. Sit, Commercial Laws and Business Regulations of the People's Republic of China 1949-
1983, (Hong Kong: Tai Dao Publishing, 1983),497. 
59 Bryan Bachner, "Intellectual Property Law", Wang and Zhang, Introduction to Chinese Law, (Hong 
Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997): 449. 
60 Peter K. Yu, "From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First 
Century", American University Law Review, 50 (1), 36. 
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lagged behind protection for patents and trademarks, perhaps because industrial property 
was considered to be more commercially necessary. The Copyright Law was fmally 
passed in 1990, although copyright had been mentioned in the 1986 General Principles of 
Civil Law. 61 
Despite establishing a comprehensive framework of statutory protection for 
intellectual property rights, China was still subject to heavy criticism from several trading 
partners, especially the US. Bilateral tensions concerning IP protection escalated in the 
1990s and sanctions were threatened on several occasions before agreements were 
reached. 62 Therefore, by the tum of the twenty-frrst century, there was a clear need for a 
new approach to intellectual property both within the international trading system and in 
China specifically to break the cycle of unilateral pressure and growing resentment. This 
alternative was provided by the accession of China to the WTO and the consequent 
obligation to comply with the TRIPS Agreement. China's path to WTO accession will be 
considered in more detail in the following section. 
1.5 China in the International Trading System 
The People's Republic of China (PRC) has a long and uneven history of 
interaction with the international trading system of GATTIWTO. Nationalist 'China' 
became an original contracting party to GATT on 30th October 1947, as the Republic of 
China (ROC). However, China's initial membership in GATT came to an end in 1950, 
when in March 1950, "the Taiwan authority informed the UN Secretary-General of its 
61 Bachner, "Intellectual Property Law", 444. 
62 This cycle of threatened sanctions and reluctantly agreed to Sino-US Accords is outlined further below in 
Section 6.3.4.1. 
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intention to withdraw from GATT.,,63 From 1950 until the early 1970s, Taiwan 
participated in GATT proceedings as an observer. However, following a thaw in 
relations between China and the US, the United Nations shifted diplomatic allegiance 
from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China. In 1971, the UN General Assembly 
passed resolution 2758 (XXVI) that recognised the PRC government and expelled 
Taiwan. Subsequently, GATT followed suit and nullified Taiwan's observer status. 
As China commenced the process of opening-up to trade with the outside world 
from 1978 onwards, a greater interest began to be shown in the benefits and membership 
of various international fmancial organisations. In 1980, China became a member of the 
World Bank and IMF and started to show an interest in GATT. However, China did not 
immediately apply to resume its membership of GATT, although it began to participate in 
GATT as an observer from 1982.64 It was not until July 1986 that this application to 
resume full membership was made. 65 Subsequently, GATT acted swiftly to consider 
China's application with a working party established to negotiate for China's full 
membership in June 1987.66 
Initially, the GATT working party made steady progress in the admission process. 
However, the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 halted further negotiations; 
"although the working party continued to meet periodically, its members developed a 
63 Yuwen Li, "Fade-away of Socialist Planned Economy: China's Participation in the WTO", Weiss, 
Denters and De Waart, International Economic Law with a Human Face, (London: Kluwer Law 
International, 1998). 
64 Margaret M. Pearson, "China's Integration into the International Trade and Investment Regime", 
Economy and Oksenberg, China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects, (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1999): 169. 
65 GATT, "Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round", 
http://www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/91240152.pdf, accessed February 6th 2007. 
66 GATT, "Document Ll6191 Working Party on China's Status as a Contracting Party", 
http://gatt.stanford.eduibin/object.pdf?91280113, accessed 20th April 2005. 
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more hardened attitude, despite their declaration of support for China's acceSSIon III 
principle." 67 China's application to GATT was further complicated by Taiwan's 
application to join GATT as a separate customs territory in January 1990. In effect, the 
accession process halted from 1989 to around 1992. 
Nevertheless, as China had at that time applied to resume GATT membership, 
"China was permitted to participate fully in the Uruguay round of multilateral trade 
negotiations." As part of this participation, Chinese representatives had been included in 
TRIPS discussions "in 1991 and before that time.,,68 Therefore, China attempted to 
follow TRIPS provisions in subsequent amendments to the intellectual property laws and 
the influence of TRIPS on the Chinese IP system should thus be considered as beginning 
much earlier than China's eventual formal WTO accession in 2001. 
Although China failed to join GATT in time to become a member of the newly 
established World Trade Organisation in 1995, negotiations resumed soon after and good 
progress was made toward accession. Several factors did stymie this process, including 
the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999.69 However, after furious 
negotiations, China fmally entered the WTO in December 2001 and from that date must 
formally comply with all the agreements that together make up the framework of the 
67 Pearson, "China's Integration into the International Trade and Investment Regime", 169. 
68 Chengsi Zheng, Intellectual Property Enforcement in China: Leading Cases and Commentary, (Hong 
Kong: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 1997): 243. . " 
69 Koichi Hamada, "China's Entry into the WTO and Its Impact on the Global EconomIC System , Moore, 
Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004): 28. 
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WTO. In the case of the TRIPS Agreement, China agreed to comply with its TRIPS 
obligations immediately upon accession, with no transition period.70 
The issue of intellectual property protection in China was a key issue in China's 
WTO accession negotiations. The importance of IP protection can be witnessed in the 
final Working Party Report on China's WTO accession, which devoted 55 paragraphs out 
of a total of 343 paragraphs to China's commitments under the TRIPS regime. 71 
Furthermore, China's capacity to fully implement its TRIPS commitments was "one of 
the most frequently aired concerns" prior to entry in December 2001.72 These concerns 
arose from the recognition that "government commitment and a sound legal framework 
would not suffice to ensure enforcement, as IPRs involve millions of enterprises and 
hundreds of millions ofindividuals.,,73 
Therefore, China's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement is an area of interest 
for several of China's trading partners and given the level of concern regarding China's 
TRIPS implementation prior to accession; it is a topic worthy of further study. 
Furthermore, as more than five years have now passed since accession, now is an ideal 
time to research the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on China's IP system. 
1.6 Key Research Questions and Structure 
As this chapter has explained, protection of intellectual property rights by 
individual countries has evolved over many centuries and has emerged as worthy of 
70 World Trade Organisation, "Protocol on the Accession ofthe People's Republic of China", Document 
WT/L/432,2001. 
71 As noted by Yongtu Long, "Implications of China's Entry into the WTO in the Field of Intellectual 
Property Rights", Magarinos, Long and Sercovich, China in the WTO: The Birth of a New Catching-up 
Strategy, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 165. . " 
72 Angela Gregory, "Chinese Trademark Law and the TRIPS Agreement- C o n f u c l U ~ ~ Meets the ~ O O , 
Cass China and the World Trading System: Entering the New Millennium, (Cambndge: Cambndge , 
University Press, 2003): 321. . ., . " 
73 Long, "Implications of China's Entry mto the WTO ill the FIeld ofIntellectual Property Rights, 169. 
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international consideration only in the past hundred years or so. Furthermore, the 
concept of intellectual property rights in China has also developed over the past hundred 
years and is now acknowledged to be an area of crucial importance for the modem 
Chinese legal system. 
As intellectual property became more and more significant for the international 
trading system in the 1980s and 1990s, the TRIPS Agreement began to emerge from the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that led to the establishment of the WTO. The 
TRIPS Agreement represented an important step in the development of international IP 
rights as the Agreement included provisions on enforcement previously neglected by 
international IP Conventions. Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement by individual 
WTO Members is thus significant as it affirms the legitimacy of the TRIPS Agreement 
and the WTO system of rules as a whole. 
Accession to the WTO and the associated commitment to fully comply with the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement is also highly significant for China. Despite previous 
attempts to introduce a comprehensive system of protection for IP rights in China, the 
pre-WTO IP system was still subject to strong criticism from key trading partners such as 
the US. Thus, the impact of the TRIPS Agreement was hoped to not only assist with the 
continuing development of the IP system, but also to alleviate IP-related tensions with 
trading partners, as well as to contribute towards economic development in China. As a 
result, it can be seen that compliance with the TRIPS Agreement would signify an 
important step forward for the intellectual property system in China. 
As WTO entry took place in December 200 I, there has not yet been any 
systematic attempt to evaluate the post-WTO system of intellectual property protection in 
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China and thus, compliance theory can be a useful tool with which to examine the current 
system. Existing theories of compliance will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. Previous studies of the legal system in China have relied on subjective 
judgments about the effectiveness of the system without any attempt to provide an overall 
model of the development of this system in response to external and internal stimuli and 
my study aims to rectify this deficit. 
My key research questions for this study were thus as follows: what are the 
characteristics of the TRIPS Agreement that may affect a Member's compliance with it? 
What has the impact of WTO accession and related TRIPS obligations been on the IP 
system in China? How effective is the current system of IP protection in China? Is 
China fully complying with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement? If there are 
areas of non-compliance, what are they and why is China not fully complying with 
TRIPS? How can any outstanding areas of non-compliance with TRIPS be resolved? 
In order to address these questions, the remainder of the thesis will be structured 
as follows: The next chapter will outline the concept of compliance and key theories and 
models of compliance that have been proposed in the literature. Then, my methodology 
and research methods of combining a questionnaire, detailed interviews and document 
analysis will be explained and justified. The fourth chapter will discuss the TRIPS 
Agreement in more detail, analysing the drafting history of the Agreement, characteristics 
of the Agreement that may affect compliance, as well as the international environment 
surrounding IP rights. The fifth chapter will focus more specifically on China, 
addressing factors specific to China that may affect compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement. Following the discussion of these factors, the sixth chapter will consider the 
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implementation of the TRIPS Agreement in China, compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement and the overall effectiveness of the Agreement in transforming the IP system 
in China. Finally, the model of compliance will be revisited and a revised model of 
China's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement will be proposed. The thesis will close 
with a summary of my fmdings and some thoughts on the implications of these findings 
for China, for the WTO, for key trading partners such as the US and for individual rights 
holders. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to evaluate China's current system of intellectual property protection and 
its compliance or otherwise with obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, it is important 
to fIrst defIne the key terms, before attempting to outline the framework under which they 
will be analysed. Consequently, the fIrst section of this chapter will introduce key 
theories that have previously been used to analyse the development of law in China. 
These concepts include legal transplants, legal legitimation and selective adaptation. 
However, these concepts alone will be shown to be insuffIcient to fully explain the 
current Chinese IP system and its relationship with the TRIPS system. 
Consequently, the following section will introduce the concept and existing 
theories of compliance, which will be key to my analysis of China's conformity with 
TRIPS obligations. The third section will outline the specifIc comprehensive model of 
compliance that will be applied in this study and the chapter will conclude with an 
overview of previous studies of compliance in China. 
2.2 Key Concepts 
TRIPS is clearly not the fIrst external legal system that China has been 
pressurised to comply with, as can be seen from the summary of the development of 
intellectual property in China in the previous chapter. As a result, China has often 
adopted and adapted foreign laws during various stages of legal reform. In fact, the 
attitude to foreign law in China has been consistently utilitarian and despite ideological 
differences, an instrumentalist approach to law has been taken at the various stages of law 
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relorm m rna. These stages of law reform as outlined in the introduction above 
include: the late Qing efforts at law reform aimed at ending extraterritoriality; the early 
Republican period after 1911; attempts at modernization under the Kuomintang (KMT) 
Nationalist government particularly after 1927; following the victory of the Communists 
in 1949, there was a further reception of foreign law, in this case, the Socialist law of the 
Soviet Union; and finally, the post-Mao era of law reform, heavily influenced by 
international organisations and pressure from key trading partners, as well as the primary 
goal of economic development. Thus, reform-era legal reforms could actually be seen as 
the culmination of a century's long process of the adaptation of western laws to China.75 
Furthermore, the latest round of Chinese legal reforms taken in response to WTO 
accession could be seen as a further recent stage of legal development. 
However, it is important to remember that the adoption or transplant of a foreign 
law is rarely a straightforward matter as, "to make the 'imported' legal institution work, 
one also needs a compatible political and economic environment as well as trained 
personnel." Thus, using Western institutions and theories out of context, "can bring 
about more theoretical problems and practical difficulties than it solves.,,76 This is 
certainly true in the case of the adoption of international intellectual property laws such 
as those embodied in the TRIPS Agreement; without the necessary theoretical 
foundations and trained personnel to operate the law, the imported intellectual property 
laws may fail to operate effectively. 
74 Chen, "Coming Full-Circle: Law-Making in the PRC from a Historical Perspective", 39, 31. 
75 Anthony Dicks, "Reforms in the Balance", The China Quarterly, 119: 559 and fu, 96. 
76 Chen, "Coming Full-Circle: Law-Making in the PRC from a Historical Perspective", 39, 
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The General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC passed in 1986 are a good 
example of the adoption of foreign legal codes into the Chinese legal system, as the 
General Principles are modelled on the German Civil Code. This ''was the model chosen 
for the modernization of the Chinese legal system some 80 years ago, and indeed, 
virtually the whole technical and conceptual language of Chinese law is translated from 
European laws.,,77 This Chinese preference for the Continental model possibly received 
via Japan, rather than the Anglo-American legal tradition may even contribute to 
American hostility toward the Chinese implementation of the intellectual property system; 
Americans may feel some unfamiliarity with or distaste for essentially Continental legal 
concepts and values. 
Therefore, it IS clear that China, like many other countries undertaking a 
comprehensive program of law reform and modernisation, has relied on existing laws in 
other countries as models for reform. However, these 'legal transplants' can be 
problematic and raise issues about the effectiveness and appropriateness of adopting 
foreign laws to the Chinese context. The 'borrowing' of foreign laws can raise issues of 
how to achieve legal legitimation, which occurs when the law operates without the need 
for coercion; and legal transplants, whereby norms of imported law may conflict with the 
pre-existing system in the recipient country.78 Selective adaptation of laws to implement 
and enforce may also be a key factor in a country's legal development. These key 
concepts of legal development will now be considered. 
77 Dicks "Reforms in the Balance", 560. 
78 Carte;, Fighting Fakes in China: The Legal Protection of Trade Marks and Brands in the People's 
Republic of China, 35. 
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2.2.1 Legal Transplants 
There has long been debate about the success of cross-cultural legal transplants in 
the legal literature. Optimists such as Watson hold that, "successful borrowing could be 
made from a very different legal system, even from one at a much higher level of 
development and of a different political complexion.,,79 From this perspective, it is 
proposed that law reformers should look for an idea in the foreign system which could 
then be transplanted into their own country, without any need for knowledge of the 
foreign law's political or social context. Watson uses the example of the adoption of 
Roman law by much of Europe to illustrate this successful process of legal 
transplantation and claims that where the Roman legal rule was inimical to the adopting 
state, its chances of being borrowed were greatly diminished, but not where the rule was 
simply different from the existing circumstances. 
Although he concedes that "a foreign legal rule will not easily be borrowed 
successfully if it does not fit into the domestic political context," he maintains that 
foreign legal rules can be transplanted successfully to countries with very different 
traditions, such as the adoption of French and German law to Japan in the late nineteenth 
century.80 Consequently, Watson would propose that China should be able to transplant 
foreign laws successfully, even if they are originally intended for different political 
systems or levels of economic development. 
On the other hand, Kahn-Freund raises senous concerns about the use of 
comparative law as a fundamental tool of law reform. 81 He looks back to the works of 
79 Alan Watson, "Legal Transplants and Law Reform", The Law Quarterly Review, 92: 79. 
80 Ibid. 81-82. 
81 Otto Kahn-Freood, "On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law", The Modern Law Review, 37 (1), 
(January 1974), 1. 
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Montesquieu who first considered the issue of legal transplantation and who claimed that 
only in the most exceptional cases could institutions of one country serve another. 
Furthermore, Montesquieu claimed that environmental, social and economic, and cultural 
factors; and purely political elements determined whether a law could be successfully 
transplanted. 82 
Kahn-Freund submits that countries have gone through a process of economic, 
social and cultural assimilation since Montesquieu's writing, but accompanied by a 
process of political differentiation. Therefore, according to Kahn-Freund, political 
factors become the most important when considering legal transplantation83 and political 
factors could act as obstacles to transplantation in three ways. First, the gulf between the 
communist and non-communist world and between dictatorships and democracies in the 
capitalist world; next, the evolution of variations on the democratic theme (e.g. 
presidential style or parliamentary type); and [mally, the role played by organised 
interests in the making and the maintenance of legal institutions such as business 
. . 84 
orgamsattons. 
Applying these political factors to China, it is clear that China did differ 
significantly from the countries from which the new laws were adopted and from the 
Western legal systems on which the TRIPS Agreement was based. Not only did China's 
style of government differ in many cases (for example, where China used laws from 
Continental Europe), but even when China borrowed from the Soviet Union, another 
Communist country, China was at a different stage of economic development. Therefore, 
82 Ibid. 6-7. 
83 Ibid. 8. 
84 Ibid. 11-12. 
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under Kahn-Freund's argument, these differences have made legal transplants into China 
problematic and indeed, would continue to make compliance with the TRIPS Agreement 
difficult. The issue of legal transplantation is certainly worthy of consideration as an 
issue affecting China's current TRIPS compliance. 
2.2.2 Legal Legitimation 
Legal legitimation is the second concept which is relevant to China's legal 
reforms through adoption of foreign laws. It is undeniable that "[t]he legitimacy of legal 
rules is, however, indirect or contingent in that it derives from the legitimacy of the 
political authority that promulgates or enforces the law.,,85 Haley uses the example of the 
adoption of western legal norms into Japan in the nineteenth century to show how foreign 
laws may be transplanted into another country and how legitimacy affected the 
transplantation's success; 
"The legitimacy of the new legal rules created by those in authority enabled 
dramatic social change despite conflict with pre-existing customary and legal 
norms. This is not to say that the new Western norms were in all instances 
overriding. However. .. in nearly all cases the failure of a new derivative 
norm to supplant a conflicting customary norm was a consequence of the 
enforcement process- such as judicial recognition of the customary norm as 
pre-eminent or a failure to enforce the new norm altogether. ,,86 
This so-called 'contingent legitimacy' is an important concept as it means that 
China's lack of intellectual property enforcement may derive from a lack of legitimacy in 
the Chinese government rather than a lack of legitimacy in the laws themselves. In this 
case, it may be necessary to move beyond Watson and Kahn-Freund's debates about the 
effectiveness of legal transplants in terms of the substantive law and look toward the 
85 John Owen. Haley, Authority without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991): 6. 
86 Ibid. 
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enforcement of the transplanted law to fully understand the complete process of 
transp lantation. 
Treating lawmaking and enforcement as two separate components, "we are able to 
explain both the fundamental dynamics of legal rules and the pivotal factors that 
determine the role and limits of law in a given society. ,,87 This separation of lawmaking 
and enforcement is also a feature of theories of compliance discussed below which 
clearly differentiate between implementation of the new law into domestic legislation and 
full compliance and is thus an important distinction in the analysis of China's TRIPS 
compliance. 
2.2.3 Selective Adaptation 
Selective adaptation is the third and fmal concept of legal development which 
may be relevant to the study of China's implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and is 
"a process by which foreign ideas are received and assimilated into local conditions. ,,88 
Selective adaptation can be seen as a useful strategy which countries can use to comply 
with international norms, whilst balancing existing local legal norms and there is 
evidence of its previous use. Early in the twentieth century, powerful international 
players pressurised developing countries to adopt their legal standards, including 
intellectual property protection. 
Japan is seen as an example of how 'selective adaptation' of Western laws was 
used to seek acceptance as an equal trading partner. As trading partners were satisfied 
with changes to the written laws, "[t]his gave Asian governments meanwhile the time to 
87 Ibid. 9. 
88 Pitman B. Potter, "Globalization and Economic Regulation in China: Selective Adaptation of Globalized 
Norms and Practices", Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 2: 119. 
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select and to focus on those among the new laws that they regarded as useful for their 
purpose of nation building and modernisation of the economy. Those laws would be 
enforced whereas others simply remained on the books.,,89 Thus, selective adaptation at a 
national level was seen as a useful strategy in fulfilling international commitments, whilst 
retaining the flexibility in implementation to fulfil national policies. 
However, in the [mal decades of the twentieth century, it became clear that "the 
industrialised nations were by now aware of the policy of selective adaptation. No longer 
were they satisfied with their fetish of written legislation. ,,90 In other words, there was a 
growing awareness of the use of selective adaptation by developing countries to appease 
international pressure without fully complying with global norms; indeed, it is clear that 
the recent focus on enforcement of domestic laws is the result of this awareness. 
However, there is a certain amount of anecdotal evidence that selective adaptation 
policies are still used in the intellectual property context in Asia. For example, countries 
such as Indonesia and Vietnam use very generally worded legislation supplemented by 
implementing decrees to allow the specific law in force to be changed according to 
changes in policy.91 Therefore, it is interesting to consider the extent to which China can 
still employ the strategy of selective adaptation in the context of compliance with the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
89 Christoph Antons, "Harmonisation and Selective Adaptation in Intellectual Property Policies in Asia", 
Antons, Blakeney and Heath, Intellectual Property Hannonisation within ASEAN and APEC, (The Hague, 
The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2004): 112. 
90 Ibid. 113. 
91 Ibid. 114. 
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2.2.4 Compliance 
Although the key concepts of legal transplants, legal legitimation and selective 
adaptation are all useful to analysis of China's compliance with the TRlPS Agreement, 
none of these concepts is complete enough to be able to use in isolation. Therefore, a 
broader concept is necessary to be able to fully evaluate China's interactions with the 
international IP system, as represented by the TRlPS Agreement. This may be provided 
by the concept of compliance. 
'Compliance' is a key term which has its ongms m international law. 92 
Compliance and law are "conceptually linked because law explicitly aims to produce 
compliance with its rules: legal rules set the standard by which compliance is gauged.,,93 
However, the concept of compliance has been increasingly used by political scientists 
since the 1980s. Compliance is desirable not only to tackle the problem that the rule was 
created for in the fIrst place, but also "both to protect the rule and to protect the entire 
system ofrules.,,94 In other words: 
"The rule of law requires compliance in order for law to be effective and 
makes compliance a matter of general international concern. Although any 
given state may be unaffected by non-compliance with a particular norm, all 
states are concerned to uphold the rule of law to ensure they are not affected 
by non-compliance in the future.,,95 
Thus, China's compliance with the TRlPS Agreement is sought-after not only to 
contend with the problem of intellectual property infringements, but also to protect the 
92 Gerald Chan, China's Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection, 
Human Rights, (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2006): 4. 
93 Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law, International Relations and Compliance", 
Carlnaes, Risse and Simmons, Handbook of International Relations, (London: SAGE Publications, 2002): 
538. 
94 Roger Fisher, Improving Compliance with International Law, (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1981): 21. 
95 Dinah Shelton, "Introduction: Law, Non-Law and the Problem of 'Soft Law"', Shelton, Commitment and 
Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000): 9. 
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TRIPS Agreement itself and the entire WTO system. As a result, China's compliance 
with the TRIPS Agreement is worthy of study for various reasons, not only to analyse the 
development of China's intellectual property system, but also to judge the effectiveness 
of imposing international IP standards through the framework of the WTO. 
However, operationalising compliance as a variable is problematic. It is clear that 
"one cannot simply read domestic legislation to determine whether countries are 
complying.,,96 These substantive measures that the state takes in order to make the 
specific international accords applicable to domestic law are more often referred to under 
the concept of implementation. However, it is clear that compliance goes beyond mere 
implementation of international commitments into domestic law; compliance "refers to 
whether countries in fact adhere to the provisions of the accord and to the implementing 
measures that they have instituted.,,97 Compliance also needs to be differentiated from 
effectiveness, which is related to compliance but is not identical. Effectiveness can be 
seen from two perspectives, both in achieving the stated objectives of the treaty and in 
addressing the problems that led to the treaty. Effectiveness may be achieved without 
compliance and equally, compliance might be fully achieved without effectiveness. 
Furthermore, compliance is difficult to assess even with a clear definition of the concept. 
This is because it is clear that perfect compliance never occurs; 
"In reality, there is a level of acceptable practical compliance in the light of 
regime norms and procedures. Moreover, this acceptable level is subject to 
96 Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, "A Framework for Analysis", Brown Weiss and Jacobson, 
Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998): 2. 
97 Ibid. 4. 
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change across case studies, time and occasions. This level actually achieved 
by states is also subject to variation. ,,98 
Therefore, despite an abstract concept of full and complete compliance, 
something less than this is usually accepted in most international accords. Even within a 
specific international accord, there may not be a fixed judgment of what level of 
compliance is acceptable. "Consequently, what is compliance to some may not be 
regarded as such by others. Seen in this light, the nature of compliance and the standards 
for measuring compliance are by and large relative rather than absolute.,,99 These 
variations in the standard of acceptable compliance have implications for the study of 
China's compliance with its TRIPS obligations as, "in the end, assessing the extent of 
compliance is a matter of judgment. ,,100 However, despite these difficulties in objectively 
analysing compliance, it is still an important aim. 
2.3 Theories of Compliance 
As stated above, the question of compliance with international commitments has 
given rise to various theories of compliance in the past few decades. The main question 
behind these various theories, which have appeared in both international relations and 
international law literature in recent years, is simply: why do states comply with their 
international obligations? Clearly, "in general states are induced to do so because, in 
their overall strategic assessment, positive outcomes resulting from compliance outweigh 
98 Ann Kent, China, the United Nations and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania, 1999): 232. ., 
99 Chan, China's Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental ProtectlOn, Human 
Rights, 66. 
100 Jacobson and Brown Weiss, "A Framework for Analysis", 4. 
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t' ,,101 H h' 
nega lve ones. owever, t ere IS no clear agreement on the exact processes that lead 
to compliance, or indeed that make compliance more likely. 
Louis Henkin, in one of the earliest attempts to consider the issue of compliance, 
famously stated that "[it]t is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the 
t · ,,102 H h I I h' [me. owever, e was ess c ear on w y natIOns comply and offered a "remarkably 
rich" list of factors to explain state compliance. 103 Henkin's model of compliance seems 
to revolve around a simple cost-benefit analysis, whereby violation would offer more 
advantage than compliance, although he does acknowledge, "[t]hat nations act on the 
basis of cost and advantage may seem obvious, but the notions of cost and advantage are 
not simple and their calculation hardly precise.,,104 
This straightforward cost-benefit analysis approach is also taken by neorealist 
compliance theorists such as Neuhold, whose analysis of state behaviour focused on 
strategic incentives at both international and domestic levels. Neuhold proposed that 
decision makers focus on three variables when deciding whether to comply: the 
magnitude and consequences of possible sanctions; the probability of the sanctions being 
imposed; and the likelihood of their non-compliance being detected. 105 However, 
neorealist theories such as N euho ld' s work best where nation-states remain the main 
players in global politics and in many areas of international law, this is no longer the case. 
101 Chan., China's Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection, Human 
Rights, 66. 
102 Emphasis in original, Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1979): 47. 
103 Raustiala and Slaughter, "International Law, International Relations and Compliance", 540. 
104 Henkin How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, 50. 
105 H a n s p e ~ e r r Neuhold, "The Foreign Policy 'Cost-Benefit Analysis' Revisited", German Yearbook of 
International Law, 42 (1999), 88. 
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Certainly in the case of IP rights, companies and individual rights holders may have a 
significant role to play in ensuring compliance with international commitments. 
Challengers to cost-benefit based theory have arguably proposed more precise 
models of a state's compliance. For example, Franck offered a detailed theory of 
compliance based on legitimacy and fairness, both substantive and procedural. 106 In this 
theory of compliance, legitimacy is the key factor; "the legitimacy of rules exerts a 
'compliance pull' on governments that explains the high observed levels of compliance 
of international law.,,107 However, although legitimacy is clearly an important factor in 
compliance, Franck's theory of compliance based on the legitimacy of the rules has been 
criticised as circular; that the rules are complied with because they are legitimate, but 
they derive their legitimacy from nations complying with them. Franck's theory has also 
been criticised as it "fails to explain why 'legitimacy' leads to compliance, why these 
factors are important, how they interact with other measures of a nation's self-interest, 
and why states violate laws with which they had previously complied."lo8 Thus, although 
the issue of the perceived legitimacy of the rules, in this case of the TRIPS Agreement, 
may playa crucial role in compliance, ultimately Franck's theory does not go far enough 
to satisfactorily explain compliance with international law and other factors may also 
need to be included. 
In recent decades, other theorists have attempted to bridge the divide between 
compliance theory in international relations and in international law, a case in point being 
106 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995). . . "" 
107 Raustiala and Slaughter, "International Law, InternatIOnal RelatIOns and ComplIance, 541. 
108 Andrew T. Guzman, "A Compliance-Based Theory ofInternational Law", California Law Revie"H", 90 
(6), 1835. 
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the managerial theory of compliance presented by Chayes and Chayes, which "rejected 
sanctions and other 'hard' forms of enforcement in favour of collective management of 
(non)-performance." 109 Chayes and Chayes sought to offer an alternative to 
'enforcement' models of compliance based on the possibility of sanctions. They contend 
that the reasons states do not fully comply are either ambiguity in the treaty language; 
limitations in capacity to carry out their undertakings; or "the temporal dimension of the 
social, economic, and political changes contemplated by regulatory treaties." 110 
Therefore, "if we are correct that the principal source of non-compliance is not wilful 
disobedience but the lack of capability or clarity or priority, then coercive enforcement is 
as misguided as it is costly.,,111 Chayes and Chayes thus provide a powerful challenge to 
enforcement models of compliance based on realist theory that states make an active 
choice to comply or not based on an assessment of the associated costs and benefits, by 
shifting the emphasis of compliance to a state's capacity to comply. However, the 
Chayes and Chayes approach has also been criticised as being incomplete: 
"The managerial modeL .. is a useful but incomplete model of compliance. 
As long as one is only interested in coordination games, it provides a good 
guide to compliance and national behaviour. If one seeks to understand 
situations where states make agreements that call upon them to act against 
their own interests in exchange for concessions from other states, a different 
d I . d d ,,112 mo e IS nee e . 
109 Raustiala and Slaughter, "International Law, International Relations and Compliance", 543. . 
110 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Soverei?nty.: Compliance with Internatlonal 
Regulatory Agreements, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Umverslty Press, 1995): 10. 
111 Ibid. 22. 
112 Guzman, "A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law", 1832-1833. 
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Furthermore, Chayes and Chayes give the impression that there is a stark choice 
between the enforcement model and their own managerial model, whereas in fact, they 
may complement each other. 1 13 
In the 1990s, dissatisfaction with existing theories and "the rise of constructivist 
theory dovetailed with work by legal scholars long interested in the normative basis of 
compliance.,,1l4 An example of this more normative approach can be seen in Koh's 
theory of 'obedience' with international law. Koh claimed that, "obedience is 
compliance motivated not by anticipation of enforcement but via the incorporation of 
rules and norms into domestic legal systems." 115 This obedience theory has three 
sequential components, interaction, interpretation and internalization. According to 
Koh's model, public and private actors fIrst interact in a variety of fora to create the legal 
rule; these actors then interpret the rule and fmally, through interaction, internalize the 
rule: 
"It is through this repeated process of interaction and internalization that 
international law acquires its 'stickiness', that nation-states acquire their 
identity, and that nations defme promoting the rule of international law as 
f h . . I If· ,,116 part 0 t err natlOna se -mterest. 
However, Koh provides no explanation of how these legal norms are eventually 
internalised and "without an understanding of why domestic actors internalize norms of 
compliance in the international arena, and a theory of why this internalization tends 
towards compliance, the theory lacks force.,,117 In other words, it may be true that 
113 Marcus Bergsteller, Theories of Compliance with International Law, (Lei den, The Netherlands: 
Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 2005): 145. . ' " 
114 Raustiala and Slaughter, "International Law, International RelatIOns and ComplIance , 544. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Harold Hongju Koh, "Transnational Legal Process (The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture)", Nebraska Law 
Review, 75 (1996), 204. ." 
117 Guzman, "A Compliance-Based Theory ofInternatIOnal Law, 1836. 
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international legal norms need to be internalised as a pre-condition for full compliance, 
but Koh does not offer a clear explanation of this process of intern ali sat ion. 
Another competing theory of compliance which emerged in the late 1990s was 
proposed by Andrew Guzman. Guzman's theory of compliance relies on reputational 
factors to explain a state's compliance and instances of violation. In his model, when a 
state considers whether or not to comply with an international obligation, the possible 
sanctions it would face are paramount. These sanctions "include all costs associated with 
such a failure, including punishment or retaliation by other states, and reputational costs 
that affect a state's ability to make commitments in the future.,,118 Guzman cites several 
factors which affect the reputational impact of a violation, which include the severity of 
the violation; the reasons for the violation; the extent to which other states know of the 
violation; and the clarity of the commitment and the violation. 119 This reputational theory 
is similar to the Chayes' managerial approach in that it places reputational concerns at the 
centre of a state's compliance. However, Guzman himself recognises the limitations of 
his reputational theory in applicability to areas where the stakes are high. 
In the past few years, the scope of theories of compliance has moved beyond the 
traditional question of why states comply with international agreements. For example, 
recent theories of compliance have sought to diminish the distinction between 'hard' law, 
such as formal treaties, and 'soft' law, such as bilateral Memoranda of Understanding. 120 
There is also a growing recognition in international relations theory that states are not the 
only relevant actor in international relations. Liberal theories of compliance such as 
li8 Ibid. 1845. 
119 Ibid. 1861. 
120 Ibid. 1828. 
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those proposed by Slaughter and Moravcsik rest on a 'bottom-up' view of politics, in 
which the demands of domestic interest groups are crucial. 121 "Liberal theory begins 
with the assumption that the key actors in international relations are individuals and 
private groups, rather than states,,,122 and thus considers the dynamics of key interest 
group within each individual state. Although it is undeniably important to acknowledge 
the role of individual actors in the international arena, focusing on these interest groups 
can also lead to overly complex theories of compliance. 
Therefore, over the past few decades, there have been various theories advanced 
to explain a state's compliance or otherwise with its international obligations, but no 
single theory has yet achieved recognition as complete. There are still clear gaps in the 
theories, with some theories suiting some legal obligations better than others. 
2.3.1 Categorising Theories ojCompliance 
It is important to recognise that although compliance is a significant area of study 
in contemporary international relations and legal study as outlined in discussion of the 
key theories above, "compliance remains a relatively young field. Many core concepts 
are debated and empirical testing of compliance theories is limited.,,123 Consequently, 
this study of China's compliance with international intellectual property standards as 
embedded in the TRIPS Agreement can contribute to this ongoing development of 
compliance theory. 
Furthermore, as there is not yet any agreement over a model of compliance for 
individual states with international obligations, it is difficult to decide exactly which 
121 Bergsteller, Theories a/Compliance with I n t e r n a t i ~ n a l l Law, 1 ~ 6 6 . .
122 Guzman, "A Compliance-Based Theory o f I n t e r n a t I O ~ a l l Law , ~ 8 3 8 . . ." 
123 Raustiala and Slaughter, "International Law, InternatIOnal RelatIOns and Compbance , 548. 
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model of compliance should be applied in this study. Before outlining the model of 
compliance which has been selected for use in this study, the competing theories of 
compliance will be considered under various categories in order to further distinguish 
their particular features. 
It is clear that the study and theory of compliance has a relatively long and 
chequered history in both international law and international relations literature and that 
there is no clear agreement on why a state complies or not with its obligations. There are 
also clear differences between these theories based on the approach they have taken to 
compliance. Compliance theories have been clustered into six broad conceptual 
categories and it is useful to explore these categories in the context of China's 
compliance with international intellectual property standards. 124 
The ftrst category of compliance theories considers the problem structure. In the 
case of intellectual property, it is both a large problem and pervasive in all developing 
countries at a similar stage of economic development. The problem is further 
complicated because infringing behaviour is often hidden. The second category of 
compliance theory is that of solution structure, which focuses on the speciftc institutional 
design or framework of the agreement. In the case of the TRIPS Agreement, it is 
consequently important to consider whether the framework of the institutional structure 
of the TRIPS Agreement itselfraises or lowers the cost of compliance. 
The third category of compliance theory is that of solution process, which 
includes the methods and processes by which the institution operates. In other words, the 
rules themselves must be seen as inclusive, fair and legitimate to encourage compliance; 
124 Categorization taken from: Ibid. 545-548. 
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the TRIPS Agreement must be seen as fair by China and other Members for full 
compliance to follow. This echoes the approach taken by Franck. 
The fourth category of compliance theory is norms. Through a process of 
socialization, new norms may be adopted by the country leading to changes in behaviour. 
Thus, it is important to not only consider the pre-existing legal and cultural norms in 
China, but also the norms associated with the TRIPS Agreement and the congruence 
between them. The fifth category is that of domestic linkages or "structural links 
between international institutions and domestic actors. ,,125 Some theories have taken this 
category a stage further by proposing a general relationship between the type of domestic 
regime and its inclination to comply with international commitments. Under this general 
relationship, 'liberal' states are more likely to comply and under the definition often used, 
China is not a liberal state. These criteria include a government based on representative 
democracy, a market economy based on private property rights and a constitution which 
protects basic civil and political rights. China certainly does not meet the criteria for a 
representative democratic government and it is debatable to what extent the economy and 
constitution would meet these 'liberal' state standards. Thus, this type of compliance 
theory would hold that China is automatically less likely to comply given the nature of 
the Chinese state as non-liberal. 
The final group of compliance theory is based on international structure. This 
considers the institutionalisation of the international system and suggests that "highly 
institutionalised systems may create positive spirals of compliance by embedding states 
125 Ibid. 546. 
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in regularized processes of cooperation that are mutually reinforcing.,,126 This kind of 
compliance theory would focus on the WTO as an international trading system and ask 
how the WTO institutions such as the dispute resolution body encourage compliance. 
The significance of these categories is that these categories need to be included in 
order to broaden existing discussions of compliance in a Chinese context. Moreover, as 
an emerging field, it is also crucial not to discount important influences on China's 
TRIPS compliance. Therefore, this study will seek to incorporate elements of all these 
different categories of compliance theory in a comprehensive model of compliance as 
outlined in the following section. 
2.4 Towards a Comprehensive Model of Compliance 
The theories of compliance related above attempt to explain a country's 
compliance with international accords in general terms. It is clear from these various 
theories that "many factors may affect a country's implementation of compliance with 
international accords," including the characteristics of the activity involved, the 
characteristics of the accord to be complied with, the international environment (i.e. are 
other countries complying?) and factors involving the country itself.l27 It is crucial to 
apply the rather abstract theories of compliance gathered above to a more detailed model 
of specific factors which affect compliance. In the past few years, several attempts have 
been made to conceive an overall model of compliance within the areas of environmental, 
human rights, or arms control agreements. 
126 Ibid. 548. 
127 Jacobson and Brown Weiss, "A Framework for Analysis", 6-7. 
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These factors can be combined into a comprehensive model of factors which 
affect implementation, compliance and effectiveness of international accords (as 
shown above in Figure 2_1 128). This model of specific factors initially developed to 
explain a state's (non-)compliance with environmental accords will be applied to the 
context of international intellectual property protection under the TRIPS Agreement 
in this study. The factors affecting compliance can thus be divided into country 
specific and non-country specific factors. The non-country specific factors relate to 
the specific activity involved, namely intellectual property infringements; the 
characteristics of the TRIPS Agreement, including the substantive and procedural 
provisions; and the international environment, including the number of countries 
already in compliance with TRIPS, international NGOs concerned with IP protection 
and coverage of IP issues in the media. 
In terms of the characteristics of the activity involved, it is believed that the 
smaller number of actors involved in the activity, then the easier it is to regulate it. 
Furthermore, economic incentives may act towards compliance and the presence of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) may contribute towards compliance as they are 
easier to influence than smaller less-visible firms. Finally, the activity is more likely 
to be easily regulated if it is concentrated in a few major countries. 129 The specific 
activity involved in the TRIPS Agreement is intellectual property infringements and 
this activity may well be particularly problematic in ensuring compliance, as 
discussed below at page 130. 
128 Source: Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, "Assessing the Record and Designing. 
Strategies to Engage Countries", Brown Weiss and Jacobson, E ~ g a g i n g g Countries: Strengthemng 
Compliance with International Environmental Accords, (Cambndge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
1998): 535. 
129 Ibid. 522. 
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Turning to the characteristics of the accord, the eight characteristics identified 
as possibly affecting implementation of that accord can be divided into substantive 
provisions and procedural provisions of the accord. 130 The accord under 
consideration in the international IP arena is the TRIPS Agreement and thus, the 
substantive provisions to consider include the perceived equity of the obligations and 
the precision of the obligations. The procedural provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 
include the role of the secretariat (the Council for TRIPS) and monitoring provisions. 
The TRIPS Agreement does contain several relevant substantive and procedural 
provisions that may affect WTO Members' compliance and these will be considered 
in more detail below at page 115. 
The final aspect of non-country specific factors to consider is the international 
environment which can also play a role in strengthening compliance with an 
international agreement. In fact, the greater media pressure and increased public 
awareness in the environmental field "may well have been the most important factor 
explaining the acceleration in the secular trend toward improved implementation and 
compliance that we observed in the late 1980s and early 1990s.,,131 Consequently, it 
is also important to consider the presence of international NGOs concerned with 
intellectual property and media pressure in this field, as well as the number of WTO 
Members already complying with TRIPS obligations. The international environment 
is considered below in chapter 4 at page 135. 
Turning to the specific context of compliance ill China, specific factors 
involving the country are some of the most important factors determining a country's 
compliance with its international obligations. These factors may be divided into 
parameters, fundamental factors and proximate factors. Parameters comprise essential 
130 Ibid. 528. 
13l Ibid. 528-529. 
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characteristics of the country which may affect its tendency to comply. The relevance 
of the history and culture ofa country cannot be denied. For example, "Japan found it 
easy to comply with the obligations of the World Heritage Convention because it had 
traditionally cherished its cultural and natural sites; protection of them was deeply 
embedded in Japanese culture." 132 In contrast, China has struggled to preserve 
historical sites. Other parameters to consider include the physical size and variation 
of the country, the number of neighbours and the country's previous behaviour in this 
field which are all considered below in chapter 5 at page 141. 
The second category of China-specific influences to consider is fundamental 
factors. In general, fundamental factors affecting a country's compliance include 
political and institutional factors, as well as economic considerations. Economic 
factors seem to be indirectly relevant and the level of government ownership of 
production seems to be particularly important as, "governments seem to be better at 
regulating the activities of nongovernmental entities than they are at regulating 
activities under their own control. ,,133 Thus, economic factors may affect compliance 
more in countries where the government and government ownership playa more 
important role in the economy. 
In terms of political and institutional factors, there is mixed evidence about the 
difference that a democratic government can make to a country's likelihood of 
complying with international agreements. It has been proposed that democratic 
governments are more likely to comply based on their greater transparency and 
greater responsiveness to public pressure or pressure from NGOs, but the idea that 
non-democratic governments do not comply with their international obligations has 
132 Ibid. 530. 
133 Ibid. 532. 
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also been challenged. Both economIC and political fundamental factors will be 
considered below at page 156. 
The final category of country-specific factors which may influence China's 
TRIPS compliance are proximate factors. These may include administrative capacity, 
the attitude of the leadership and the influence of NGOs. It is undeniable that, "a 
crucial factor contributing to the variance among the performance of countries is 
administrative capacity," 134 which includes funding for administrative agencies, 
powers assigned to these agencies and having sufficient numbers of trained personnel. 
Proximate factors such as administrative capacity will be discussed in chapter 5 at 
page 175. 
In addition to consideration of both non-country specific and country specific 
factors, this comprehensive model of compliance represented in Figure 2-1 also 
distinguishes between implementation of the specific obligations, compliance, both 
substantive and procedural, and effectiveness of the resultant system. This distinction 
may be particularly pertinent to China's TRIPS compliance as China's 
implementation of TRIPS obligations is widely praised, yet compliance is sometimes 
doubted and the effectiveness of the current IP system is certainly criticised on a 
frequent basis. As a result, implementation, compliance and effectiveness will be 
detailed further in chapter 6. 
Overall, the model above suggests which factors may be important in affecting 
a country's compliance with international agreements, but does not describe how the 
dynamic process of change in a country's compliance may occur. Changes within 
countries can be explained within two dimensions, the intention to comply and 
capacity to comply. Factors endogenous to the country concerned are important, such 
134 Ibid. 
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as changes in the government or major changes in the domestic economy. Exogenous 
factors such as fmancial and technical assistance can also playa role. However, 
intention to comply is meaningless without the capacity to comply. Therefore, 
"external pressure may contribute to a country's resolve to comply, but its role is 
limited.,,135 In the end, "[t]he level of a country's compliance ... depends crucially on 
the leaders and citizens of the country understanding that it is in their self-interest to 
comply, and then acting on this belief,,136 It is also important to recognise that even 
if less than full compliance is confrrmed, there is no straightforward explanation for 
this lack of compliance. "A lack of reach of the law could be a sign of government 
impotence, a reservation of government discretion, or a way for the government to 
conserve its resources, or any or all of these." 137 Therefore, the dynamic processes of 
change will be considered in chapter 7 when this comprehensive model of compliance 
will be revisited and modified for the specific context of China's TRIPS compliance. 
This comprehensive model of compliance has striking similarities to the 
conclusions of other recent studies of compliance. For example, a recent major study 
of factors which may influence compliance with non-binding, or so-called 'soft' 
norms, in the international legal system examined the role of four commonly cited 
factors: the institutional setting, regional differences, the type of obligation involved; 
and the generality and specificity of the obligations. 138 This study concluded that "the 
circumstances that led to the negotiation of a non-binding obligation affect 
1· " 139 comp lance. Furthermore, regional consensus about the norm increased the 
likelihood of compliance, whereas costs associated with compliance, either economic 
135 Ibid. 540. 
136 Ibid. 541. . . 
137 Tahirah V. Lee, Law, the State, and Society in China, (New York: Garland PublIshmg Inc., 1997), 
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139 Edith Brown Weiss, "Conclusions: Understanding ComplIance With Soft Law, 536. 
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or in terms of lack of capacity, made compliance less likely. Overall, "compliance 
with both hard and soft law is affected by two important factors ... These are the intent 
of a state (or non-state actor) to comply; and the state's (or non-state actor's) capacity 
to comply.,,140 
This study of compliance with soft law norms concurs with Jacobson and 
Brown Weiss' model of compliance that there are various specific factors which 
affect compliance. The regional differences/consensus factor highlighted by Shelton 
et at equates to the international environment category of factor in Jacobson and 
Brown Weiss' model. In addition, the institutional setting, type of obligation 
involved and the generality or specificity of the obligation are all related to the 
category of the characteristics of the accord. Finally, the emphasis in Shelton et aI's 
conclusion on the capacity of the state to comply falls under the category of the 
factors involving the country. Therefore, it appears that the comprehensive model of 
factors which affect compliance as proposed by Jacobson and Brown Weiss can also 
be applied to 'soft' law agreements and thus may be of general application. As a 
result, it seems that this model, with the categories of characteristics of the activity 
involved, characteristics of the accord, the international environment, and factors 
involving the country, could be applicable to China's compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement and will thus be the model of compliance applied in this study. 
2.5 Previous Studies of Compliance in the Chinese Context 
Detailed studies into China's compliance with international commitments are 
limited, but are beginning to emerge in various areas of international law, not only 
140 Ibid. 550-1. 
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intellectual property. Existing studies of China's compliance have focused mainly on 
the areas of arms control, trade, environmental protection and human rights. 
2.5.1 Early Studies of China's Compliance 
One of the earliest studies of compliance in China is an early study of China's 
compliance with international treaty agreements from the 1960s which found that 
overall, "with respect to trade agreements, except for difficulties in connection with 
the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the PRC has enjoyed an 
excellent reputation for meeting its obligations.,,141 Due to China's lack of diplomatic 
recognition at this time, trade agreements were concluded at the Associationallevel, 
for example, between the Canadian Wheat Board and the China Resources 
Corporation regarding grain imports and exports. China's compliance with these 
early trade agreements could be seen as an indication of the PRC' s willingness to 
comply with its obligations on the global stage and indeed the approach taken by 
Beijing to international agreements at that time mirrors the experience of China's 
accession to the WTO. 
In Lee's study, he concluded that, "the consensus appears to be that, while 
negotiation with Peking is not always an easy matter, once an unambiguous 
agreement is reached, compliance likely will follow." 142 Applying this finding to 
China's compliance with WTO obligations, it must not be forgotten that China 
actively negotiated the trade agreements of the 1960s and furthermore, these 
agreements were bilateral. Conversely, China's commitment to the WTO, specifically 
in the field of intellectual property protection was based on a multilateral agreement 
(the TRIPS Agreement), the terms of which had already been fully negotiated prior to 
141 Lee China and International Agreements: A Study a/Compliance, 119. 
, 
142 Ibid. 
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China's entry. It is conceivable that China's problems in fully complying with the 
TRIPS Agreement were created by the nature of China's accession to the WTO 
Agreements on a 'take it or leave it' basis. 
Therefore, the main findings of this early study of China's compliance with 
international obligations may still be applicable to contemporary China, although the 
political and institutional framework of acceding to international agreements in China 
today is very different. 
2.5.2 China's Compliance with Environmental Agreements 
China's pattern of entry to and implementation of to international accords has 
also been studied in the context of environmental agreements. Oksenberg & 
Economy found that China acceded to international accords only after careful 
consideration of the costs, benefits and responsibilities involved. 143 This corresponds 
with the impression given from the historical research on China's compliance with 
international agreements discussed above, that China takes a long time to commit to 
an international accord, but once China has committed, then compliance should 
follow as China has already weighed up the costs and benefits of the agreement. 
This study of China's implementation of and compliance with environmental 
accords also found several factors which determine the success of implementation. 
These range from the status of the implementing agency and the level of support from 
high-level political leaders, to the visible nature of the agreement and whether the 
requirements "are congruent and converge with the path China was pursuing prior to 
143 Michel Oksenberg and Elizabeth Economy, "China: Implementation under Economic Growth and 
Market Reform", Brown Weiss and Jacobson, Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with 
International Environmental Accords, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998): 356. 
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signing the agreement.,,144 However, in terms of codification of these environmental 
agreements, Oksenberg and Economy found that China was often ahead of the 
necessary timescale for commitments and the real problem lay in the enforcement of 
these domestic laws and regulations: 
'The key problem is effective implementation of existing regulations, not 
the absence of regulations. The Chinese have proved adept at drafting 
laws to implement the treaties they have signed. Often, in fact, they have 
attempted to build up a legal infrastructure based on the treaty prior to 
ratification of the treaty ... For the most part, the Chinese have developed 
a strong legal system on paper.,,145 
China's efforts to comply before accession to these accords thus mirrors the 
experience of compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, whereby China began to amend 
the relevant intellectual property laws in the late 1990s, prior to WTO accession in 
December 2001. However, Oksenberg and Economy fail to consider the 
characteristics of the specific international agreement involved. 
2.5.3 China's Compliance with Human Rights Agreements 
China's international obligations have also been studied in the context of 
interactions with the United Nations human rights system. Kent proposes five levels 
of international and domestic compliance in the context of China's compliance with 
its human rights commitments, which could also be applied to China's compliance 
with its intellectual property commitments: first, accession to (human rights) treaties; 
second, procedural compliance with reporting and other requirements; third, 
substantive compliance with requests of the (UN) body; fourth, de jure compliance-
144 Ibid. 358. 
145 Ibid. 392. 
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the implementation of international norms in domestic legislative prOVISIOns; and 
finally, de facto compliance- or compliance at the level of domestic practice. 146 
The first three levels represent international compliance and could also be 
considered as 'superficial' compliance as the norms embodied in the international 
accord are not necessarily accepted and absorbed. The frnal two levels of compliance 
in this model represent domestic compliance and could also be considered as 'deep' 
compliance, as the norms are thus internalised into domestic practice. Thus, this 
model is useful for further considering compliance which falls short of full 
compliance; problems with compliance can be identified at a specific level of 
acceptance. Kent's model also reflects the distinction in compliance theory between 
implementation, compliance and effectiveness. 
Kent concludes that China has clearly experienced organizational learning in 
an instrumental or adaptive sense. She determines that: 
"Whatever the external balance of power, China's compliance with 
international human rights norms may still be obtained when national 
interests, prompted by domestic pressures, and external pressures 
converge ... Conversely, ... when the domestic interests of the regime did 
not coincide with external pressures, or when external pressures 
perceptibly weakened, external pressures on their own were unlikely to 
d 1· 1 Ch' 'b .. k ,,147 pro uce comp lance, un ess rna s argarnrng power was wea . 
Consequently, Kent appears to concur with the Chayes and Chayes 
enforcement model of compliance that contrary to realist theory, external pressure 
alone is not enough to force compliance and also reflects elements ofKoh's normative 
theory of compliance, that internal adaptation of necessary to facilitate sustained 
changes. 
146 Kent, China, the United Nations and Human Rights: The Limits a/Compliance, 7. 
147 Ibid. 249. 
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2.5.4 China's Compliance with Arms Control Agreements 
China's arms control compliance has also been recently analysed. Frieman's 
recent study of China's compliance with international arms control agreements set up 
a framework of costs and benefits to understand how China responds to different arms 
control regimes. 148 The potential costs Frieman identified include: provision of data, 
prevention and limitation of exports, refraining from testing or use, making legal 
commitments, making verifiable commitments, submitting to inspection or other 
international verification and setting up monitoring stations. The potential benefits 
include: enhanced security, economic or fmancial gain, avoidance of censure, access 
to new technology or new information, and the ability to shape the international 
regime and gain prestige. 149 Many of these costs and benefits such as the desire to 
access the latest technology also apply to compliance with international intellectual 
property commitments. 
However, Frieman's maIn conclusion was that, "despite the absence of 
compelling tangible benefits, China has been willing to bear substantial costs. ,,150 
China has been willing to pay substantial costs for only marginal benefits because the 
international arms control regime is seen as inevitable and thus, China would rather 
playa role in shaping the future regime from the inside. This desire to be able to 
influence the system could also apply to China's implementation of the obligations 
associated with the TRIPS Agreement. 
Frieman also concluded that China will try hard to avoid international isolation; 
that China's compliance is directly related to the regime's universal acceptance; if the 
regime does not relate to China's immediate concerns, then China is reluctant to 
148 Wendy Frieman, China, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 
149 Ibid. 149. 
150 Ibid. 171. 
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comply; and finally, that China might join an existing regime, but will not take 
extraordinary measures to protect the regime. 151 Frieman's main conclusion about 
China's concern for its international reputation chimes with Guzman's reputational 
theory above. Equally, the relationship between compliance and China's policy goals 
is also emphasised by Frieman which echoes Kent's conclusion that national interests 
and external pressure need to converge for compliance to follow. 
2.5.5 China's Compliance with Intellectual Property Agreements 
Compliance theory has also been directly applied to the protection of 
intellectual property rights in China. One study which focuses more specifically on 
China's compliance with international intellectual property norms is Carter's study of 
trademark enforcement in China in the 1990s. Carter's model of trademark 
enforcement is based on "four factors, inherent in the Chinese brand of Socialist 
legality, [that] could prevent the Western-style trademark law from gaining the 
acceptance of people in the PRC," 152 and five factors inherent in Chinese culture 
which operate against the acceptance of trademark law. 153 
The four factors inherent to the Chinese legal system are: firstly, "as a rule, 
PRC laws and regulations are enacted to achieve specific, immediate policy 
objectives", but these objectives may be the appeasement of international pressure, 
rather than the effective protection of intellectual property rights; secondly, "some 
PRC laws remain secret" and this lack of transparency does not allow for widespread 
public familiarity with the law which would be the first step to acceptance of the law 
as legitimate; thirdly, "many PRC laws are intentionally vague in order that policy-
151 Ibid. 173-4. . , 
152 Carter, Fighting Fakes in China: The Legal Protection of Trade Marks and Brands In the People s 
Republic of China, 41-2. 
153 Ibid. 43-4. 
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makers and implementing officers may have flexibility in interpretation." This 
vagueness can also operate against the acceptance of the law as legitimate. The fourth 
and final characteristic of the Chinese legal system that Carter identifies is that, 
"many PRC laws are programmatic, that is, they present ideals or goals rather than 
implementation details." In other words, the lack of transparency and precision in the 
substantive law prevent effective trademark enforcement in China. It may be 
interesting to see whether this is equally applicable to other areas of the IP system. 
The five cultural factors which Carter identified as operating against the 
acceptance of intellectual property law are: firstly, "traders might think that 'copying' 
is not wrong because emulation was seen as an exercise in deference and socialisation 
in Chinese society"; secondly, there is no tradition of individual property ownership; 
thirdly, under Marxist thought, intellectual property is seen "as products of the society 
from which they emerge"; next, Chinese consumers are used to relying on brands to 
guide their choices; and [mally, guanxi and networks "override formal law-based 
obligations. ,,154 
Carter places equal emphasis on both cultural factors and systemic factors in 
the legal system as responsible for the current condition of the trademark system in 
China. According to Carter, these nine legal and cultural factors operate together to 
prevent the successful legal transplant of international standards of trademark law by 
inhibiting the legitimation of trademark protection in Chinese society. Carter's 
emphasis on factors based on China's legal system and cultural traditions appears to 
highlight the importance of factors specific to China under the Jacobson and Brown 
Weiss comprehensive model of compliance outlined above. 
154 The influence of guanxi is discussed further below at page 160. 
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It is indeed necessary to acknowledge the role of cultural values in any legal 
system. "The nature and role of law are delineated in any society within its particular 
cultural and institutional matrix.,,155 Thus, cultural factors are indeed significant in 
analysing compliance with international legal norms. Furthermore, recent analyses of 
intellectual property and its role in international relations have also focused on 
moving beyond a formalist concept of international law to a more normative approach. 
This is in line with the Rawlsian approach which "maintains that international 
relations are not solely about states, but are also about people and peoples."l56 This 
corresponds with Ryan's study of the politics of international intellectual property 
described as 'knowledge diplomacy', which agrees that "state power offers only a 
superficial explanation of the multilateral diplomacy concerning intellectual property 
rights that has been conducted in the 1980s and 1990s.,,157 
For example, "US patent and copyright business interest groups drove trade-
related intellectual property policy in the 1980s and 1990s, although the diplomacy 
was conducted on their behalf by the US executive branch.,,158 Accordingly, it is no 
longer sufficient to solely examine the law and government policy in order to analyse 
intellectual property law; it is crucial to also examine the many interest groups also 
involved in intellectual property lawmaking and enforcement. This shift of emphasis 
from the state as the sole actor in IP to other groups and individuals reflects the 
emergence of liberal theory in international relations literature which also focuses on 
the role of the individual. Thus, previous studies of China's compliance may be 
outdated if they ignore the role of actors below the level of the state. 
155 Haley, Authority without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox, : 4. " . . 
156 Discussion of Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 1999 m: Graham Mayeda, A Normative Perspective on 
Legal Harmonization: China's Accession to the WTO", U B . ~ ~.. Law Review, 3 ~ . ( 1 ) , , 86. 
157 Michael P. Ryan, Knowledge Diplomacy: Global CompetltlOn and t ~ e e PO/ztICS of I n t e l l ~ c t u a l l
Property, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998): Washmgton D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998): 3. 
158 Ibid. 8. 
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Finally, a recent study of China's compliance in global affairs by Chan 
considered China's compliance with international trade agreements such as those 
mentioned above, as well as the previously discussed areas of arms control, 
environmental protection and human rights. His overall conclusion is that, 
"It can be concluded that China's overall compliance record in global 
affairs is satisfactory to good, given the difficulties that it faces in its 
economic, social and political transitions, and given the fact that 
compliance measurement is difficult to make.,,159 
Chan further concluded that China's compliance with its global trade 
commitments is judged as 'satisfactory' overall, but highlighted intellectual property 
as an area in which China has had problems fully meeting its international obligations. 
Chan also considered the impact of different theories in China's interactions in global 
trade, including neo-realism, liberal institutionalism and social constructivism, but 
overall takes a fairly neo-realist approach to compliance, for example stating that 
"nation-states are still the main actors in international affairs".16o Considering this 
tension between commentators who hold that, at least in China's case, the state is the 
most important player, and those commentators who insist that the role of other 
interest groups is also significant, it may be interesting to consider who exactly are the 
main actors in China's developing IP system. 
In terms of research into China's intellectual property system specifically, 
there is a persistent idea that intellectual property "has always evolved in response to 
economic and political necessity.,,161 Some observers have used this idea as a basis 
159 Chan, China's Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection, 
Human Rights, 204. 
160 Ibid. 210. 
161 Assafa Endeshaw, Intellectual Property in China: The Roots of the Problem of Enforcement, 
(Singapore: Acumen Publishing, 1996): 79. 
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for explaining why China lacks effective intellectual property protection. The 
dominant theory is outlined below. 
The experience of Taiwan and Korea has been used to argue that a 
combination of external and internal pressure is truly necessary to bring about 
genuine change in IPR protection. 162 Based on the development of intellectual 
property protection elsewhere in Asia (such as Korea, Japan and Taiwan), a three-
phase model has therefore been proposed for the development of an effective IP 
regIme. These three stages are: fIrst, external trade pressure leads to legal formalities 
such as adequate laws and regulations; then, a stop-gap form of enforcement by 
government edict emerges following US pressure; fInally, IP agreements become self-
sustaining and a genuine rule of law begins to emerge due to the development of 
indigenous technologies. 163 
In China, the fITst two stages can clearly be witnessed in the US-Sino 
Agreements of the 1990s, 164 which fITst emphasised the substantive legislation on 
intellectual property and then focused on the enforcement of intellectual property. 
Therefore, if this model also applies to China; in the fmal stage of the model, 
intellectual property needs to be developed by Chinese rights holders in order to 
become self-sustaining. This theory is supported by many observers who believe that 
if Chinese private companies possessed more intellectual property, protection would 
be sought and obtained for these rights. 165 
This three-stage theory of China's development of intellectual property 
protection and moves towards global IP norms also reflects some aspects of the 
162 Warren H. Maruyama, "US-China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual Property and the Rule of 
Law in a Global Economy", Cohen, Bang and Mitchell, Chinese Intellectual Property Law and 
Practice, (London: Kluwer Law International, 1999): 167. 
163 Ibid. 207. 
164 Discussed in more detail below at page 228. 
165 Endeshaw, Intellectual Property in China: The Roots of the Problem of Enforcement, 79. 
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compliance theories outlined above. It is clear that codifying international obligations 
into domestic legislation is insufficient for full compliance. Furthermore, this model 
seems to reflect Koh's theory of transnational legal process that it is only once 
imported norms have been internalised that full compliance can be observed. Finally, 
this model is similar to the five stages of compliance identified by Kent in the context 
of compliance with human rights agreements, in that procedural compliance is 
distinguished from de jure and de facto compliance. De jure compliance could be 
seen as equating to implementation under the Jacobson and Brown Weiss model of 
compliance and de facto compliance means enforcement of these laws in practice. 
However, this theory of intellectual property development has been criticised 
as a form of 'historical determinism' that, "developing countries mount a 
deterministic development ladder, from light assembly to heavy manufacturing and on 
to high-tech products, and, having achieved this degree of industrialization, they begin 
to create, and protect IP.,,166 This reflects the criticism levelled at many compliance 
theories that they do not adequately explain the process of change. 
Furthermore, China often does not follow conventional models of 
development. For example, 
"Advocates of rule of law and neoclassical economists alike have argued 
that sustainable economic development requires rule of law and in 
particular clear and enforceable property rights. Yet at frrst blush China 
seems to have had tremendous economic growth without either, leaving 
economists political scientists, and legal scholars to puzzle over the 
, . d' k d I I . ~ ~ t' ,,167 success ofChma's economy esplte mar et an ega lmperlec IOns. 
Consequently, although strong intellectual property rights may have 
necessarily developed elsewhere in Asia in order to maintain economic growth, "an 
166 Anne Stevenson-Yang and Ken DeWoskin, "China Destroys the IP Paradigm", Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 168 (3), (March 2005). . " 
167 Randall Peerenboom, China's Long March toward Rule of Law, (Cambridge: Cambndge Umverslty 
Press, 2002): 19. 
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examination of the present situation in China indicates that this historical lesson may 
be inapplicable to China, at least for the present.,,168 Additionally, there may be key 
differences between China and other Asian countries which mean that the path of IP 
development is different. For example, Korea, Japan and Taiwan developed effective 
IP systems in response to pressure from domestic rights holders. However, as China 
is such a diverse country, whilst some innovative companies are already clamouring 
for stronger IPR, others are still promoting economic development through imitation. 
Overall, these previous studies of intellectual property in China are simplistic 
and rely on emphasising one factor such as economic development or the role of 
individual rights holders to the exclusion of all others. Clearly, this issue of trying to 
rationalize non-enforcement of intellectual property rights needs further analysis 
before a conclusive model can be agreed upon. 
2.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter fIrst outlined key concepts of legal development which have 
previously been used to discuss China's legal system and then discussed the main 
theories of compliance which have emerged from international law and international 
relations literature in recent decades. Previous studies of compliance in China, 
particularly in relation to IP commitments, were also considered. Overall, previous 
studies into China's compliance with international commitments, including research 
focusing on intellectual property protection, have tended to mostly focus on factors 
specific to China without fully considering the nature of the obligations involved. 
Equally, existing theories of compliance often focus on characteristics of the specifIc 
agreement without allowance for the individual country. 
168 Daniel Chow, "Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China", Washington University Law 
Quarterly, 78 (1), (Spring 2000): 53. 
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Therefore, this thesis will apply a comprehensive model of compliance to 
China's intellectual property protection under the TRIPS Agreement. This model will 
allow for consideration of factors both specific to China, as well as considering the 
nature of the TRIPS Agreement itself and the nature of the intellectual property 
protection problem. Firstly, the methodology used in this study will be fully 
explained and justified in chapter 3. Then, this comprehensive model of compliance 
will be applied to China's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement in three stages: 
firstly in chapter 4, the background context of the TRIPS Agreement itself will be 
examined, to evaluate if there are factors which are not specific to China which 
generally affect compliance with its provisions. Secondly in chapter 5, factors 
specific to China will be evaluated to assess their impact on China's compliance with 
the TRIPS Agreement. Thirdly in chapter 6, the post-WTO IP system in China will 
be assessed not only in terms of compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, but also the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the subsequent effectiveness of the 
system as the separation of these components is also a key feature of this compliance 
model. 
These three stages correspond to the three levels in the compliance model, 
namely general factors (comprising characteristics of the activity (intellectual property 
infringement), characteristics of the accord (the TRIPS Agreement), and the 
international environment); factors specific to China (parameters, proximate factors 
and fundamental factors); and the compliance with and implementation of the 
agreement and overall effectiveness. Once these three stages have been outlined, 
various so lutions will be offered and the model will be appraised and refmed for its 
applicability to the context of China's compliance with international intellectual 
property norms in chapter 7. 
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The fmal model of compliance should not only describe China's compliance 
with the TRIPS Agreement, but also attempt to understand any remaining non-
compliance with these international obligations. These functions are key to any 
compliance theory and will show that the proposed compliance model is not only 
descriptive of China's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, but may also be 
applied to China's compliance with other areas of international law or other countries' 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. 
68 
3 Methodology and Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
This study used a combination of research methods to address the research 
questions concerning the compliance of China's intellectual property system with the 
TRIPS Agreement outlined in the literature review chapter above. These methods 
included the use of a questionnaire as an initial contact with respondents, with follow-
up interviews taking place face-to-face, via the telephone or via email. Qualitative 
data was also gathered from key texts such as the primary legislation to further aid a 
deeper understanding of the operation of China's current intellectual property system. 
This chapter will first outline the theoretical foundations of this research 
before explaining the specific methods used in more detail. Ethical considerations as 
well as key practical issues that were faced during this research will also be 
considered. These practical issues included the issue of translation and the use of 
computer software to assist me in the data analysis process. 
3.2 The Use of Qualitative Research Methods 
Qualitative research is difficult to defme as it can include a broad range of 
theoretical standpoints and methodologies. A generic defmition of qualitative 
research is that "qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in 
the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world 
visible.,,169 The use of qualitative research methods is often perceived as providing 
'richer' data than purely quantitative methods may allow. This is because the data 
169 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonne S. Lincoln, "Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of 
Qualitative Research", Denzin and Lincoln, The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, (London: 
SAGE Publications, 2005): 3. 
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collection methods do not place the same restraints on the data collected and also, the 
range of valid data sources under consideration can be wider. 170 
There are traditionally stated to be a number of significant differences between 
qualitative and quantitative research, such as the tendency for qualitative research to 
use words, while quantitative research uses numbers; the former to focus on meaning, 
while the latter focuses on behaviour; the former to rely on the inductive logic of 
inquiry, with the latter using hypothetic-deductive method; and finally, qualitative 
research's lack of quantitative research's power to generalise. 171 However, it is clear 
that these oft-cited distinctions are too simplistic to be applied to much research 
design in practice. 
Consequently, there IS a growmg recognition that the whole 
qualitative/quantitative dichotomy is open to question, as more and more qualitative 
researchers incorporate elements of quantitative research into their research design. 
Indeed, it has been claimed that qualitative research fo llows an inherently multi-
method approach and further, that "[t]he combination of multiple methodological 
practices, empirical materials, perspectives, and observers in a single study is best 
understood, then, as a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and 
d h ., ,,172 ept to any mqurry. 
Furthermore, there IS a growmg movement advocating the use of mixed 
methods in research in order to "offset the weaknesses of both quantitative and 
qualitative research." 173 It has even been stated that the combination of quantitative 
and qualitative research methods can offer a more complete picture of a research 
170 Simeon 1. Yates, Doing Social Science Research, (London: SAGE Publications, 2004): 139. 
171 Julia Brannen, "Working Qualitatively and Quantitatively", Seale, Gobo, Gubrium and Silverman, 
Qualitative Research Practice, (London: S A ( ~ i E . ~ b l i c a t i o n s , , 2?04): 312-3: . " 
172 Denzin and Lincoln, "Introduction: The Dlsclplme and PractIce of Quahtattve Research, 5. 
173 John W. Creswell and Vicki L. Plano Clark, Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research, 
(London: SAGE Publications, 2007): 9. 
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problem "by noting trends and generalizations as well as in-depth knowledge of 
participants' perspectives." 174 
The use of multiple methods may also be particularly pertinent in this subject 
area due to particular problems associated with research into intellectual property: 
"There is no scientific method for determining the exact size of the 
counterfeiting problem and any efforts to do so can proceed only on the 
basis of partial and scattered information. Counterfeiters operate outside 
the reach of the law and public scrutiny; thus a great deal of information 
about counterfeiting is simply inaccessible and it becomes necessary to 
proceed based upon extrapolation from existing data.,,175 
Given that the IP field is opaque as infringements cannot easily be observed, 
thus multiple methods can assist in this instance. However, a formal mixed methods 
approach will not be used; rather an initial quantitative approach will be embedded 
into an overall qualitative approach. Therefore, this study of the intellectual property 
system in post-WTO China will utilise a variety of methods in order to gain breadth 
and complexity, but without abandoning the richness and depth of solely qualitative 
methodo 10 gies. 
Previous studies of the legal system in China have also followed a qualitative 
research approach. For example, an early study of China's compliance with 
international treaty obligations used a combination of interviews with around fifty 
respondents and examination of primary source materials to see if they corroborated 
the respondents' views. 176 A more recent study of China's trademark protection in 
the 1990s also adopted interviews as the main research method used. A total of 
nineteen respondents are listed, from Europe, China and the US. I77 
174 Ibid. 33. 
175 Chow "Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China", 12. 
176 Lee China and International Agreements: A Study of Compliance, 19. 
177 C a ~ e r , , Fighting Fakes in China: The Legal Protection of Trade Marks and Brands in the People's 
Republic of China, 74-76 (Appendix 2). 
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It is notable that a variety of nationalities were interviewed for the study, as 
this may reflect the idea that the analysis of various international perspectives is a 
useful method for studying IP protection in China and further, that these different 
perspectives may increase the reliability of the results. The interviewees also 
remained anonymous and this is an important factor to consider, that respondents may 
be more willing to contribute if they receive strong assurances of anonymity. Thus, 
this research study will draw upon the approach taken by previous studies and 
combine different methods to collect qualitative data from a variety of sources. 
Respondents from different nationalities will also be sought, as well as Chinese 
respondents. 
Although different methods will be used to collect relevant data, it is important 
to note that the aim of this is not formal 'triangulation'. Triangulation attempts to 
address the same question with a variety of data and it is well recognised that this is 
rarely successful as it is difficult to ensure that the same question will be addressed by 
each of the types of data or approaches. 178 Triangulation is also sometimes used as a 
method of validating the results obtained, but triangulation does not automatically 
convey validity on these results. As a result, this research will combine a variety of 
methods, including survey data, follow-up interviews and document review, but 
without attempting to use one method to 'prove' the truth of the results of another 
method. 
There are three ways in which qualitative and quantitative data can be 
combined: triangulation, where one type is used to corroborate another; facilitation, 
where collecting one type facilitates the collection of another type; and 
complementarity, where different sets of data address different but complementary 
178 Lyn Richards, Handling Qualitative Data: A Practical Guide, (London: SAGE Publications, 2005): 
21. 
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aspects of the research. 179 In this study, although the aim of using both qualitative and 
quantitative methods is not formal triangulation, elements of both facilitation and 
complementarity apply. The initial use of the survey facilitated follow-up interviews 
with a number of respondents. Document analysis was primarily used to evaluate the 
institutional setting of the TRIPS Agreement and thus, this data was complementary 
to other aspects of the research, focusing specifically on China. Therefore, the use of 
multiple methods had a number of advantages in this study. 
Much of the relevant information regarding IPR ill China is virtually 
unattainable due to the illegal nature of IP infringements, the confidential nature of 
strategies to tackle infringements and the opaque nature of the Chinese legal system in 
general. In order to overcome this problem, not only will a number of research 
methods be used, but also the issue will be examined from a variety of different 
viewpoints. These include lawyers, both international and domestic; multinational or 
foreign-invested enterprises in China; Chinese companies themselves; and the official 
government view. Therefore, although the use of mixed methods is not intended to be 
formal triangulation, it is hoped that the data obtained can provide a fuller picture of 
the IP system in China than the use of just one method alone. 
3.3 Research Strategy and Design 
A flexible research strategy was adopted throughout this research; 
consequently, as the research progressed, the overall research strategy evolved. This 
flexibility is a key feature of qualitative research methodology and as such can be 
seen as a key strength of this approach. The research strategy changed in response to 
both external and internal factors. For example, it was originally intended that a 
greater number of questionnaires would be analysed and rely less on follow-up 
179 Brannen, "Working Qualitatively and Quantitatively", 314. 
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interviews, but as the follow-up stage commenced, it was clear that the richness and 
depth of data emerging from these interviews merited greater emphasis. 
In terms of the process of research, the approach followed was more deductive 
than inductive in nature. However, although I started out with a comprehensive 
model of compliance in mind, my ideas did develop throughout the research process 
and I remained open to new insights and data. Thus, this approach is similar to that 
described as a foreshadowed problems approach, in which the researcher is orientated 
by existing theories and ideas, but is still open to new research questions and data. 180 
Throughout the research process, I tried to remain reflexive and sensitive to 
the historical and cultural context of my research. Specifically, there are recognised 
problems in attempting to study China through the legal system. "Law, of all 
disciplines that can be used in the West to study China, seems the most difficult for 
Westerners to use meaningfully because it is so rooted in Western values." 181 
Therefore, it was important not to attempt to judge China through the application of 
Western legal norms and conclude that if China is lacking these norms, the legal 
system must be a failure. A clear example of this occurred during the 1990s when 
China was being pressured by the US to raise the level of intellectual property 
protection based on the American idea that the ideal intellectual property system 
should closely resemble their own. 182 
On the other hand, it is nevertheless recognised that China can act as an 
important example in the study of compliance with international commitments. China 
can act as a 'least likely case study', which is especially useful for confrrmation of a 
180 Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography: Principles in Practice, (London: Routledge, 
1995): 206. 
181 Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Refonn in China After Mao: 12. 
182 Ibid. 
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theory. As China is not considered likely to comply with many international 
obligations, due to its history and cultural traditions and the fact that it "lacks tradition 
of the rule of law and is powerful enough to ignore its international obligations,,,183 if 
China complies, then this compliance could be highly significant. 
Below, the specific research methods used to collect my data are detailed, 
namely questionnaires, follow-up interviews and documentary data, and how this data 
was analysed. 
3.3.1 Questionnaires 
A short questionnaire was used to make initial contact with respondents. This 
questionnaire contained 18 questions, which combined open, closed and scale type 
questions. The main aim of the questionnaire was to elicit brief comments about the 
intellectual property system in China in order to direct the focus of the follow-up 
interviews and to provide an overview of opinions about the current IP system. 
Questionnaires have several recognised advantages; they can "provide a cheap 
and effective way of collecting data in a structured and manageable form.,,184 In 
addition to being inexpensive to administer, the completed questionnaires can also be 
analysed quickly. However, the drafting of questionnaires is more problematic. Thus, 
although questionnaires may need less time to analyse if a clear coding frame is 
drafted; the preparation of questionnaires can be a long and hard process. 
There are many key considerations when drafting a questionnaire. These 
include the need to draft questions in an unambiguous and clear way, considering the 
length of the questionnaire in total, the balance of questions between open and closed, 
the handling of any sensitive issues and the ordering of questions. A further 
183 Kent, China, the United Nations and Human Rights: The Limits of C o m p l i a n ~ e , , 251, fn. 4. 
184 David Wilkinson and Peter Birmingham, Using Research Instruments: A Guldefor Researchers, 
(London: RoutledgeFalmer, 2003): 7. 
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consideration in the drafting of a questionnaire is the maximisation of the possible 
response rate. The response rate can be improved by the use of a short clear cover 
letter, the inclusion of a pre-paid envelope and possibly attempting to offer the 
respondent something in return for their participation. I85 
In the case of the preliminary questionnaire used in this study on intellectual 
property protection in China, all of these strategies were applied. A short cover letter 
was enclosed with every questionnaire explaining the purpose of the questionnaire. 
The cover letter also stated that all respondents would receive a summary of the final 
results, as this was thought to increase the likelihood of their responses. In addition, a 
stamped addressed envelope to return the questionnaire was also distributed to every 
respondent. Finally, the statement of anonymity was strengthened from the first draft, 
which stated that names of respondents or companies would only be revealed with 
their permission. The fmal draft stated that "no names or company names will be 
used under any circumstances." (See Appendices 2 and 3 for a copy of the covering 
letter and initial survey used.) This strengthening of the assurances of anonymity was 
also intended to increase the response rate as the research instrument was dealing with 
the sensitive topic of IP protection and respondents may be reluctant to give honest 
responses if their identities could be used. 
The length of the questionnaire was also considered; particularly observing the 
standard advice that a survey should take no more than twenty minutes to complete, 
otherwise respondents would lose interest. I86 In this study, as most of the target 
respondents were professionals working in business, the length of the survey was felt 
to be of even greater significance. Therefore, the number of questions included was 
limited from the frrst draft, in order to ensure that all respondents would be able to 
185 Ibid. 16. 
186 Ibid. 17. 
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complete the questionnaire within twenty minutes, and furthermore, that most 
respondents would be able to complete it within ten or fifteen minutes. Therefore, the 
questionnaire contained a mixture of closed and open questions, with a number of 
Likert-scale type questions included to gain further information about the 
respondents' opinions, whilst still being quick to complete. 
The scale questions (questions 8, 11, 13 and 15 on the questionnaire) all 
included five or more possible responses. Offering several responses "provides more 
flexibility to the respondent and affords greater accuracy in recording their views on a 
given subject.,,187 Several of these scales do not include a mid-point. For example 
question 11 asks, "In your opinion, how effective is the current system of IP 
protection in China?" and offers a six-point scale for respondents to choose from. As 
there is no mid-point, respondents are forced to choose either a negative (1-3) or 
positive response (4-6). "This technique prevents 'questionnaire drift' setting in- the 
respondent is forced to provide either a positive or negative view of the statement 
posed. ,,188 
Although questionnaires do have a number of recognised benefits in terms of 
cost and speed of analysis, there are also a number of potential drawbacks that need to 
be considered. When drafting the questions, it was important to be aware of the 
difficulty of avoiding leading questions and avoiding ambiguous or unclear questions. 
To give respondents more opportunity to clarify their answer, an 'other' option was 
included for several questions in which the respondent was asked to choose from a list 
of responses. 
187 Ibid. 15. 
188 Ibid. 13. 
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The administering of the questionnaires was successful in its primary aim of 
establishing contact with respondents, and also provided a lot of rich data from the 
open questions for further analysis. Following the receipt of the completed 
questionnaires, respondents who had indicated they would be willing to participate in 
follow-up interviews were contacted and follow-up interviews arranged, either face-
to-face, via telephone or via email, depending on the respondents' preferences. 
3.3.2 Interviews 
The follow-up interviews were carried out with a number of respondents and 
also provided a great deal of rich qualitative data to analyse. However, interviews are 
often seen to be problematic, as "the desire of many researchers to treat interview data 
as more or less straightforward 'pictures' of an external reality can fail to understand 
how that 'reality' is being represented in words".189 In fact, a tension is commonly 
thought to exist between being subjective and remaining objective in the interview 
process. 190 On the one hand, the interviewer and interviewee need to establish an 
understanding, but on the other hand, the researcher also needs to maintain a 
'distance' to avoid bias. 
Therefore, it is important for the interviewer to be aware of the so-called 
'outside' and 'inside' of interview accounts. Interviews have been criticised as 
meaningless as the interviewer and interviewee construct a version of the social world 
exclusive to the interview; rather than a narrative that is representative of some wider 
truth. 191 This effect may be exacerbated by differences, perceived or otherwise, 
between the interviewer and the interviewee in terms of age, gender, class and race. 
189 David Silverman, "Introducing Qualitative Research", Silverman, Qualitative Research: Theory, 
Method and Practice, (London: SAGE Publications, 2004): 4. . . 
190 Tim May, Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process, (Maidenhead: Open UmversIty Press, 
2001): 127. ., ,.,.. ... ." 
191 Jody Miller and Barry Glassner, "The 'insIde and the Out.sIde: Fmdmg RealItIes m . l n t ~ r V 1 e w s , , . 
Silverman, Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice, (London: SAGE PublIcatIOns, 2004). 
125. 
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However, other commentators have held that interviews can still be a useful research 
tool as they can reveal knowledge about the world beyond the interview. Any 
interviewer must be cautious of 'romanticising' the interview data, but interviews can 
still provide useful data if the researcher focuses on exploring the subjective point of 
view of the interviewee. 192 
Semi-structured interviews were the format chosen for follow-up interviews, 
rather than structured or open interviews. The structure of the interview tended to 
follow the topics of the survey (recent changes in the IP system, problems they had 
experienced, reasons for these problems, as well as possible solutions and predictions 
for the future development of the system), but with the flexibility to include follow-up 
questions depending on the interviewee's responses. This flexibility provided the 
opportunity to seek clarification and elaboration on any key points that were not clear 
in the respondent's answer or that were thought to be particularly interesting. This is 
one of the recognised advantages of this form of interviews. 193 
Therefore, in the semi-structured interviews conducted, it was important to 
remain aware of the interaction between interviewer and the interviewee and this 
awareness of the interview as a social construct helped me to appreciate their opinions 
as 'true' for them. It was also important to remain aware of the 'active' nature of 
interviewing as opposed to the traditional view of interviews as a one-way flow of 
information from the interviewee to the interviewer.194 This recognition of the nature 
of all interviews as active and as producing an interpretation of the social world also 
had implications for the analysis of the data produced by the interviews. 
192 Ibid. 127. 
193 May, Social Research: Issues, Methods and P r o c e s ~ , , 123. . " . . . 
194 James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, "The ActIve InterVIew, SIlverman, QualItative Research: 
Theory, Method & Practice, (London: SAGE Publications, 2004): 143. 
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3.3.3 Documents 
It is recognised that documentary analysis is often overlooked in qualitative 
research strategies and researchers "make too little of the potentialities of texts as rich 
data." 195 Thus, documents can provide a further source of useful data. In this study, 
the use of documents was clearly necessary in order to assess the current IP system in 
China. Consequently, a variety of primary legal documents were collected to assist in 
assessing China's implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and also proved 
invaluable in examining the drafting of the TRIPS Agreement and the perceived 
equity and precision of the resulting Agreement. 
One advantage of the use of documentary data is that they are non-reactive, 
therefore the possibility that they have adapted due to the role of the researcher can be 
largely discounted as a limitation on the validity of the data. 196 This is in contrast to 
the questionnaire responses and interview data which were produced specifically for 
this research and thus may reflect the researcher's intervention. Furthermore, "texts 
can be used alongside other forms of evidence so that the particular biases of each can 
be understood and compared." 197 Therefore, including analysis of key relevant 
documents can increase the validity of the results obtained. 
It may be important to distinguish between documents and records; documents 
are prepared for personal rather than official reasons and thus require more 
1· d . . 198 contextua Ise mterpretahon. However, in practice, the terms are often used 
interchangeably and although in this study, the documentary data used came primarily 
from official records, the term 'documents' will also be used to refer to them. Official 
documents deriving from the state, such as used in this study, can provide "a great 
195 David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction, 
(London: SAGE Publications, 1993): 89. . . 
196 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, (Oxford: O x f o r ~ ~ Ulllversl7, P r e ~ s , , 2004): 3 8 ~ . . . 
197 Ian Hodder, "The Interpretation of Documents and Matenal Culture , Wemberg, Quaiztatlve 
Research Methods, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002): 267. 
198 Ibid. 266. 
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deal of textual material of potential interest, such as Acts of Parliament and official 
reports." 199 
On the other hand, the use of documents is not wholly unproblematic. The 
quality of any documents used must be assessed in order to evaluate the reliability of 
those documents. Documents can be assessed using four criteria: authenticity, 
credibility, representativeness and meaning. 200 In this study, documents analysed 
include laws and regulations concerning intellectual property in China and official 
documents from the WTO or its predecessor, GATT, such as minutes of key meetings 
or proposed drafts of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Analysing these documents against these four criteria, it is clear that the 
authenticity of the documents is not in doubt as the documents all originate from 
official sources. In terms of meaning, there is also little cause for concern, as the 
content of the documents is clear. Credibility should not be an issue, except that some 
of the Chinese laws and regulations were considered in their translated form, which 
may give rise to errors or distortions from the originals. Finally, the 
representativeness of the documents may be slightly problematic as the documents 
analysed were subjectively chosen and thus may not be representative of all the 
documents available. However, a wide variety of documents were identified for 
inclusion, particularly concerning the drafting of the TRIPS Agreement, in order to 
fairly represent the relative positions of both the developed countries and developing 
nations. The documentary data was combined with the survey responses and 
interview transcripts and the data was then subject to detailed qualitative content 
analysis. This process of data analysis is described in more detail below at page 87. 
199 Bryman, Social Research Methods, 386. .. " 
200 John Scott, A Matter of Record: Documentary Sources m SOCIal Research, (Cambndge: PolIty 
Press, 1990): 6. 
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3.3.4 Sampling Strategy and Respondents 
As highlighted by previous studies of China's legal system, a variety of 
perspectives are necessary to avoid jUdging the system by foreign norms. 
Consequently, a range of legal and business professionals were targeted, both foreign 
and Chinese, and predominantly based within China. The sampling strategy was 
purposive in that key companies were targeted for selection and the approach to 
sampling respondents evolved as the initial responses were received. For example, 
legal professionals were initially quicker to respond and responses were frequently 
more detailed than those from other respondents. As a result, an electronic version of 
my questionnaire was added to the university's web pages in order to give other 
respondents an alternative method of completion if time was a factor for them. This 
sampling strategy did also incorporate an element of snowball sampling as several 
respondents suggested people to contact and occasionally also facilitated the initial 
contact. 
3.3.4.1 Making Contact with Respondents 
The respondents in this study could be categorised into three groups: legal 
professionals working in IP in China, domestic Chinese enterprises concerned with IP 
rights and foreign enterprises with a presence in China. There may not also be a clear 
distinction between these groups; for instance, defining a 'foreign-invested enterprise' 
is difficult given the myriad of business structures existing in China. Consequently, 
in this study, a company was defmed as 'foreign' if the respondent stated that the 
headquarters of the company was outside China. 
The questionnaires were largely distributed between November 2005 and May 
2006 to all three groups of respondents. The first group of respondents were legal 
professionals, to whom questionnaires were sent in November 2005 to a variety of 
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both international and local law firms. These firms were selected based on their 
inclusion in the Legal500 list of recommended law firms in China. 
The second group of respondents were Chinese companies with well-known 
trademarks, selected from the "Well-known Trademark Enterprise Name List" 201 and 
the China500. 202 However, only a handful of responses were received from this group. 
It is difficult to explain why the response rate was so low for this group of 
respondents. It is possible that the contact information provided by the publishers was 
inaccurate. It could also be the case that the low response rate reflects the lack of 
interest in intellectual property issues observed in domestic companies by various 
observers. 
The fmal group of respondents were foreign invested enterprises in China. 
Questionnaires were sent to the members of the Quality Brands Protection Committee 
(QBPC), which is a group of multinational companies operating in China whose 
mission is "to work cooperatively with the Chinese central and local governments, 
local industry, and other organizations to make positive contributions to intellectual 
property protection in the People's Republic of China.,,203 Again, the number of 
responses was disappointing. It is possible that confidentiality concerns were a 
primary cause of non-responses, as indicated by the response of one company, which 
claimed that they "could not provide details in this respect as your questionnaire 
proposes, because all information is highly confidential. ,,204 
201 Ebuywww (Beijing) Info. Co. Ltd, Chiming Shangbiao Qiye Minglu (Well-known Trademark 
Enterprise Name List), (Beijing: E b u ~ ~ ( B e i j i n g ~ ~ Info. Co: Ltd., 2005). . 
202 The list of the top 500 Chinese enterprIses accordmg to therr revenue as produced by the Chma 
Enterprise Confederation (2005), "Zhongguo qiye 500 qiang: (Top 500 China Enterprises), 
http://www.cec-ceda.org.cnlenglish/. accessed September 24 2006. 
203 Quality Brands Protection Committee, "Factsheet", 
http://www.gbpc.org.cnlenlabout/about/factsheet. accessed 1st May 2005. 
204 Comment from respondent FOOD03, June 2006. 
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In addition to the members of the Quality Brands Protection Committee, 
questionnaires were also sent to a variety of foreign enterprises operating in relevant 
sectors such as the luxury goods market and in the technology or telecommunications 
sector in China. These enterprises were selected from the "China Foreign Enterprise 
Directory,,205, published by the China Economic Review. 
The total number of questionnaires received from the initial postal survey was 
disappointing. Therefore, an electronic version of the questionnaire was prepared in 
order to increase the number of target respondents. This web-based questionnaire was 
uploaded to the University of Nottingham's server using UNIX.206 The University's 
FormManager was also used as a template for the web-based survey as this provided 
an easy way to ensure the completed forms would be emailed to my chosen email 
account and that the respondents would then see a standard confIrmation page. 207 
After this webpage was uploaded to the University's server, remaining respondents 
were contacted by email in order to ask them to complete the survey online at 
w w w . n o t t i n g h a m . a c . u k / ~ l i x k m 6 . . in order to increase the number of initial 
respondents. 
Although response to the initial questionnaire was somewhat disappointing, 
the vast majority of questionnaire respondents also indicated their willingness to 
participate in follow-up interviews and indeed several were very enthusiastic about 
participating in the study. Consequently, during early 2006, a number of face-to-face 
interviews with respondents in China were conducted to obtain more detailed 
205 China Economic Review, China Foreign Enterprise Directory, (Hong Kong: China Economic 
Review Publishing, 2006). 
206 University of Nottingham- Information Services, " G e t t i ~ g g Started on the Unix Service", 
http://www.nottingham.ac. uklis/supportlknowledgebase/ gmdes/IS 130 l.pdf, accessed November 22nd 
2006. 
207 University of Nottingham- Information Services, "Handling HTML .Forms with FormManager", 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uklis/supportlknowledgebase/formmanager/mdex.phtml, accessed December 
14th 2006. 
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information on their opinions of the current state of the intellectual property system, 
ranging from thirty to eighty minutes. Several telephone interviews with respondents 
in Hong Kong were also completed and more detailed responses to follow-up 
questions were received from several other respondents who indicated their 
willingness to participate via email. The main form of contact with respondents is 
detailed in Appendix 1. 
3.3.4.2 Respondent Characteristics 
In total, 49 respondents participated in this study. In response to some basic 
questions about their involvement with this topic, all 49 informed me that they are 
invo lved with IP in China and furthermore, all 49 respondents are based in China or 
Hong Kong. It is also significant that 45 of the 47 respondents who gave a valid 
answer to this question claimed that they had experienced problems with IP in China. 
This may have been a strong factor in their participation in the study and may also 
have had a negative influence on their responses. 
When asked how long their company had been working in China, the majority 
responded that they had been established in China for more than ten years. This 
affirms that respondents should be knowledgeable about the topic of intellectual 
property protection in China as all deal with IP and the majority have been based in 
China for many years. The table below illustrates the length of time that the 
respondents' companies have been working in China. 
Table 3-1 Number of respondents according to the length of time their company has been 
established in China 
2-5 vears 5-10 vears More than 10 years NA TOTAL 
7 9 32 1 49 
The respondents also represented a mix of nationalities with 29 respondents 
from China and 20 from other countries, mostly in Europe or North America. The 
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type of enterprise represented in the study also showed a mix with the majority being 
domestic Chinese enterprises and the rest being foreign-invested enterprises operating 
in China. As noted above, it is sometimes difficult to defme the exact status of an 
enterprise operating in China, so the simple definition for a foreign enterprise adopted 
in this study was whether the headquarters of the company were located outside China. 
The table below shows the breakdown of respondents by nationality and the type of 
enterprise that they work for: 
T bl 3 2 N b f d d' d r d a e - urn er 0 respon ents accor m ~ ~ to respon ent natIOna It:y an type 0 f enterprise 
R e s ~ o n d e n t t TIDe of Works for Domestic Works for F oreign- TOTAL Nationality Entemrise Chinese Entemrise Invested Entemrise 
Chinese 22 5 27 
Foreign 5 17 22 
TOTAL 27 22 49 
In addition to a variety of nationalities and enterprise types represented 
amongst my respondents, a number of different industries were represented. The 
majority of respondents were from law firms, but this was broadly defmed as 
including trademark and patent agencies, as well as companies offering legal advice 
under a broader framework of consultancy. The number of respondents is shown in 
the table below according to the type of goods or services that their enterprise offers. 
Ta ble 3-3 Number of respondents a c c o r d i n ~ ~ to the goods or services their company 0 ffers 
Tvoe of Goods or Services Offered Number of Respondents 
Legal Services 31 
Manufacturing 8 
Food & Beverage 3 
Fashion & Luxury Goods 2 
Services 2 
Automobile 1 
Pharmaceutical 1 
Technology and Telecommunications 1 
TOTAL 49 
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Therefore, although the number of respondents was somewhat limited, they 
represented a wide variety of nationalities, types of enterprises and goods and services 
offered. In addition, the respondents provided a great deal of rich qualitative data 
overall. The analysis of this data will now be considered. 
3.4 Data Analysis 
Data analysis did not constitute a discrete stage of research as the analytical 
process commenced much earlier than the formal coding of the data. Indeed, it is 
suggested that analysis of the data was inherent during the data collection stage, as 
questionnaires and detailed comments were received; follow-up questions drafted and 
decisions made about which areas to focus on. Furthermore, preliminary data analysis 
was not undertaken systematically, but rather through a process of reading and re-
reading material to increase familiarity. As a result, by the time formal coding of the 
data began, some key themes and concepts had already been established which would 
influence the analysis. 
Initially, grounded theory analysis 208 was a major influence and it was 
intended that themes and concepts should emerge from the data, rather than being 
imposed by a pre-existing theoretical framework. However, it proved impossible to 
examine the data and not make connections between the data and key concepts which 
had emerged from the literature review. Therefore, although I remained open to new 
themes and concepts emerging from the data, existing theories were used as a strong 
influence on the initial coding frame (below at Figure 3-4). 
The answers given on the questionnaire in response to the open questions were 
combined with the follow-up and documentary data and analysed using the NVivo 
208 Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative 
Research, (New York: Aldine, 1967). 
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software to code the answers given, to build a model of IP enforcement in post-WTO 
China. However, both during and after the coding process, nodes constructed of all an 
individual respondent's comments were referred to in order to see their remarks in 
their full context. This was to try and avoid fragmentation of data which may occur 
when a researcher codes the interview data and discards comments which do not seem 
to fit an identified theme. A voiding this potential problem with the use of qualitative 
data has been discussed in the context of advocating a narrative analysis approach209 
to interview data, which instead treats an interview as a whole. 
My initial coding framework was extensive and featured 41 potential nodes 
under which the data was coded. These nodes are shown below. 
Initial N ode Heading 
Assessing the Current System Comparisons to other systems 
Experiences with the current system 
Praise for the current system 
Problems in the current system 
Inconsistency 
Local protectionism 
Problems with corruption 
Pro b lems with enforcement 
Problems with legislation 
Other problems 
Causes of the current state of the IP system Fundamental factors 
Attitudes and values 
Economy 
Political or institutional 
Parameters 
History of IP in China 
Physical characteristics of China 
Proximate Factors 
Administrative capacity 
Knowledge and Information 
Leadership 
209 Amanda Coffey and Paul Atkinson, Making Sense of Qualitative Data: Complementary Research 
Strategies, (London: SAGE Publications, 1996). 
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Other causes 
Forces for Change Changes observed in the IP system 
Attitude of Leadership 
Foreign companies and foreign countries 
Impact of WTO entry 
Local companies 
Natural development or "matter of time" 
Other force for change 
Administrative changes 
Solutions Awareness 
Government commitment 
International cooperation 
Resources 
Training 
Other solutions 
Predictions for the future of the IP system 
Figure 3-4 Initial coding framework used in NVivo 
Following this initial coding, several of the nodes were then merged to create a 
more manageable framework for analysis and then continued this process of reading 
the data and making decisions about coding categories whilst attempting to move 
towards a comprehensive model of compliance. 
3.4.1 Presentation of Data 
The transcripts of the interviews followed some basic transcription 
conventions210 ; the following are the most important which may appear in quotes 
taken from these transcripts: 
( ) parentheses indicates that the words were inaudible, or not clear enough to 
transcribe, words within the parentheses represent a best estimate of what 
was said; 
[ ] square brackets indicates overlapping talk, most commonly saying "yeah" or 
''uh-huh'' whilst the respondent was talking; 
« )) double brackets indicates commentary of other events, such as observing a 
mobile phone ringing or knocking being audible on the tape; 
becau- hyphen represents a self-interruption or an abrupt cut-off of what the 
respondent was saying. 
210 David Silverman, Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice, (London: SAGE 
Publications, 2004), Appendix: Transcription Conventions: 368-9. 
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The use of the interview data will tend towards more comprehensive data 
treatment, in an attempt to avoid 'anecdotalism,.211 Therefore, longer extracts may be 
included where appropriate, in order to increase the transparency of the data analysis 
process and thus, help both the reliability and validity of my data analysis. 
Furthermore, a different font will be used for direct quotes from respondents, for ease 
of identification. 
In order to maintain the confidentiality of all respondents, codes were assigned 
to each respondent which will be used to identify their comments. These codes aim to 
identify the basic characteristics of the respondents, such as the nature of the 
enterprise they work for, without revealing their identity or enough details to enable 
identification by someone knowledgeable in the IP field in China. Consequently, 
codes were assigned based on the respondents' enterprise, followed by a two-digit 
number, and then a "T" if the comments had been translated. For example, LAW01T 
represents the first respondent from a law firm and that their comments have been 
translated. It is important to identify which comments are translated in order to 
maintain transparency of the data, as these comments are not in the respondents' own 
words. A full table of the respondents with their codes and primary characteristics 
can be found in Appendix 1. 
3.5 Ethical Considerations 
Although the research methods applied in this study may appear to be 
relatively uncontroversial, ethical considerations must still play a part in the design 
and application of the chosen research methods. As the Economic & Social Research 
211 David Silverman, "Who Cares About 'Experience'? Missing Issues in Qualitative R ~ s e ~ r c h " , ,
Silverman, Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice, (London: SAGE PublIcatIOns, 2004): 
362. 
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Council (ESRC) explains, research is defmed broadly and research ethics refer to the 
moral principles guiding all research, "from its inception through to completion and 
publication of results and beyond. ,,212 Therefore, any relevant ethical considerations 
must be identified and taken into account in the context of this specific research. 
Ethical considerations have a long history in social research and there are various 
codes of ethics which guide researchers. However, most codes have similar 
overlapping principles such as informed consent, avoiding deception, ensuring 
privacy and confidentiality and the accuracy of the data.213 Consequently, the ESRC 
ethical code currently in operation will be applied. 
From January 1st 2006, the ESRC put in place a new Research Ethics 
Framework (REF). This framework sets out what the ESRC and various other 
funding bodies perceive to be "good practice for all social science research.,,214 The 
REF lays down six broad principles which the ESRC expects to be addressed in all 
social science research. These are: firstly that research should be designed, reviewed 
and undertaken to ensure integrity and quality; next, that research subjects should be 
fully informed about the purpose, methods and intended possible uses of the research, 
what their participation entails and what risks, if any, are involved. Thirdly, the 
confidentiality of information supplied by research subjects and the anonymity of 
respondents must be respected and fourthly, that research participants must participate 
in a voluntary way, free from any coercion. Harm to research participants must be 
212 Economic & Social Research Council, "Research Ethics Framework (REF)", 
http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uklESRClnfoCentrelImagesIESRC Re Ethics Frame tcm6-
11291.pdf accessed March 14th 2006: 7. 
213 Clifford G. Christians, "Ethics and Politics in Qualitative Research", Denzin and Lincoln, The SAGE 
Handbook a/Qualitative Research, (London: SAGE Publications, 2005): 144-5. 
214 Economic & Social Research Council, "Research Ethics Framework (REF)", 1. 
91 
avoided and finally, the independence of research must be clear and any conflicts of 
interest or partiality must be explicit.215 
These key principles of research ethics must be considered in tum in the 
context of my research on intellectual property protection in China. The first 
principle relating to integrity and quality entails a commitment throughout the 
research process to research of the highest quality and accountability. This principle 
underpins the remaining tenets. The second principle of informed consent is highly 
relevant to this research. "Informed consent entails giving as much information as 
possible about the research so that prospective participants can make an informed 
decision on their possible involvement.,,216 This information was provided to all 
respondents in this study prior to their initial involvement. My position as a 
postgraduate researcher and the aims of this research were explained in both the cover 
letter and the top of the questionnaire or start of the interview and it was made clear to 
all respondents that they could raise any questions or concerns that they had about 
their participation in this study.217 
The issue of informed consent is more problematic in this research as many of 
the respondents were Chinese. It is well recognised that the concept of informed 
consent relies on the 'primacy of the individual', which may not exist in some cultural 
contexts, where the individual may take less precedence to the family or 
community.218 In the context of China, it is true that individual rights may not take 
precedence. However, many of the Chinese respondents worked for foreign invested 
enterprises or for multinational corporations operating in China and they have 
consequently been exposed to concepts of individual rights such as consent and 
215 Ethical principles taken from: Ibid. 
216 Ibid. 24. . . 
217 For details, see the cover letter used to make initial contact with respondents m Appendix 2. 
218 Ibid. 
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privacy on previous occasions. Therefore, the same wording was used to deal with 
the issue of informed consent in both the Chinese and English versions of the 
questionnaire and was handled in broadly the same way at the start of each interview. 
The third principle regarding confidentiality and anonymity is a crucial 
consideration in this study. This ethical principle "requires that researchers take steps 
to ensure that research data and its sources remain confidential".219 The anonymity of 
all respondents was a key concern to many respondents as the issue of IP protection is 
commercially sensitive. Therefore, assurances of anonymity were given in the initial 
contact letter/email and reinforced in the questionnaire/interview. Contact details 
provided by respondents were contained within a separate sheet, which was detached 
from the survey immediately on receipt of the completed questionnaire. Furthermore, 
each respondent was assigned a code relating to which group of respondents they 
belonged to and this code was used in all documents relating to their individual 
responses and comments. Anonymization "is a matter of skill in changing details 
sufficiently so that the reader cannot identify the individual concerned but in such a 
way as not to destroy the social-science research value of the [mal report. ,,220 In this 
study, this balance between retaining sufficient detail and ensuring that individuals 
could not be identified was achieved by only providing basic details of the respondent, 
whether they were Chinese or foreign and the type of company they worked for. The 
location was also included when this was felt to be significant and where this did not 
increase the probability of the respondent's identification. 
The next principle concerns the need to ensure that participants take part 
voluntarily and without coercion. This is closely linked to the issue of informed 
219 Ibid. 25. . 
220 Tom Wengraf, Qualitative Research Interviewing: Biographic Narrative and Seml-Stmctured 
Methods, (London: SAGE Publications, 2001): 187. 
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consent. No pressure was exerted on participants who expressed their concern about 
participating and all respondents were assured that they could choose to withdraw at 
any time. Indeed, several respondents declined to answer certain questions as they 
were deemed to be too sensitive regarding the company's IP strategy and this 
response was not challenged. 
The principle of avoiding harm to participants was also considered. Harm 
doesn't just include physical or psychological harm; it can also include "a subject's 
social standing, privacy, personal values or beliefs, their links to family and the wider 
community, and their position within institutional settings. ,,221 Therefore, a further 
consideration in this study was the possibility of harm to an individual's or company's 
reputation as a result of comments made. This possibility was minimised by giving 
clear assurances of anonymity and ensuring that respondents could not be identified in 
the results, but the possibility of later identification may have inhibited some 
respondents from giving their true opinions, particularly where these were critical of 
the current system. 
The final princip Ie is that the researcher should declare any affiliations and 
potential conflicts of interest. Although this is not directly relevant to my research, 
respondents were still informed of my status as postgraduate researcher and affiliation 
with the University of Nottingham and further, that the data collected was for use in 
my PhD thesis. 
A further consideration was that the majority of my research was carried out 
outside of the U.K. This raises issues not only about the cultural context of key 
concepts such as consent and privacy, but also possible perceived differences between 
221 Economic & Social Research Council, "Research Ethics Framework (REF)", 21. 
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the power of the researcher and the researched and the handling of personal data.222 
Although these issues were not felt to pose any major difficulties to the research, it is 
still important to be mindful of their potential impact. The handling of personal data 
followed the standards laid down in the Data Protection Act 1998, despite the fact that 
data was collected outside the U.K. and thus outside the remit of this legislation. This 
legislation provides that data must be obtained for a specific purpose and should not 
be kept for any longer than is necessary for this purpose. Data should also be kept 
secure from unauthorised access. 223 As a result, data collected from respondents was 
obtained for the specific aims of the research and will be destroyed on completion of 
the study. Data will also be stored in secure computer files and the use of codes to 
identify respondents should further protect their personal information. 
Therefore, although the research methods chosen do not raise difficult ethical 
issues, ethical considerations were still considered in this research. The most 
important ethical issues were the informed consent of respondents and ensuring the 
anonymity of respondents, particularly given the sensitive nature of the topic of 
intellectual property protection. 
3.6 Practical Issues 
-
There are various practical issues which arose during this research. The main 
two practical issues which need to be discussed here are the issue of translation and 
the issue of the use of computer software to assist my data analysis. 
3.6.1 The Issue of Translation 
There are three main practical problems that may arise from attempting to 
translate questionnaires from one language into another target language. These are 
222 Ibid. 17. 
223 Information Commissioner's Office, "The Basics", 
h ·11 . gov uklwhat we coverldata protection/the basics.aspx, accessed February 24th 2007. ttp. WWW.ICO. . 
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the lack of semantic equivalence across languages, the lack of conceptual equivalence 
across cultures and the lack of normative equivalence across societies. 224 These 
factors may be relevant to the translation of a survey written initially in English to 
Chinese. For example, legal concepts do not necessarily translate into easily 
understood Chinese categories. One case in point would be the widely discussed 
concept of the 'rule of law', which has different translations into Chinese depending 
on the usage. For example, 1i.;; n:t (fazhi) translates as 'rule of law', but the 
Constitution uses the phrase t&1i.;;n:t 00 (yifazhiguo), which has been translated as both 
ruling the country by law and rule of law. 225 This may also be due to a lack of 
conceptual equivalence across different legal cultures; coming from a western 
common law background, it is important not to assume that legal norms applicable in 
one jurisdiction necessary are applicable in China. 
Finally, the lack of normative equivalence in China may relate to certain social 
conventions. These include the willingness or otherwise to discuss certain topics, the 
manner in which ideas are expressed and the treatment of strangers.226 It is important 
to be aware of all of these potential problems in the Chinese context as the concepts of 
'face' and 'networks/relationships' (guanxi) may be influential, both in terms of 
access, but also in terms of the answers given to an outsider. Furthermore, as the 
majority of the questions in my survey relate to attitudes and opinions, it is more 
likely that these social conventions and norms will playa role in the answers received 
from respondents. 
224 Orlando Behling and Kenneth S. Law, Translating Questionnaires and Other Research Instruments: 
Problems and Solutions, (London: Sage Publications, 2000): 4-5. 
225 Y ongnian Zheng, "From Rule By Law to Rule of Law? A Realistic View of China's Legal 
Development", China Perspectives, 25 (Sept.-Oct. 1999). 
226 Behling and Law, Translating Questionnaires and Other Research Instruments: Problems and 
Solutions, 5-6. 
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In order to mInImISe these potential problems, the following steps were 
performed. With regards to semantic issues, the language used was carefully 
considered when drafting the original survey in English. This was especially 
important when considering the wording of attitudinal questions. Key guidelines 
developed to aid translation were also considered during the drafting process. These 
guidelines include; using short, simple sentences of less than sixteen words; 
employing the active rather than passive voice; avoiding subjunctives such as 'could' 
or 'would' where possible; and avoiding words indicating vagueness such as 
'possibly' or 'probably' where possible.227 
With regards to conceptual issues, as stated above, certain legal concepts may 
be grounded in the Western legal tradition and this was also borne in mind whilst 
drafting the survey. To minimise these issues, the legal terms used in the primary 
legislation was used, as this should represent the most familiar IP terms and concepts. 
However, it is still possible that certain conceptual problems remained in the survey 
and this is a limitation of the research methodology. 
Finally, with regards to solving normative problems, there are recognised 
problems in China with questions asking for political opinions. This is thought to be a 
legacy of the Cultural Revolution which has "led to a general pattern of disguising 
attitudes and feelings. ,,228 As a result, assurances of anonymity in this study were 
strengthened to assure respondents that their identity would not be revealed under any 
circumstances. Individual names and company affiliations were also not requested, 
unless the respondent wished to provide them for follow-up contact. This aimed to 
reassure respondents and decrease any potential reticence on sensitive topics. 
227 R.W. Brislin, "Translation and Content Analysis of Oral and Written Materials", Triandis and Berry, 
Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology, (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1980). 
228 Behling and Law, Translating Questionnaires and Other Research Instruments: Problems and 
Solutions, 42. 
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However, it is still possible that Chinese respondents were less willing to be critical of 
their legal system and framework of IP protection and again this must be borne in 
mind during analysis of responses. 
Two Chinese translators were used to confirm semantic equivalence in the 
survey; their role was also to advise on the wording of the survey with knowledge of 
the target culture and social norms, in order to minimise normative issues. The issue 
of striving for semantic and conceptual equivalence was also an issue in the 
translation of respondents' answers from Chinese to English. Again, translations were 
as close to the original text as possible, but did require some interpretation in certain 
cases. As with the translation of the original research instrument from English into 
Chinese, Chinese research assistants were asked to check the translation and discuss 
any phrases or sentences which were particularly problematic in terms of language or 
context. Consequently, although it was not always possible to check with the 
respondents as to their intended meaning, mistranslations were hopefully minimised. 
However, the issue of translation should constantly be borne in mind when reading 
quotes given, as they may be an interpretation of the respondents' original meaning. 
Additionally, the use of a survey was not the only research method used. 
Document analysis is useful in this context for providing an unobtrusive method of 
collecting data without encountering the same levels of semantic, conceptual and 
normative problems. Face-to-face and telephone interviews were also carried out in 
English, thus direct quotes can be given from respondents from these interviews. 
3.6.2 The Use ojCAQDAS in Data Analysis 
The qualitative data collected may be interesting, but without coherent 
analysis, it may be meaningless. Therefore, qualitative data analysis is crucial to 
increasing the legitimacy of the results obtained. In the analysis of qualitative data, 
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coding is crucial. "Codes or categories are tags or labels for allocating units of 
meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study. ,,229 
The researcher needs to be able to create and change codes, as well as adding 
. d 1 230 memos, III or er to constant y reflect on the data collected. Therefore, the merits of 
using computer software to assist in the coding and analysis process have been 
strongly debated over the past couple of decades. The fITst rudimentary mainframe 
CAQDAS programs began to be used in the early 1980s, with theory building 
programs being developed in the late 1980s, but "in the early stages of their 
development computer-based methods for qualitative analysis faced resistance based 
on epistemo logical suspicion. ,,231 
However, it now appears that the use of software to assist with data analysis is 
now more accepted in qualitative research; the ESRC advised in 2001 that "students 
should have skill in the use of qualitative data analysis software packages".232 There 
are certain advantages to using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS), which include increasing the transparency of data analysis, which in tum 
can increase the legitimacy of qualitative research; improving data management; and 
supplying the ability to experiment with different approaches. 233 Conversely, 
although CAQDAS can clearly be a useful tool in qualitative data analysis, it is also 
important to recognise that the "benefits of CAQDAS are dependent on the skills of 
the researcher how the researcher chooses to use available tools, and how CAQDAS , 
229 Tehmina N. Basit, "Manual or Electronic? The Role of Coding in Qualitative Data Analysis", 
Educational Research, 45 (2), (Summer 2003), 144. 
230 Nigel Fielding, "Automating the Ineffable: Qualitative Software and the Meaning of Qualitative 
Research", May, Qualitative Research in Action, (London: Sage Publications, 2003): 163. 
231 Nigel G. Fielding and Raymond M. Lee, Computer Analysis and Qualitative Research, (London: 
SAGE Publications, 1998): 13. 
232 Joy D. Bringer, Lynne H. Johnston and Celia H. Brackenridge, "Maximising Transparency in a 
Doctoral Thesis: The Complexities of Writing about the Use of QSR*NVIVQ Within a Grounded 
Theory Study", Qualitative Research, 4 (2), (2004), 247. . . 
233 Fielding, "Automating the Ineffable: Qualitative Software and the Meaning of QuahtatIve 
Research", 169. 
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is taught.,,234 It is also important to recognise that the use of CAQDAS should not be 
seen as a time saving device, as data coding and analysis will always be a time-
consummg process. 
There are also potential disadvantages to using CAQDAS, which must be 
acknowledged in order to minimise their effect. The main criticism levelled at the use 
of CAQDAS is that is "has the potential to transform qualitative research into a rigid, 
automated analysis of text that, in actuality, requires human interpretation." 235 
However, the software can only do so much; the researcher is still ultimately 
responsible for the analysis. This is the idea of 'rubbish in- rubbish out'; that the 
analysis is still guided by the skills of the researcher. 
It is also a frequently voiced concern that researchers may choose their 
research methods and perspective based on the strengths and limitations of the 
software. However, in this study, the use of CAQDAS was considered after data 
collection as a helpful tool in drawing together qualitative data from various sources 
to analyse, including questionnaire responses, more detailed follow-up responses and 
interview transcripts. The use of CAQDAS is also appropriate to this research as it 
explores a relatively new area of research with little existing theory in this area. Thus, 
CAQDAS is an appropriate tool for testing and modifying existing theories, as well as 
theory building. Therefore, it was felt that the use of CAQDAS was justified in this 
study and NVivo software was consequently used in the data analysis stage of 
research. 
234 Bringer, Johnston and Brackenridge, "Maximising T r a n ~ p ~ r e n c y y in a Doctoral Thesis: ~ e e
Complexities of Writing about the Use of QSR *NVIVO Wlthm a Grounded Theory Study , 250. 
235 Ibid. 248. 
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3.7 Alternative Approaches 
Although a mixture of methods were chosen to research this topic of IP 
protection in China and compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, there are a variety of 
other methods that could have been employed. For example, a more conventional 
quantitative approach could have been followed by expanding the number of 
questionnaires distributed and sampling the respondents randomly from a total 
population of lawyers operating in China. Analysis of available enforcement statistics 
such as a breakdown of fines imposed by province could also have provided data for a 
quantitative comparison of possible areas where local protectionism flourishes. 
If a more streamlined qualitative approach had been taken, interviews with a 
greater number of respondents could have been conducted without an initial survey. 
Observation of respondents dealing with IP issues and infringements in practice 
would also have been an informative approach to take, but access would obviously 
have been more of an issue. Furthermore, the respondents targeted by this study 
could have focused solely on one group of respondents such as multinational 
enterprises to evaluate their perception of the current IP system in more detail. 
Equally, legal professionals could have been the only respondents targeted in order to 
take a more formal legalistic approach to compliance with the letter of the TRIPS 
Agreement. However, it is argued that the chosen research strategy, incorporating 
different methods of data collection and three distinct groups of respondents, 
combined the advantages of qualitative research, with the benefits of viewing the IP 
system in China from various different perspectives. This approach offered the best 
opportunity to comprehend a complex and opaque system and to answer the key 
research questions. 
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3.8 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the research strategy that was applied to analysis of 
the question of China's TRIPS compliance. Essentially, a qualitative approach was 
used, which combined different methods of data collection: a brief questionnaire used 
to make initial contact; detailed follow-up interviews; and documentary data from 
primary legal documents such as GATTIWTO minutes and Chinese IP laws, 
regulations and white papers. All this qualitative data was codified using NV ivo 
software and the initial coding framework was modified to move toward amending 
the existing model of compliance for the specific context of TRIPS compliance. 
Important practical issues have also been examined in this chapter. These 
issues included the issue of translation and the use of computer software to assist in 
the data analysis process. Finally, the alternative approaches that could have been 
taken were outlined. The next chapter will begin the process of examining 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement by describing the drafting of the TRIPS 
Agreement in more detail and considering non-country specific factors which may 
affect compliance with the Agreement. 
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4 Implementing the TRIPS Agreement: Non-country 
Specific Factors Influencing TRIPS Compliance 
4.1 Introduction 
According to the comprehensive model of compliance outlined above at page 
48, there are various categories of factors which may influence the likelihood or 
otherwise of compliance with a specific international accord. These categories 
include both country-specific factors such as the history, size and culture of the 
country, as well as non-country specific factors relating to the agreement and the 
activity concerned. In this chapter, the non-specific factors influencing compliance 
with the TRIPS Agreement will be considered. 
Firstly, the background to the TRIPS Agreement will be outlined, in order to 
detail the drafting history and consequent context of compliance with this specific 
accord. Then, the specific characteristics of the TRIPS Agreement will be examined, 
to analyse their possible affect on compliance. The chapter will also include 
discussion of the characteristics of the activity which the TRIPS Agreement was 
designed to solve, that is intellectual property infringements. Finally, the international 
environment surrounding the protection of intellectual property rights will be explored. 
4.2 The Drafting of the TRIPS Agreement 
As detailed above at page 6, the pre-WTO international trading system did not 
offer a detailed and universal framework for IPR protection. Under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT), provisions relating to intellectual 
. 1 b' l' d 236 H property had been limited and effectIve y no su stantIve terms app Ie . owever, 
GATT protection of intellectual property became prioritised by developed countries 
during the 1980s and 1990s due to a growing reliance on technology. It was 
236 Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading 
System: The WTO and Beyond, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 282. 
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consequently an important issue during the Uruguay round of trade negotiations 
(1986-94), where it proved to be a divisive issue. Following this key round of 
negotiations, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) emerged as the successor to 
GATT in 1995/37 with the TRIPS Agreement at the heart of the new international 
organisation. 
The issue of IP protection was first raised in the context of the GATT system 
at the close of the Tokyo negotiation round in 1979, where the European Community 
and the United States unsuccessfully tried to obtain an 'Agreement on Measures to 
Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods'. 238 Although the Tokyo round had 
attempted to move beyond reducing tariffs as barriers to trade to consideration of non-
tariff barriers, this shift in focus was taken to new levels in the years following the 
conclusion of the Tokyo Round. 
This new emphasis on intellectual property protection arose as technology 
started to become more of an important factor in global competition.239 Developed 
industrialised countries were becoming conscious of the pressure that newly 
industrialising nations especially in Asia were beginning to place on their own 
economic growth. However, initial proposals regarding the inclusion of IP in GATT 
negotiations were modest. In the early 1980s, proposals for consideration of 
intellectual property rights in the multilateral trading system focused almost 
exclusively on trade in counterfeit goods; "this was because commercial 
counterfeiting had become such a serious problem for trademark owners in a number 
237 For further information on the history ofthe WTO, TRIPS agreement and GATT, see World Trade 
Organisation, "What is the WTO?" http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/whatise.htm. 
accessed April 10th 2004. 
238 Goldstein, International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice, 53. 
239 Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS 
Agreement and Policy Options, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2000): 3. 
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of countries. ,,240 Thus, initial consideration of the inclusion of IP protection in the 
GATT/WTO system was much narrower than the broad scope of the fmal TRIPS 
Agreement. 
Furthermore, the very inclusion of intellectual property protection in the scope 
of multilateral trade negotiations was strongly resisted by some of the large 
developing countries such as Brazil and India, who argued that the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) was the proper forum within which to negotiate this 
issue.241 However, WIPO was widely regarded as ineffective at enforcing the various 
treaties it was responsible for such as the Paris and Berne Conventions, whereas the 
GATT dispute settlement mechanism was admired as a potentially more efficient tool 
in enforcing international IP obligations.242 These Conventions were also criticised 
for relying on the principles of non-discrimination and national treatment, rather than 
providing uniform standards of protection. This meant that if a country did not offer 
any IP protection to its own nationals, then it was not obliged to offer higher 
protection to foreign nationals. This lack of pressure on developing countries to 
introduce IPR was clearly unsatisfactory to the richer industrialised nations. 
In other words, the reasons why the developed countries wished to include 
intellectual property protection in the GATT system were two-fold; first, to subject 
intellectual property disputes to the multilateral dispute settlement body, and second, 
to provide uniform standards of protection which all signatories would have to 
provide. The lack of enforcement provisions in the existing conventions was also 
seen as a weakness of the international intellectual property system then in force. The 
240 A. Jane Bradley, "Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in the Uruguay 
Round: Laying the Foundations", Stanford Journal of International Law, 23 (1987), 65. 
241 Ibid. 67. 
242 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997): 311. 
105 
Uruguay Round of negotiations, launched in Punta del Este on September 20th 1986, 
included the issue of intellectual property for negotiation as follows: 
"In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade 
and taking into account the need to promote effective and a d e q u a t ~ ~
protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and 
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves 
become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify 
GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and 
disciplines. ,,243 
Therefore, the scope of intellectual property protection to be negotiated during 
the Uruguay Round already appeared to be broader than the narrow scope of 
counterfeit goods originally tabled in the Tokyo Round. From the very outset of the 
Uruguay Round, there were severe disagreements between developed and developing 
countries over the direction of the intellectual property negotiations. Australia 
proposed that the Berne, Paris, Rome and Geneva Conventions be incorporated into 
the multilateral system, a proposal with which most economically developed countries 
agreed. On the other hand, India proposed that negotiations be limited to practices 
that distort international trade, a proposal with which many developing countries 
concurred. 244 
Resistance to the broader scope of TRIPS was not based on resistance to the 
idea of combating counterfeiting per se, rather it arose from the perception that the 
proposed TRIPS Agreement would embody "a policy of 'technological protectionism' 
aimed at consolidating an international division of labour.,,245 This 'technological 
protectionism' was perceived as protecting the interests of industrialised countries at 
the expense of the developing economies and was thus strongly resisted by many of 
the negotiating powers. Developing countries were concerned that greater intellectual 
243 GATT "Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round", 7. 
244 Teren;e P Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1993), (Deventer, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993): 2270-2272. 
245 Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS Agreement 
and Policy Options, 5. 
106 
property protection would strengthen the monopoly power of multinational 
corporations, and detrimentally affect the poor by increasing the prices of key 
d· . d.c: d 246 h . me lcmes an 100 s. It as also been claImed that developing countries never 
really had a significant part to play in the TRIPS negotiations. According to one 
commentator: 
"The negotiations on TRIPS are often said to have begun properly in the 
second half of 1989, when a number of countries made proposals, or the 
fIrst part of 1990, when five draft texts of an agreement were submitted to 
the negotiating group. A more sceptical view is that the negotiations were 
by then largely over. An even more sceptical view is to say that no real 
negotiations ever took place. Developing countries had simply run out of 
alternatives and options. ,,247 
It is certainly undeniable that private actors had a significant role to play in the 
drafting of the TRIPS Agreement, a public law instrument. For example, the 
Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) was seen as crucial in the TRIPS 
negotiations. 248 The IPC was made up of representatives from major US 
multinational corporations and presented a draft text which the negotiators then fme-
tuned. Thus, it could be said that the negotiators did not actually draft the full text of 
the fmal Agreement, but rather were heavily influenced by powerful private 
participants in the shape of the IPC and other lobby groups. Developing countries 
were concerned that intellectual property protection was only being considered in the 
context of its commercial effects, rather than also considering the use of IP protection 
in the context of national development. 249 Nevertheless, these concerns were 
sidelined by the developed countries who dominated the TRIPS negotiations. 
Indeed, as the Uruguay Round of negotiations progressed, the tensions 
between developing and developed countries appeared to diminish, whereas tensions 
246 Hoekman and Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO and 
Beyond, 283. 
247 Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996): 171. 
248 Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, Chapter 5. 
249 May and Sell, Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History, 157. 
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grew between industrialised nations, such as the United States and the European 
Community. This was as a result of the negotiations moving towards detailed 
substantive provisions which were not always in congruence with the existing 
domestic systems of protection. 250 
Whatever the truth about the tensions or otherwise between the countries 
negotiating the TRIPS Agreement, by a midterm review carried out in 1989, most 
countries, both developed and developing, agreed that substantive intellectual 
property protection was desirable and a framework for the TRIPS Agreement was put 
in place. 251 Furthermore, "by the time of the Dunkel text in December 1991, there 
seemed to be an enormous change in attitudes, including attitudes of developing 
countries, which led many such countries to be willing ultimately to accept the IP 
Agreement as part of the very broad package of the Uruguay Round.,,252 
It is unlikely that agreement between developing and developed countries, 
who had initially appeared diametrically opposed, was reached based solely on the 
text of the proposed TRIPS Agreement alone. Instead, consensus was achieved 
through the common negotiating strategy of 'linkage-bargaining'. This "occurs when 
a negotiator offers something of value to a counterpart as a means of convincing the 
counterpart to offer concessions on matters considered valuable to the negotiator.,,253 
In other words, developed countries gained the agreement of developing countries on 
intellectual property issues by threatening to withdraw concessions agreed in other 
trade areas of concern to developing nations, such as agriculture. Put simply, 
"They [the developing countries] were subjected to pronounced economic 
coercion leading up to and during the negotiations. Furthermore, they 
250 Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 312. 
251 Goldstein International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice, 55. 
252 Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 311. 
253 Donald G. Richards, Intellectual Property Rights and Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of 
the TRIPS Agreement, (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004): 123. 
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assented to an IP agreement in exchange for the OECD commitments to 
expand market access for developing countries agricultural and textile 
exports. ,,254 
This high stakes negotiating strategy has been heavily criticised, but did lead 
to agreement overall, which ultimately would not have been possible in single issue 
negotiations involving international standards for intellectual property protection. 
The fmal text of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights was signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on April 15th 1994 and can consequently be 
seen as a compromise on the part of the developing countries, in order to receive 
benefits from other areas of the WTO Agreements. 
Although the TRIPS Agreement can be seen as a highly significant step in the 
expansion of IP protection in the global system and is notable on many levels, TRIPS 
has also been the subject of various criticisms. In contrast to the existing international 
intellectual property Conventions, the TRIPS Agreement removes the national 
autonomy which was used to decide the appropriate level of protection at a domestic 
level. The TRIPS Agreement instead advances a 'one size fits all' approach which 
"defies both economic analysis and historical experience. ,,255 
Furthermore, the stated justification for the TRIPS Agreement has come under 
fire; the explicit aim of promoting economic development through stronger IP 
protection is disputed by several studies and the delicate balance between rights 
holders and the public interest is tipped firmly in favour of protection. Finally, the 
TRIPS obligations represent a stark departure from the existing GATT system. Not 
only was GATT previously focused on trade in goods, but the TRIPS Agreement also 
254 Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, 9. 
255 Ibid. 13. 
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contrasts with the Uruguay Round's aims of deregulation and trade liberalization by 
striving for "internationally driven re-regulation. ,,256 
Moreover, it could be claimed that the controversy surrounding the inclusion 
of intellectual property protection in the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations has its 
legacy in the full title of the resulting agreement, 'Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights', known as TRIPS. Initial negotiations had 
limited intellectual property protection to that relating to trade, but the [mal agreement 
is so far-reaching that 'trade-related' is a misleading title. 257 It has even been claimed 
that "the term TRIPS was invented to make the issue look GATT -relevant, but many 
economists think it is meaningless because intellectual property cannot be trade-
specific. ,,258 However, as both developed and developing countries conceded that a 
system of IP protection was a necessary inclusion in the international trading system, 
this seems an overly critical stance. 
The TRIPS Agreement, which resulted from these negotiations, has also been 
criticised as beneficial only to industrialised nations, whilst detrimentally affecting 
developing countries. This criticism is based on the notion that the standards of 
intellectual property protection it expounds are solely suitable for industrialised 
nations. 259 By protecting technology already established in developed countries and 
restricting the development of technology in poorer countries, it has been argued that 
developed countries could increase exports and stifle competition. The TRIPS 
Agreement has also been criticised for attempting to remove intellectual property 
256 Ibid. 15. 
257 Bhagirath Lal Das, The World Trade Organisation: A Guide to the Framework for International 
Trade, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1999): 355. 
258 Graham Dunkley, The Free Trade Adventure: The WTO, the Uruguay Round and Globalism- A 
Critique, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2000): 187. . . 
259 Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developmg Countnes: The TRIPS Agreement 
and Policy Options, 5. 
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protection from the realm of global politics by ignoring the developmental 
implications for developing nations and redefine it solely as a legal issue.26o 
Therefore, the TRIPS Agreement clearly had a controversial drafting history 
and has also been strongly criticised as favouring developed countries over 
developing countries. The specific provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which 
resulted from this complex negotiating process will now be considered. 
4.2.1 The Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS Agreement is one of the three so-called 'pillar' agreements that 
together make up the commitments of the WTO.261 While the drafting of the TRIPS 
agreement clearly caused controversy, what provisions does the [mal text of the 
Agreement actually contain? In sharp contrast to most 'negative' obligations imposed 
by the WTO agreements (e.g. not to use certain policies such as export subsidies or 
quotas), TRIPS invokes a 'positive' obligation to adopt a set of substantive rules.262 
This set of substantive rules is contained within 7 major parts and 73 articles of 
TRIPS. The seven areas covered are: copyright, trademarks, geographical indication, 
industrial design, patents, layout-design of integrated circuits, and undisclosed 
information. 263 
Among other provisions, the TRIPS Agreement: 
• Sets minimum standards of protection for these seven areas; 
• Sets minimum standards for the enforcement of intellectual property rights in 
administrative and civil actions; 
260 May and Sell, Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical His:01J!.' 16:. 
261 The full text of TRIPS is available at: World Trade OrgamsatlOn, Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights". . 
262Hoekman and Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Tradmg System: The WTO and Beyond, 
~ 6 ~ ~ h a g i r a t h h Lal Das, An Introduction to the WTO Agreements, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1998): 115. 
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• 
• 
Sets mInImUm standards, with regard to copyright pIracy and trademark 
counterfeiting, for the enforcement of intellectual property rights in criminal 
actions and actions at the border , 
Requires that, subject to limited exceptions, WTO members provide national 
and Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment to the nationals of other WTO 
members with regard to protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.264 
The extensive provisions of the TRIPS Agreement did not emerge solely from 
the Uruguay Round of negotiations; rather it pulls together and supplements previous 
intellectual property conventions.265 In fact, the substantive provisions on minimum 
levels of protection essentially incorporate existing IP conventions into the TRIPS 
Agreement. Part III of the TRIPS Agreement deals specifically with minimum 
standards for the enforcement of intellectual property rights. The TRIPS Agreement 
was a result of compromise between the negotiating positions of the developed and 
developing countries respectively, and the provisions on enforcement demonstrate this 
compromise. 266 In general, developed countries argued for stringently applied 
remedies, whereas developing countries were concerned about maintaining their 
judicial discretion. 
Thus, members are required to give the appropriate judicial authorities the 
power to grant certain remedies but without further specifying the substantive form 
that the remedy should take. This preserves the concept of judicial autonomy, seen as 
crucial by some members. The enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement were 
264 Summary ofTRlPS provisions adapted from Terence P Stewart, "China's compliance with World 
Trade Organization obligations: a review of China's first two years of membership", 
http://www.uscc.gov/researchreports/2004/stewartpaper/040415stewart.htm. accessed April 21st 
2004. 
265 Richards, Intellectual Property Rights and Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of the TRIPS 
Agreement,4. . 
266 Goldstein, International Copyright: Principles, Law and PractIce, 59. 
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also seen as crucial because the lack of enforcement prOVISIons ill the existing 
conventions was one of the main stimuli to the negotiation of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 267 C tl th TRIPS . onsequen y, e provIsions on enforcement will be decided 
below. 
4.2.2 The TRIPS Provisions on Enforcement 
As stated above, Part III of the TRIPS Agreement is concerned with the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights and this Part is divided into twenty one 
articles and five sections: 
• General Obligations (Article 41) 
• Civil and Administrative Procedures and Remedies (Articles 42-49) 
• Provisional Measures (Article 50) 
• Special Requirements Related to Border Measures (Articles 51-60) 
• Criminal Procedures (Article 61) 
All of these provisions on enforcement can be said to have two basic 
objectives: "One is to ensure that effective means of enforcement are available to 
rights holders; the second is to ensure that enforcement procedures are applied in such 
a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for 
safeguards against their abuse." 268 Part III as a whole also complements the 
substantive minimum standards of TRIPS as "from a rights holder's perspective, 
substantive minimum rights are of little value if there are no effective procedures for 
the enforcement of such rights. ,,269 
Section 1 of Part: III outlines the general obligations relating to enforcement. 
The frrst paragraph of Article 41 outlines the main principles of enforcement, that 
267 May and Sell, Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History, 173. 
268 World Trade Organisation, "Overview: The TRIPS Agreement", 
http://www.wto.org/englishltratope/tripse/intel2be.htm#enforcement. accessed November 2005. 
269 UNCTAD-ICTSD, "Resource Book on TRIPS and Development: An Authoritative and Practical 
Guide to the TRIPS Agreement", http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsdldocslRB 4.30 update. pdf, 
accessed October 2005, 575. 
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enforcement procedures shall "permit effective action against any act of infringement 
of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious 
remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further 
infringements." Sections 2 and 3 (dealing with civil and administrative procedures 
and remedies; and provisional measures) are applicable to all intellectual property 
rights infringements, whereas sections 4 and 5 (special requirements related to border 
measures and criminal procedures) apply only to trademark counterfeiting and 
copyright piracy. 
It is significant that, in sharp contrast to the substantive provisions, the TRIPS 
provisions on enforcement in part III mark a significant departure from previous 
intellectual property protection offered by international agreements such as the Paris 
and Berne Conventions by adding teeth to the substantive provisions. 
"Under these 'Great Conventions' as they are known, state practice treated 
the adoption in domestic law of a statute that more or less embodied an 
international standard as sufficient to discharge a given state's 
international responsibility, even if the domestic law in question were lax 
or loosely enforced, ,,270 
whereas under TRIPS, the prescribed mmlmum standards of protection have to 
actually be imp lemented. 
Another important consideration to take into account is that Part III of TRIPS 
does not attempt to harmonise national enforcement procedures, but rather aims to 
establish general minimum standards, which can then be implemented by each 
Member as they see fit. This approach is also laid out in the Preamble to TRIPS 
which states that the negotiating parties saw "the need for new rules and disciplines 
concerning ... c) the provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement 
of trade-related intellectual property rights, taking into account differences in national 
270 1. H. Reichman, "Enforcing the enforcement procedures of the TRIPS Agreement", Virginia Journal 
of International Law, 37 (Winter 1997),338. 
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legal systems"(emphasis added). This is important to remember when assessing 
China's compliance; even if China's IP system is considerably different from that of 
its trading partners, China could still be in compliance with TRIPS due to this built-in 
flexibility in the TRIPS Agreement. 
Overall, the drafting of the TRIPS Agreement provoked controversy between 
the developed and developing WTO Members and as a result, the [mal text of the 
Agreement reflects the compromises made in the negotiating process. This 
compromise is reflected most prominently in Part III provisions on enforcement. As 
the controversy surrounding the establishment of the TRIPS regime has now been 
outlined, the TRIPS Agreement will now be analysed in the context of compliance. 
4.3 Analysing the TRIPS Agreement- The Characteristics of the 
Accord 
According to the model of compliance presented above in Chapter 2 at page 
48, the characteristics of the specific accord may affect the prospects of compliance 
with it. Thus, it is crucial to consider the TRIPS Agreement itself before judging 
China's compliance with its intellectual property obligations under this accord. The 
non-country specific factors which may influence compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement should be considered under various categories: the perceived equity of the 
obligations; the precision of the obligations; provisions for obtaining scientific and 
technical advice; reporting requirements; provisions for other forms of monitoring; 
the secretariat; and other incentives and sanctions. 
4.3.1 The Perceived Equity of the Obligations 
The perceived equity of the TRIPS Agreement is in some doubt. As discussed 
above at section 4.2, negotiations over intellectual property rights within the GATT 
system were protracted and involved serious compromises on the part of the 
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developing countries in return for concessions in other areas of trade negotiations. 
During the TRIPS negotiations, China participated as an observer and joined with the 
bloc of developing countries in the TRIPS negotiations. Fourteen of these developing 
countries, including China, submitted a draft text concerning intellectual property in 
May 1990.
271 
Unlike the three rival drafts submitted by the United States, Japan and 
Switzerland respectively, the developing countries' draft emphasised the "need to take 
into consideration the public policy objectives underlying national systems for the 
protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological 
objectives. ,,272 This draft also emphasised that signatories should not have recourse to 
unilateral measures in the event of any dispute. However, the draft was heavily 
criticised for providing "a wide degree of latitude" to governments with respect to 
legislating on standards and for providing levels of protection seen as insufficient by 
developed countries.273 
It was clear after the rival drafts had been submitted that tensions still existed 
between the objectives of the developed countries and those of the developing 
countries within the TRIPS negotiations. In 1991, one developing country 
commented that they "continued to believe that the situation of the negotiations fell 
far short of addressing the special needs and problems of developing countries. ,,274 
Therefore, it is clear that throughout the negotiating and drafting process, there were 
concerns amongst the developing countries that their interests and concerns were 
271 Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights, "Communication from 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay", 
Document MTN.GNG/NGll/W171 at docsonline.wto.org accessed November 18th 2006. 
272 Ibid. 1. 
273 Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights, " M i n u ~ e s s of Meeting 
of Negotiating Group of 14-16 May 1990", Document MTN.GNGINGll/21 at docsonlme.wto.org, 
accessed November 18th 2006. 
274 Negotiating Group on T r a d e - R e l a t e ~ ~ ~ s p e c t s s ofIntellectual Property Rights including Trade in 
Counterfeit Goods, "Meeting ofNegotlatmg Group of27 and 28 Jun.e 1991 
Note by the Secretariat", Document MTN.GNG/TRIPS/I at docsonhne.wto.org, accessed November 
20th 2006. 
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being overlooked. As a result, there may still be a lingering perception that the [mal 
Agreement is not fair as it favours the interests of industrialised nations over poorer 
Members. If some Members do hold this perception, this may decrease the likelihood 
of their full compliance with their TRIPS obligations. 
4.3.2 The Precision of the Obligations 
The precision of the TRIPS Agreement is almost certainly an area of some 
doubt. This is not helped by the nature of the TRIPS Agreement itself, which is a 
minimum standards agreement. This means that each member must provide 
protection of at least the standard provided for in the agreement, but is free to decide 
exactly how to implement the specific provisions. In this minimum standards nature, 
it is similar to a European Union directive. The minimum standards nature of the 
TRIPS Agreement is provided for by Article 1, which states: 
"Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members 
may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive 
protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such 
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. 
Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal 
d . ,,275 system an practIce. 
The precision of the obligations contained within the TRIPS Agreement is also 
subject to the balance between substantive precision and judicial autonomy which is a 
result of the hard fought negotiations during the drafting of the Agreement. For 
example, many of the Articles relating to enforcement provisions are couched in 
language which states that the judicial authorities should have the authority to grant a 
particular remedy but without further guidance on how this should be implemented. 
An example of this is Article 44, which provides that: "the judicial authorities shall 
have the authority to order a party to desist from an infringement". However, the 
275 World Trade Organisation, "Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights". 
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exact process of granting an injunction, the evidence which must be presented in order 
for an injunction to be granted, or any remedies for breach of an injunction are not 
further specified. This vagueness of language may lead to disputes. 
In general, the wording of the TRIPS Agreement has been condemned as 
"result-oriented" and vague. Many of the provisions require members to give judicial 
or other authorities the authority to do something, but these authorities are not then 
obliged to exercise this power.276 This flexibility within the obligations, particularly 
contained in Part III of TRIPS, means that assessing a Member's compliance can be 
problematic. 
For example, as stated above, Article 41 outlines the general obligations 
regarding enforcement procedures. Article 41 (1) commits Members to ensuring the 
availability of the specified enforcement procedures "so as to permit effective action 
against any act of infringement". "Effective action" is not defmed here and thus, 
there is considerable room for interpretation. It has even been stated that "any 
judgment about compliance should be objectively based on whether Members have 
made or not the required procedures available. ,,277 This test seems to be permissive; 
mere existence of the procedures seems to satisfy this obligation, regardless of how, 
or indeed if, the procedures are actually utilised. 
The analytical index of the WTO offers interpretation and application for any 
provisions that have been interpreted in cases brought before the WTO.278 However, 
there is little formal interpretation available concerning the TRIPS provisions on 
enforcement. The interpretation that is available concerns the scope of "unwarranted 
276 UNCTAD-ICTSD, "Resource Book on TRIPS and Development: An Authoritative and Practical 
Guide to the TRIPS Agreement", 576. 
277 Ibid. 580. 
278 World Trade Organisation, "WTO analytic i n d ~ x x ?uide to W T O . l a ~ ~ and practice", 
http://www.wto.org/englishlreselbookspe/analytIcmdexe/analytlcmdexe.htm. accessed August 
2005. 
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delays" in Article 41 (2) and the words "shall have the authority" in Article 42. As 
many subsequent Articles also use the wording "shall have the authority", this 
interpretation is signalled to be of broader application than just to Article 42. 
In India-Patents (EC) , India tried to claim that a generally available system 
was not required by the wording "shall have the authority" in Articles 42-48. 
However, this argument was rejected by the panel who affirmed that "the function of 
the words 'shall have the authority' is to address the issue of judicial discretion, not 
that of general availability." Therefore, although it has been argued that the mere 
provision of these procedures is sufficient, the outcome in this case would appear to 
suggest that compliance requires more; the procedures have to be available. 
To date there have been twenty-four disputes involving provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement.279 Several of these disputes have involved legal arguments about 
the precise nature of the obligations and arise from the imprecise nature of these 
obligations. Therefore, the precision of the obligations in the TRIPS Agreement is in 
doubt and this lack of precision may be a factor affecting compliance with the 
Agreement overall. 
4.3.3 Provisions for Obtaining Scientific and Technical Advice 
There are several provisions within the TRIPS Agreement which provide for 
technical assistance and cooperation to assist members to comply with their 
obligations. The main provision is contained within Article 67. Under Article 67, 
developed countries shall provide technical and fmancial cooperation in favour of 
developing and least-developed countries: 
"Such cooperation shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and 
regulations on the protection and enforcement of i n t e l l ~ c t u a l l property 
rights as well as on the prevention of their abuse, and shall mclude support 
279 As of July 2007 and including the recently launched complaints against China discussed below at 
page 216. 
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regarding the establishment or reinforcement of domestic offices and 
agencies relevant to these matters, including the training of personnel." 
This issue of technical assistance has been central to the agenda of the Council 
of TRIPS and has resulted in numerous initiatives, such as conferences and training 
semmars. It has also led to two joint initiatives between WIPO and the WTO' , 
specifically, "in 1998, the joint initiative on technical cooperation to assist developing 
countries in meeting the deadline for implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and, in 
2001, the same initiative targeted the least-developed country Members.,,28o 
In addition to the WIPO-run Cooperation for Development Program, the 
European Patent Office offers various programs, the World Bank includes IP in their 
legal training program and the WTO, UNCT AD and NGOs all offer support. In terms 
of bilateral support, the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
"spends around a quarter of its annual budget on legal and regulatory training. ,,281 
Therefore, it is clear that a variety of training programs exist under the auspices of 
Article 67 in order to assist developing countries to comply with the TRIPS 
Agreement. Furthermore, as the changes necessary to comply with TRIPS require 
considerable resources, many developing countries rely on this assistance?82 
However, it is clear from the wording of this provision that any such 
cooperation must be at the request of the developing country member and cannot be 
imposed by the developed country partner without mutually agreed terms and 
conditions. Therefore, this provision may not always allow for the necessary 
cooperation where it is perceived by the developing country member that the 
assistance offered is interference in domestic affairs rather than helpful support. 
280 Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: A Drafting History, 354. 
281 May and Sell, Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History, 177. 
282 Ibid. 
120 
In addition, the training programs and assistance offered has also been 
criticised for encouraging countries to adopt 'TRIPS-plus' legislation, regardless of 
whether it is in the country's best interests or not and for discouraging the use of 
autonomy or flexibility in implementation permitted under the TRIPS Agreement.283 
In other words, the assistance offered by developed countries may encourage 
recipients to model their IP system on the developed country which may not be a 
suitable model for emulation, particularly if it requires stronger protection than 
mandated by TRIPS. Furthermore, assistance offered may also breach the key TRIPS 
principle that each member is free to implement TRIPS provisions as they see fit. 
Thus, although assistance is available under Article 67 and many developing countries 
need such assistance, this training and cooperation may not always benefit the 
developing country as intended. Indeed, it has also been claimed that despite the 
provisions for cooperation under Article 67, "in the years since the promulgation of 
the WTO treaty there has been little- if any- real effort by developed countries to meet 
the Article 67 obligation.,,284 
There is further provision under Article 69 for more general international 
cooperation. This article provides that members: 
"Shall establish and notify contact points in their administrations and be 
ready to exchange information on trade in infringing goods. They shall, in 
particular, promote the exchange of information and cooperation between 
customs authorities with regard to trade in counterfeit trademark goods 
and pirated copyright goods." 
To comply with this provision, the WTO Secretariat established a list of 
contact points in the administration of members and the World Customs Organisation 
283 Ibid. 178. 
284 Hon. Bruce Lehman, "Copyright, Culture and Development: The ~ ? l e e ofIntellectual Property and 
ofWIPO in the Cultural Industries", http://www.iipi.org/speechesiBe1]lng Culture 052202.pdf, 12. 
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has established a database to facilitate the exchange of information regarding cross-
border trade in goods which infringe intellectual property rights.285 
Overall, there are provisions within the TRIPS Agreement itself for assistance 
and cooperation regarding implementation of TRIPS provisions. However, there is 
some dispute over the effectiveness of some of these measures and in general, there is 
a perception that developed countries could do more to assist developing country 
Members. 
4.3.4 Reporting Requirements 
The main reporting requirement IS created by Article 63 of the TRIPS 
Agreement which concerns transparency. Article 63(2) of the TRIPS Agreement 
provides that Members shall notify relevant laws and regulations to the Council for 
TRIPS "in order to assist that Council in its review of the operation of this 
Agreement." Relevant laws and regulations can also include final judicial decisions 
and administrative rulings which pertain to the subject matter of the TRIPS 
Agreement (Article 63(1)). There are also further reporting requirements contained in 
TRIPS, such as the requirement to notify of contact points under Article 69 or 
notification of certain options relating to national treatment under Article 3. The 
TRIPS Council may also ask for notification regarding a Member's involvement in 
cooperation under Article 67. 
It is clear that the notification requirements arising from the TRIPS Agreement 
are not insignificant. For example, notifications of laws and regulations under Article 
63 include: the texts of all relevant laws and regulations in their original language; 
translations into one WTO language; a listing of "other laws and regulations" in a 
specific format; as well as responses to a checklist regarding the law and practice of 
285 Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: A Drafting History, 360. 
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enforcement.286 However, the Council for TRIPS also recognises that the notification 
requirements may constitute a considerable burden for some Members: 
"It was recognised that the volume of these notifications would be very 
large and procedures were adopted to attempt to reduce the burdens for 
Members in preparing them as well as for the Secretariat in processing 
them.,,287 
Therefore, the reporting requirements of the TRIPS Agreement may operate 
against full compliance despite some allowances made by the TRIPS CounciL 
Although it is clearly necessary for Members to inform the Council for TRIPS of laws 
and regulations affecting IP rights, some Members, especially developing country 
Members, may struggle to fulfil their reporting obligations, especially when combined 
with various other reporting requirements of the WTO. It may be necessary to offer 
further assistance to support some Members in fulfilling these reporting requirements, 
such as the WIPO assistance with translation of laws and regulations into a WTO 
language for the purposes of Article 63.2. 
4.3.5 Provisionsfor Other Forms of Monitoring 
There are various bodies which monitor intellectual property standards 
internationally. The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) is one of the 
main organisations in the field of international intellectual property. WIPO' s strategic 
goals are to promote an IP culture; to integrate into national development policies and 
programs; to develop laws and standards; to deliver quality services in global IP 
protection systems; and to increase the efficiency of WIPO' s management and support 
processes. 288 Consequently, although the role of WIPO is not directly related to 
active monitoring of individual countries' IP standards, the development of these 
286 World Trade Organisation, "Technical Cooperation Handbook on Notification Requirements: 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects o f I n ~ e l l e c t u a l l Property.Rights", available at 
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto e/whatIs e/eol/e/pd£lnotnpsl.pdf, accessed January 2006,4. 
287 Ibid. 
288 WIPO, "What is WIPO?" http://www.wipo.intlabout-wipo/enlwhat is wipo.html, accessed 
February 24th 2006. 
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standards indirectly incorporates a form of passive monitoring. Thus, the role of 
WIPO could be said to be a form of monitoring. 
There are also a number of international intergovernmental organisations 
which are granted observer status at meetings of the TRIPS Council. 289 These 
organisations could also be informally seen as a form of monitoring of the operation 
of the TRIPS Agreement, although clearly their role is not to question an individual 
Member's compliance. 
Food and Agriculture Organization (F AO) 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (UPOV) 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) 
United Nations (UN) 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 
World Bank 
World Customs Organization (WCO) 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
Figure 4-1 International Intergovernmental Organisations with observer status at TRIPS 
Council 
In addition to these organisations which hold formal observer status, the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) may also observe TRIPS Council meetings on an 
ad hoc basis. Additionally, there are various bodies globally that may informally 
monitor the operation of the TRIPS Agreement through monitoring intellectual 
property protection and levels of counterfeiting and piracy. These bodies will be 
considered further under the category of the international environment below at page 
135. 
289 World Trade Organisation, "lntemationallntergovemmental Organizations granted Observer Status 
to WTO Bodies", http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/igoobse.htm#trips. accessed November 22nd 
2006. 
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4.3.6 The Secretariat 
The Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the 
Council for TRIPS) is formally established by the WTO Agreement. Article IV (5) 
establishes that the Council for TRIPS shall operate under the general guidance of the 
General Council, but with the power to create its own rules of procedure and 
subsidiary bodies as necessary.290 Article 68 of the TRIPS Agreement further details 
the creation of the Council for TRIPS, which is responsible for monitoring the 
operation of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 68 states: 
"The Council for TRIPS shall monitor the operation of this Agreement 
and, in particular, Members' compliance with their obligations hereunder, 
and shall afford Members the opportunity of consulting on matters 
relating to the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights." 
It is clear that monitoring Members' compliance with TRIPS "is the 
predominant task of the Council. ,,291 However, as the wording of Article 68 implies, 
monitoring by the Council does not only relate to Members' compliance, but extends 
to the operation of the TRIPS Agreement in general. 
The Council for TRIPS is also the forum where members can consult on 
matters relating to intellectual property. This provision that the Council shall provide 
Members with a chance to consult over IP issues is intended to avoid the use of the 
formal dispute settlement process. The Council is also responsible for providing 
assistance in the event of any disputes and overseeing the review of legislation in 
member countries. One of the ftrst tasks completed by the Council for TRIPS was the 
establishment of formal links with WIPO under Article 68, for ease of cooperation. 
The Council for TRIPS is also the body responsible for the review and amendment of 
the TRIPS Agreement, after the expiration of the one year transitional period and 
290 World Trade Organisation, "Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization", 
http://www.wto.org/englishldocs e/legal e/04-wto.pdf, accessed December I 8 ~ ~ 2 ~ 0 4 : : 11. . 
291 UNCT AD-ICTSD, "Resource Book on TRIPS and Development: An AuthontatIve and PractIcal 
Guide to the TRIPS Agreement", 744. 
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every two years thereafter under Article 71. Thus, there are five main functions that 
the Council for TRIPS performs292 , as summarised in the table below. 
Role of the TRIPS Council 
1. Monitoring 
2. Consultation 
3. Technical Cooperation 
4. Review and Negotiations on Specific Subjects 
5. Review of the TRIPS Agreement 
Figure 4-2 Role of the TRIPS Council as specified by the WTO 
It is clear from the detailed Annual Reports submitted by the Council for 
TRIPS that the Council performs a significant number of important tasks to ensure the 
full implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. For example, the Annual Report for 
2006 lists the activities carried out in three formal meetings of the Council. 293 The 
Council took note of new notifications by members regarding new or amended 
legislation relevant to the TRIPS Agreement; continued with the process of reviewing 
the legislation of developing country members; undertook the annual transitional 
review of China's implementation efforts required by Article 18 of China's accession 
protocol; continued its discussion relating to biological diversity and the protection of 
traditional knowledge and folklore; continued its discussion of the issue of 
geographical indications; and agreed a draft regarding TRIPS and public health to be 
sent to the General Council, amongst other issues. 
Overall, the Council for TRIPS works hard to fulfil its role of monitoring both 
individual Members' compliance and the operation of the TRIPS Agreement in 
general. In addition, the Council plays a useful role in mediating between Members, 
292 World Trade Organisation, "Frequently Asked Questions about TRIPS in the WTO", 
http://www.wto.orglenglishltratope/tripse/tripfge.htm. accessed November 23rd 2006. 
293 Council for TRIPS, "Annual Report (2006) of the Council for TRIPS" (IP/e/44), available at 
docsonline.wto.org, accessed February 2nd 2007. 
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to try to avoid the use of the formal dispute resolution mechanism. Therefore, the role 
of the secretariat would appear to be a factor which encourages compliance. 
4.3.7 Other Incentives and Sanctions 
There are certain provisions in the TRIPS Agreement relating to least-
developed country members. These provisions act in addition to the general clauses 
relating to technical and international cooperation outlined above. For example, under 
Article 66, in addition to granting the least-developed countries substantial transitional 
periods to comply with the TRIPS Agreement, Article 66(2) also provides that: 
"Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and 
institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and 
encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members in 
order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base." 
In theory, this provision should increase the incentives for least-developed 
countries to cooperate with the TRIPS regime as they will be entitled to significant 
assistance in terms of technology transfer from more developed members. However, 
in practice, transfers are not as frequent as the Article would suggest, as many 
Members are reluctant to transfer their technology prior to the least-developed partner 
enacting effective intellectual property protection. 
With this reluctance in mind, on 19th February 2003, the Council for TRIPS 
adopted a decision that developed country Members should make annual reports 
regarding their activities under Article 66.2?94 This decision was prompted by the 
Ministerial meeting at Doha which had directed Members to put in place a mechanism 
for ensuring the monitoring and full implementation of the obligations in Article 66.2. 
These annual reports should contain an overview of the incentives regime put in place, 
294 Council for TRIPS, "Implementation of Article 66.2 ofthe TRIPS Agreement - Decision ofthe 
Council for TRIPS of 19 February 2003" (IP/C128), available at docsonline.wto.org, accessed June 24th 
2006. 
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as well as information regarding the operation of these incentives, including details of 
technology transferred and recipient countries. 
According to the minutes of the Council for TRIPS meeting which established 
the annual report mechanism to monitor Article 66.2, the proposal was well-received 
by developing countries. For example, the representative of Bangladesh said that: 
"Implementation of Article 66.2 was of prime importance to LDCs. 
Developing countries, and in particular LDCs, had assumed onerous 
responsibilities in the TRIPS Agreement. Article 66.2 was one of the few 
prOVISIons in Uruguay Round agreements that provided LDCs 
opportunities to build up their economies, and thereby helped them to 
comply with TRIPS provisions.,,295 
It is clear from the comments of the Bangladesh representative that Article 66 
is seen as highly significant for the developing countries. In fact, Article 66 is almost 
seen as 'payback' for agreeing to some of the most burdensome obligations contained 
within TRIPS and could therefore be seen as one of the 'carrots' offered in the 
negotiating process. 
In contrast to these additional incentives available for complying with the 
TRIPS Agreement, sanctions for non-compliance are less clear. The Council for 
TRIPS does not have any power to impose sanctions for non-compliance; the role it 
plays is positive, to facilitate Members' compliance rather than identify offenders. 
Thus, the only route available to sanction non-complying Members is through the 
WTO dispute resolution mechanism. Overall, although further incentives do exist to 
increase the likelihood of compliance, particularly the potential for technology 
transfer under Article 66(2), there are few sanctions applicable to Members that do 
not fully comply with their TRIPS obligations. 
295 Council for TRIPS, "Minutes of Meeting- Held 18-19 February 2003" (IP/CIM/39), available at 
docsonline.wto.org, accessed June 18th 2006. 
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4.3.8 The Characteristics of the Accord Overall 
The various characteristics of the TRIPS Agreement itself may affect whether 
Members fully comply with their obligations or not. These characteristics and their 
effect on compliance are summarised in the table below. 
Characteristic of the TRIPS Agreement Evaluation 
Perceived equity of the TRIPS obligations Poor 
Precision of the TRIPS obligations Poor 
Provisions in TRIPS for obtaining Adequate 
scientific and technical advice 
Reporting requirements under the TRIPS Adequate 
Agreement 
Provisions for other forms of monitoring Poor 
under the TRIPS Agreement 
The Secretariat of the TRIPS Agreement Good 
Other incentives and sanctions Incentives- Adequate 
Sanctions- Poor 
Figure 4-3 Summary of characteristics of the TRIPS Agreement and Effect on Compliance 
The most problematic areas of the TRIPS Agreement overall are the perceived 
equity and the precision of the obligations contained within the Agreement. There is a 
general perception originating in the drafting process that the standards of protection 
embodied in the TRIPS Agreement protect the interests of developed country 
Members, whilst preventing the economic development of developing country 
Members. This perceived inequality clearly operates against compliance. The 
precision of the obligations is also in doubt; as TRIPS obligations are imprecise, 
compliance with them is difficult to measure and thus countries may not do all that 
they should to comply with the accord. In addition, although the Council for TRIPS 
plays an important role in monitoring compliance, other monitoring provisions are 
largely absent. Moreover, the reporting requirements may be difficult for some 
Members to comply with and the provisions for assistance and cooperation that exist 
may not be used as much as they should be. 
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Therefore, in relation to the TRIPS Agreement, the institutional framework as 
represented by the Council for TRIPS is sound, but the procedural framework in terms 
of available incentives, sanctions and monitoring varies in terms of promoting 
compliance. The features that most discourage full implementation of and 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement are related to how the substantive provisions 
are actually written, namely the perceived inequality and imprecision of the 
obligations. This may be a result of the negotiating process that led to the 
establishment of the TRIPS Agreement and the inevitable compromises that were 
made between negotiating parties. Overall, there are certain characteristics of the 
TRIPS Agreement itself that may not encourage full compliance, particularly the 
perception that the provisions benefit certain Members more than others and the 
imprecision of some of the provisions. 
4.4 The Characteristics of the Activity Involved 
According to the Brown Weiss and Jacobson comprehensive model of 
compliance, the characteristics of the activity involved may also affect whether 
compliance with the international accord can be achieved. There are four elements of 
the activity which need to be considered: the number of actors involved; the effect of 
economic incentives; the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in the activity; 
and the concentration of the activity in major countries. These elements will now be 
considered for the specific activity with which the TRIPS Agreement is concerned to 
resolve, namely intellectual property infringements. 
4.4.1 Number of Actors Involved 
The first element of intellectual property infringements that may be influential 
in ensuring compliance with the TRIPS Agreement is the number of actors involved 
in the activity. Clearly, in the case of piracy and counterfeiting, large numbers of 
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actors are involved worldwide. However, it is equally clear that it is difficult to 
estimate clearly the number of actors involved due to the opaque nature of the activity. 
Furthermore, intellectual property infringements are a problem worldwide and 
are not just restricted to a few developing countries. Thus, the number of actors 
involved in the activity is large and this may act against compliance. As a large 
number of actors are involved in counterfeiting and piracy, dealing with this activity 
is clearly not straightforward as it follows the "conventional wisdom that the smaller 
the number of actors involved in the activity, the easier it is to regulate it.,,296 
4.4.2 Effect of Economic Incentives 
The second element of intellectual property infringements which needs to be 
considered is the possible effect of economic incentives. In this case, the effect of 
economic incentives on the levels of intellectual property infringements needs to be 
considered. Undoubtedly, economic incentives are highly relevant to the specific 
activity ofIP infringements, as economic considerations are the primary factor behind 
a great deal of the existing global infringements. 
Clearly, economic incentives may playa large role in intellectual property 
infringements in general; for an individual company, infringing activities offer easy 
profits in the short-term which may seem more attractive than unknown long-term 
benefits from complying with intellectual property accords. The economic benefits of 
TRIPS compliance may be easier to appreciate on a macro-economic level, where 
. . . 297 
stronger intellectual property protechon may encourage greater mnovahon. 
296 Jacobson and Brown Weiss, "Assessing the Record and Designing Strategies to Engage Countries", 
521. " A' Ch' , 
297 K . th Maskus "Intellectual Property Rights m the WTO AcceSSIOn Package: ssessmg ma s R e f o ; ~ s ' " " h t t p : / / ~ i t e r e s o u r c e s . w o r l d b a n k . o r g ! I N T R A N E T T R A D E l R e s o u r c e s / m a s k u s s tips. pdf, 
accessed 24th February 2004, 7. 
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4.4.3 The Role of MNCs in the Activity 
The third element of intellectual property infringements that may be important 
to the likelihood or otherwise of compliance with the TRIPS Agreement is the role of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) in the activity. The companies actually 
committing the majority of intellectual property infringements do not tend to be 
MNCs, but rather smaller, less visible enterprises. In the context of intellectual 
property rights, MNCs do have a strong role to play, as there is a growing recognition 
of the value of intangible assets to a company. However, it is only in the past couple 
of decades that this recognition has been widespread amongst MNCs. 
Therefore, the role MNCs played in intellectual property protection was 
limited until the 1980s. Once MNCs did begin to seek to protect their rights, they 
swiftly formed a powerful lobby group, in order to pressurise governments globally to 
seek stronger international IP standards. This is clearly evidenced in the Uruguay 
round of GATT negotiations, when, for the fIrst time, the influence of the MNCs was 
notable. 298 
However, this pressure from MNCs may not necessarily be seen as a positive 
force; on the contrary, MNCs are sometimes perceived as just seeking to protect their 
own interests with little or no regard to the economic development of developing 
countries. Hence, the role of MNCs in the fIeld of intellectual property rights is a 
signifIcant driver toward stronger protection, but may not be a wholly positive factor 
in encouraging compliance amongst smaller developing WTO Members as vocal 
MNCs can cause local hostility. 
298 See discussion above at page 107 concerning the role of the Intellectual Property Committee in the 
TRIPS drafting process, for example. 
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4.4.4 The Concentration of the Activity in Major Countries 
The final element of the specific activity that should be taken into account as 
an influence on potential TRIPS compliance is the concentration of the activity in 
major countries. This factor is important because it could affect the concentration of 
pressure to comply; if the activity is limited geographically, pressure to comply is less 
likely to be universal. In the case of intellectual property infringements, the activity is 
certainly not only limited to a handful of countries. On the contrary, infringements 
are a global phenomenon, although rates of IP infringements do vary from country to 
country. 
For example, the Global Piracy Study conducted annually by the Business 
Software Alliance shows marked variation in levels of software piracy worldwide. 299 
Globally, piracy of software stands at an average of 35%, implying that "for every 
two dollars worth of PC software purchased legitimately, one dollar's worth was 
obtained illegally. ,,300 However, this average includes vast differences in piracy rates 
from one country to another. The highest piracy rate observed was in Vietnam at 90%, 
while the lowest was in the US where only 21 % of software was pirated. China was 
ranked as fourth worst offender for software piracy with a piracy rate of 86%. 
However, this did represent a four-point drop from the previous survey, the biggest 
. f f h . . d 301 Improvement 0 any 0 t e mnety-seven countnes surveye . Therefore, it is 
obvious that even the most developed countries suffer from intellectual property 
infringements and this activity is not solely concentrated in a few developing 
countries. However, the worst rates of infringements are to be found in developing 
countries, predominantly in the Asia-Pacific region. 
299 Business Software Alliance, "Third Annual BSA and IDe Global Software Piracy Study", 
http://www.bsa.org/globalstudyluploadl2005%20Piracy%20Study%20-%200fficial%20Version.pdf, 
accessed July 19th 2006. 
300 Ibid. 1. 
301 Ibid. 4. 
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In addition to the overall number of countries invo lved in infringing activities, 
it is also relevant to consider the extent of the activity in one country as a proportion 
of the total. In other words, it may be more efficient to focus on one country which is 
responsible for a large proportion of the overall activity rather than several smaller 
countries each responsible for a small proportion of the total. In fact, this may explain 
why China is so consistently the focus of scrutiny regarding its intellectual property 
protection; as China's contribution is so large, if compliance in China can be achieved, 
this would make a significant contribution toward decreasing the total amount of 
infringing activity. Conversely, this constant pressure on China may contribute to 
China's perception of unequal treatment and actually discourage greater compliance 
with TRIPS obligations. Overall, the location of infringing activity may be relevant to 
compliance for two reasons. Firstly, as infringements are not limited to just a few 
countries, the problem is more difficult to tackle. Secondly, certain countries may be 
responsible for a larger proportion of the infringing activity overall and thus more 
attention may be devoted to those countries, although this attention may create 
resentment. 
4.4.5 The Characteristics of the Activity Overall 
In general, the characteristics of the activity involved in the TRIPS Agreement, 
intellectual property infringements, may playa part in affecting the implementation of 
and compliance with the Agreement. The most significant of these is the economic 
incentives invo lved in infringing activities and the discouraging effect that they may 
have on compliance with TRIPS obligations by offering individuals and private 
companies easy profits in the short-term. 
Multinational corporations also playa role in lobbying for stronger intellectual 
property protection. Although they played a large part in the negotiations regarding 
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the drafting of the TRIPS Agreement, their role in the IP field today is not entirely 
welcome. In fact, pressure from MNCs may discourage implementation of and 
compliance with TRIPS obligations in some developing countries. Finally, both the 
number of actors and the number of countries involved in intellectual property 
infringements may also discourage compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. As both a 
large number of actors and a large number of countries are involved, it may be 
difficult to assess compliance reliably and there may be scope for individual 
enterprises and countries to not do as much as they should. 
4.5 The International Environment 
In addition to the characteristics of the specific accord and the specific activity 
invo lved, the international environment surrounding the specific activity and accord 
should also be examined. According to the comprehensive model of compliance 
proposed by Brown Weiss and Jacobson, there are several elements of the 
international environment that may influence compliance with the specific 
international obligations. These include: major international conferences, worldwide 
media and public opinion, the presence of international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), the number of parties adhering to the accord and other 
international organisations including international fmancial organisations. As the 
model is not restricted to intellectual property protection, some of these factors may 
be more relevant than others. Thus, the international environment will be considered 
under three main headings: the role of international organisations; worldwide media 
and public opinion and the number of parties adhering to the TRIPS Agreement. 
4.5.1 The Role of International Organisations 
International organisations active in the intellectual property field may include 
both intergovernmental organisations and industry lobby groups. The role that these 
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organisations may play mostly consists of monitoring and pressure. Apart from the 
WTO, WIPO is arguably the most important international organisation operating in 
the field of intellectual property rights and WIPO's role in working with the Council 
of TRIPS to improve TRIPS compliance and assist developing countries to build 
effective IP systems has been discussed above. Although WIPO does play an 
important role in supporting the TRIPS Agreement, the organisation is also criticised 
for lacking any effective means of enforcing IP Agreements which it is charged with 
administering. 
However, there are also a host of other international bodies which may playa 
part in intellectual property protection. For example, the International Intellectual 
Property Alliance (lIP A) is a coalition representing US copyright-based trade 
associations in a number of sectors such as software, music, film and publishing.302 
The lIP A has a large part to play in the Annual Special 301 Report issued by the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR); the lIP A Issues specific 
recommendations for each country which can form a significant part of the USTR's 
fmal report.303 The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) is another US 
based organisation lobbying for higher levels of IP protection, with membership open 
to IP rights holders predominantly in the US. There are also a number of think-tanks 
world wide which contribute to the IP debate, such as the IP Institute, a London-based 
think-tank focused on research into economic aspects of intellectual property. 
Despite the large number of international organisations which exist within the 
IP arena, their role in encouraging TRIPS compliance is minor. This is due to a 
number of reasons; not only do these international organisations not enjoy widespread 
302 International Intellectual Property Alliance, "Description of the lIP A", November 2005, 
h t t p : / / w w w . i i p a . c o m J a b o u t i i p a . h t r ~ l , , a c c e s s ~ d d February 19th 2007. . 
303 The Special 301 reports and Chma are dIscussed further below at sectIOn 6.3.4.1. 
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public support, but as many of them are US based, they may face the same feelings of 
resentment that MNCs do when pressuring for stronger IP protection. 
4.5.2 Worldwide Medial Public Opinion 
The influence of global public opinion is linked to previous discussion of the 
limited role of MNCs and international organisations; as there is a lack of consensus 
in public opinion worldwide on the issue of IP protection, strong pressure to increase 
IP standards is at risk of being perceived as imposed by certain self-interested actors. 
Indeed, the global issue of IP protection could be seen as a delicate balancing act 
between weak IP protection to stimulate low level economic growth and strong IP 
protection to protect innovative industries. This lack of global agreement on required 
IP standards differs from public opinion regarding other areas of international 
agreements; not everyone may benefit equally from improved IP protection. 
Therefore, without clear consensus in worldwide opinion, there is a lack of consistent 
media pressure toward TRIPS compliance. 
4.5.3 Number of Parties Adhering to this Accord 
As of 11th January 2007, the WTO has 150 Members. 304 After the 
establishment of the WTO in 1995, developed countries were granted a one-year 
transition period, meaning they had to comply with TRIPS from 1st January 1996; 
developing countries and most transition economies were allowed until 1st January 
2000 to comply. In addition, 32 WTO Members are designated as least-developed 
countries, which means they have a longer transition period within which to bring 
their IP system into compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. This was due to expire 
on 1st January 2006, but was extended to 1 st January 2016 for pharmaceutical patents. 
304 World Trade Organisation, "Understanding the WTO: Members and Observ.ers", 
http://www.wto.orglenglishlthewtoe/whatise/tife/org6e.htm. accessed Apn127th 2007. 
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Therefore, the majority of WTO Members are now subject to the provisions of 
the TRIPS Agreement and must adhere to their commitments. As there are now such 
a large number of countries within the TRIPS system, it is possible that this may drive 
momentum towards greater overall compliance with the Agreement. 
4.5.4 The International Environment Overall 
In general, the international environment does not play a critical role in the 
formulation and implementation of international intellectual property protection 
standards. In contrast to the field of international environmental protection, where 
changes in the international environment are considered to be the most important 
factor in the trend toward improved implementation and compliance in the 1980s and 
1990s, the international environment is not as significant for intellectual property 
protection. The sole feature of the international environment that may encourage 
greater compliance with the TRIPS Agreement is the number of countries that are 
now WTO Members and thus subject to the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. In 
terms of momentum, there are few countries left outside of this regime and thus 
individual Members may not want to be seen to be lagging behind. This effect may 
accelerate once all the transition periods applicable to least-developed countries have 
ended and when all countries then have to fully comply with the TRIPS Agreement. 
4.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has considered various non-country specific factors which may 
have an impact on compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. Of these factors, arguably 
the most significant are the perceived inequity and imprecision of the obligations 
contained within the TRIPS Agreement. These factors arose due to the drafting 
history of the Agreement and the nature of TRIPS as a minimum standards agreement. 
Other factors related to characteristics of the TRIPS Agreement specifically include 
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the burden of notification obligations that Members must fulfil and the lack of 
sufficient incentives in the form of technology and cooperation from developed 
country Members. On the other hand, the TRIPS Agreement does have several 
features that may have a positive effect by encouraging compliance. These include 
the broad role of the Council for TRIPS and the role of the WTO dispute resolution 
body as a multilateral forum for resolving disputes and imposing sanctions. 
With regards to the characteristics of the activity that the TRIPS Agreement 
aims to confront, namely the problem of intellectual property infringements, and the 
international environment surrounding the issue of IP protection, there are also several 
factors which may affect compliance. The most significant of these are the large 
number of actors and countries involved in IP infringements; piracy is a global 
activity, which makes it difficult to combat. In addition, many infringers are 
encouraged by short-term economic gains from IP infringements. Other factors which 
may have a smaller adverse effect on compliance include the lack of consensus in 
public opinion worldwide on the subject of IP protection and a certain amount of 
resentment towards MNCs and international IP organisations based in powerful 
developed countries for the pressure they impose for stronger IP protection. 
However, as with the characteristics of the TRIPS Agreement, the 
international environment and characteristics of the activity of IP infringements may 
also have a positive impact on compliance. Specifically, the role of international 
organisations such as WIPO and the large number of countries which are now 
included in the WTO system may both entice countries to comply with the TRIPS 
Agreement. Having examined factors relating to the TRIPS Agreement in general, 
the next chapter will focus specifically on factors which may influence China's 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. 
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5 Implementing TRIPS in China: Country-Specific Factors 
Influencing TRIPS Compliance 
According to the comprehensive model of compliance outlined previously in 
section 2.4, in addition to the characteristics of the activity involved, the 
characteristics of the accord and the international environment, there are various 
country-specific factors which should be considered in analysing China's compliance 
with international obligations, the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in this instance. 
Under this model, these country-specific factors can be divided into three categories; 
parameters, fundamental factors and proximate factors. It is immediately clear that 
these categories may not be mutually exclusive and indeed, there is a considerable 
overlap between some of the factors. 
For example, several of the respondents comment on the pace of China's 
economic development in the past few decades and the corresponding influence on 
the IP system today. However, these comments defy simple categorization, as they 
clearly relate both to the influence of China's economy on the IP system, as well as 
the history of the IP system. Therefore, in the discussion below, some elements may 
be discussed under more than one category and any overlaps may be highlighted 
further in the analysis of the original model below. On the questionnaire, the factors 
which may contribute to the current state of the IP system in China were divided into 
four loose categories; social and cultural factors, economic factors, political factors 
and factors specific to the legal system (see Appendix 3 for a copy of the 
questionnaire used in this study). 
Furthermore, question 15 listed sixteen factors which had been previously 
cited in the literature as responsible for the current state of the intellectual property 
system in China. Respondents were asked to rate the contribution of each of these 
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factors on a scale from 0 to 6, where 0 represents no contribution and 6 signifies a 
major contribution to the current IP system in China. 
The results of question 15 in terms of the respondents' ranking of these factors 
is summarised below in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1- Factors contributing to the current IP system as ranked by respondents 
Rank Factor A v e r a ~ e e score 
1 Lack of public awareness ofIP rights 4.44 
2 Local protectionism 4.13 
3 Inadequate penalties 3.96 
4 Lack of consistency in enforcement 3.8 
5 Weak judicial enforcement 3.76 
6 Lack of powers to enforce court judgments 3.73 
7 Lack of trained and experienced legal personnel 3.71 
8 Length of the process 3.24 
9 Lack of transparency 3.11 
10 Lack of the concept of individual rights in China 3 
11 The role of the government in the economy 2.89 
12 Over-reliance on public enforcement mechanisms 2.84 
13 Lack of a unified agency for dealing with IP 2.76 
14 Perception that IP only benefits foreigners 2.42 
15 Influence of socialism l.78 
16 Influence of Confucianism l.09 
These country-specific factors contributing to China's TRIPS compliance will 
now be analysed in more detail. 
5.1 Parameters 
According to the Brown Weiss and Jacobson comprehensive model of 
compliance, the first category of country-specific factors that may affect China's 
compliance with its international obligation is parameters. Parameters include basic 
characteristics of the specific country such as the previous behaviour of the country in 
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that area of concern; the history and culture of the country; the physical size of the 
country; the physical variation within the country and the number of neighbours that 
the country has. These suggested parameters will now be applied to China to assess 
their significance to China's TRIPS compliance. 
5.1.1 Previous Behaviour 
As described above in Chapter 1, the development of intellectual property law 
has not followed a smooth and unbroken path. Intellectual property was virtually 
unknown until the final years of the Qing dynasty and its introduction in the early 
years of the twentieth century was predominantly as a result of Western pressure to 
reform the legal system and China's concomitant desire to bring extraterritoriality to 
an end. These initial intellectual property laws, introduced first by the Qing rulers and 
later by the KMT government, were not comprehensively implemented due to 
political unrest during China at that time. 
When the PRC was established in 1949, the legal system, including the early 
intellectual property laws, was overhauled as new socialist laws were launched. 
These laws initially conformed to the Soviet model of IP laws, but later became even 
more radical, transferring all IP rights in inventions and creations to the state. In 
addition, much of the legal framework of courts, lawyers and judges was dismantled 
during the Cultural Revolution. Thus, at the start of the reform period in the late 
1970s, China faced an awesome task in rebuilding the entire legal system, embracing 
both substantive laws and regulations, the court system and the necessary legal 
personnel. 
The establishment of a modern legal system beginning in 1978 also included 
the need for a modern system of intellectual property protection. Therefore, it could 
be said that the intellectual property system in China is still less than thirty years old. 
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It is noticeable that no respondents explicitly refer to intellectual property protection 
in China prior to the start of the reform period in 1978, although many respondents do 
consider China's development in the post-1978 period as a key factor in the 
contemporary IP system. For instance, one Chinese respondent explicitly states that 
the IP system: 
"Is changing every year since China's reform and opening-up" 
and that: 
"The success that China has achieved in intellectual property 
protection in the past 20 years is equivalent to what has been 
gained by others through several decades or even the efforts of a 
century. Without knowing this, it is unlikely that you will fully 
understand the development of IPR in China, or learn the relevant 
regulations.,,305 
This idea, that China's previous behaviour in the intellectual property arena 
only stretches back a short distance is echoed by this respondent: 
"Don't forget that the country only opened up 30 years ago. So 
these issues are only a small hick up ((sic)).,,306 
As a consequence, it would seem that respondents do not feel that China's 
previous behaviour of protecting intellectual property rights is a significant factor in 
the current system of protection. Rather, the only mention of the past is to recognise 
China's progress in such a short time span. 
5.1.2 History and Culture 
In addition to the influence of previous behaviour on a country's compliance, 
the history and culture of that country is also thought to playa significant role. In 
China the historical influences of Confucianism and socialism are often cited as , 
continuing influences in contemporary Chinese culture and consequently on the 
305 Questionnaire comments from respondent LAW27T. 
306 Questionnaire comments from respondent SERVICESO 1. 
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intellectual property system today. This category of factors clearly overlaps with the 
category of attitudes and values considered below at page 156 under the issue of 
fundamental factors affecting compliance. 
5.1.2.1 The Influence of Confucianism 
The fIrst element of Chinese history and culture which may be significant in 
China's TRIPS compliance today is the influence of Confucianism. Confucianism is 
often cited as the main reason why intellectual property protection is not stronger in 
China, even to the exclusion of other factors. The following quote is typical of the 
importance placed by some commentators on the influence of Confucianism by some 
commentators: "The cultural and political reasons for China's failure to develop 
intellectual property laws equivalent to those being contemporaneously developed 
elsewhere are rooted in the teachings of Confucius. ,,307 
There are two aspects to the influence that Confucian thought is believed to 
exert on the concept of intellectual property in China. Firstly, it is contended that 
Confucianism advocates a belief that "copying another's creative works is not morally 
bankrupt, a view contrary to Western beliefs.,,308 This is because copying or imitation 
is seen as a "noble art", and thus the Chinese were encouraged to become compilers 
rather than composers. 309 Imitation of a great master was seen as a mark of respect 
rather than a theft of their ideas. The second aspect of Confucianism that is held to 
impact upon the modem protection of intellectual property is the emphasis placed on 
collective rights, over individual rights.310 It has been suggested that this has led to a 
307 Feder, "Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China: You Can Lead a Horse to Water But 
You Can't Make it Drink", 231. 
308 Kolton, "Copyright Law and the People's C ~ ~ s s in the People's Republic of China: A Review and 
Critique of China's Intellectual Property Courts ,424. . . ." 
309 Yu "The Second Coming oflntellectual Property Rights III Chma , 17. 
, 
310 Ibid. 18. 
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lack of individual private property rights, which in tum has been blamed for the lack 
of intellectual property enforcement. 311 
However, despite the strong emphasis placed on the influence of 
Confucianism in the literature, most respondents did not agree that Confucianism is a 
primary factor in the effectiveness of the contemporary IP system in China. On the 
contrary, many respondents consider the influence of Confucianism on the modem IP 
system to be minimal. Out of the sixteen factors identified on the questionnaire as 
potential influences on the IP system in China, Confucianism did not rank as one of 
the most significant factors. On a scale of 0 to 6, where 0 represented no influence at 
all and 6 represented a very strong influence, Confucianism was ranked an average of 
1.09, suggesting that it plays only a minor role, if any, in the current IP system. 
Furthermore, compared to the scores chosen for other factors, Confucianism ranked 
sixteenth out of the sixteen factors. 
Clearly, this would suggest that most respondents feel that although 
Confucianism may still make some minor contribution to the IP system, there are 
many other factors of greater significance. However, this fmding is in stark contrast 
to the position of many previous studies. Thus, although it is possible that 
Confucianism really no longer is a major influence on the Chinese legal system, it is 
also possible that the responses in this study are from too small a sample to be 
representative or that the questions were framed inappropriately. 
In addition, there did not appear to be clear agreement about exactly what 
Confucianism means in the context of the intellectual property system. As one 
respondent commented when questioned about the influence of Confucianism: 
311Endeshaw, Intellectual Property in China: The Roots of the Problem of Enforcement, 37. 
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"I don't. r e ~ l I y y know about the Confucian part, but I would definitely, 
for s ~ c l a l l s s u e s s anyway, yeah, they, they have an attitude that yep, 
copying can be good [uh-huh]. Copying is not necessarily bad. 
[Uh-huh] 
And the whole idea of, um .. , you know, of taking something that 
w o r ~ s , , that you maybe didn't develop yourself and being able to 
duplicate that and, and, you know, the bottom line here is all about 
making money. [Yeah] So I don't know so much if it's about 
Confucianism.,,312 
As this comment suggests, there is some confusion about exactly what 
Confucianism means and whether it necessarily equates to willingness to copy. This 
perception is strengthened by the comments of another respondent who explained the 
influence of Confucianism as follows: 
"The principle generally is, let's say, don't do something radical, just 
keep quiet, keep everything in the middle, don't go to extremes. 
Let's say, this is an interpretation of Confucianism in one aspect. 
So, with the influence of Confucianism over 2000 years, or 2500 
years, most of the Chinese people feel the best way to solve 
conflicts and disputes are not in court. The best way to solve these 
is in (friends), in neighbourhoods, uh ... they don't like to go to court 
actually. This is the (bias of them). They seek justice through 
some relationships, through some friends, through some 
partnerships, some colleagues and so on.,,313 
Thus, these two respondents have defmed Confucianism quite differently in 
their interpretation of what it means for the intellectual property protection system in 
China. The fIrst respondent appears to be suggesting that Confucianism is linked to 
"an attitude that copying can be good", whereas the second respondent appears to be 
defIning Confucianism more in terms of the preference for non-legal resolutions to 
disputes, rather than linking it to an attitude towards copying. Therefore, the use of 
the concept of 'Confucianism' in the literature may be problematic as different 
respondents clearly interpret Confucianism in different ways and this reflects the 
uncertainty over the exact role of Confucianism in the contemporary IP system. 
312 Interview with respondent LAWlO. 
313 Interview with respondent LAW16. 
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However, there is evidence to suggest that overall respondents believe that 
Confucianism is not a major contributing factor to the IP system in China today. 
5.1.2.2 The Influence of Socialism 
The second element of history and culture that may be influential in the 
context of China is the influence of socialism. The lack of an emphasis on individual 
rights may also be attributed to the impact of socialism, as the socialist economic 
system is based on the notion that property belongs to the state, rather than the 
individual. Furthermore, as intellectuals have been targeted at various times during 
the PRC's history, especially during the Cultural Revolution, creators and innovators 
became reluctant to acknowledge their creations.314 Both Confucianism and socialism 
are thus seen by many observers to have played a major part in the evolution of the 
contemporary legal system; for example, "although Communism has had a significant 
influence on the Chinese legal system, the modern system is a product of both 
traditional culture and Maoism.,,315 
As discussed in Chapter 1 above, the development of intellectual property in 
the PRC has been strongly influenced by socialism, particularly in the years 
immediately following the establishment of the PRC in 1949. This initial reliance on 
Soviet legal models in the early 1950s gave way during the 1960s to a more extreme 
Socialist concept of intellectual property whereby all creations and innovations were 
properties of the state and the individual had no claim over them. This view was at its 
height during the Cultural Revolution, but has clearly faded from the legislation and 
official rhetoric in the years since the beginning of the reform and opening-up. 
Therefore, how strong an influence is socialism on the contemporary intellectual 
314 Yu "The Second Coming ofIntellectual Property Rights in China", 18 and discussed above at page 
, 
1 1 ~ ' K e n Y O n n S. Jenckes, "Protection of Foreign C o p ~ i g h ~ s s in C h ~ a : . . ~ e e Intellectual P r o p e ~ ~ ~ o u r t s s
and Alternative Avenues of Protection", South Califorma InterdlSclplmary Law Journal, 5. 5)4. 
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property system? Does it still militate against full compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement? 
Overall, socialism was not considered to be a highly significant influence on 
the current IP system by the majority of respondents in this study. The influence of 
socialism was ranked fifteenth out of the sixteen factors on the questionnaire and on 
the scale of 0 to 6, scored an average of 1.78. Therefore, it is clear that although it 
appears that socialism exerted a powerful influence on the intellectual property system 
in the pre-reform years of the PRC, this influence is perceived to have diminished in 
recent years. However, there appeared to be some differences of opinion amongst the 
respondents, with some respondents still attributing much of the ineffectiveness of the 
current system on the continuing influence of socialism. For example, one respondent 
from a foreign-invested enterprise in China claimed: 
"Socialism is an important cause of the problem.,,316 
On the other hand, most respondents expressed the opinion that the influence 
of socialism is no longer highly significant; 
"I don't think socialism can be blamed at all, I think maybe 
(specifically) it could, but in general I don't think it can be blamed or, 
you know, said to be a reason for, for the ineffectiveness of the 
protection of intellectual property here.,,317 
Besides this, several respondents mentioned the influence of socialism in the 
context of the success of the ruling Communist party; for instance, 
"At the end of the day, the traditional Communist party is at threat if 
. . t· ,,318 there IS no Innova Ion. 
This opinion, that further economic reform and development are essential for 
the future of Communist party rule and in turn, are dependent on increased innovation 
316 Questionnaire comments from respondent SERVICESOI. 
317 Interview comments from respondent LAWIO. 
318 Interview comments from respondent LAWOI. 
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supported by an effective intellectual property system, was also expressed by several 
other respondents. Therefore, although the influence of socialism is not significant in 
the way it was in the pre-reform years of the PRC, it may emerge that socialism is still 
a significant factor in the contemporary IP system as the government attempts to tread 
the fme line between maintaining China as a communist country and moving further 
towards a free market economy. Overall, these key influences of Confucianism and 
socialism seem to be thought by respondents in this study to have minimal effect on 
the intellectual property system in China today and thus, the history and culture of 
China may not play such an important role as suggested by some commentators. 
However, the low ranking given to the influences of Confucianism and socialism may 
also reflect limitations with this study in terms of number and range of respondents 
contacted or the wording of the questions asked. 
Notwithstanding the importance placed on cultural factors by many 
commentators, a note of caution is also sounded in a few instances. It is important to 
recognise that reliance on cultural factors assumes a cultural homogeneity that rarely 
exists; "at no time is any society'S culture monolithic.,,319 Furthermore, it is also 
argued that overemphasis on cultural factors can be misleading as, "the Chinese obey 
laws and observe rights if they are persuaded that it will be in their best interest to do 
so, just as people everywhere do.,,320 Therefore, although historical and cultural 
values may playa role in China's implementation of international intellectual property 
obligations, it is likely that other important factors also exert a strong influence. 
319 Alford, To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in C h ~ n e s e e .Civili.zat:,on, 6. 
320 Thomas Lagerqvist and Mary L. Riley, "How to Protect I n t e l l e ~ t u a l l ~ o p e ~ t y y Rights m C h ~ a a '. 
Riley, Lee, Lagerqvist and Liu, Protecting Intellectual Property Rlghts m Chma, (Hong Kong. S\\ eet 
& Maxwell Asia, 1997): 4-5. 
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5.1.3 Physical Size and Physical Variation 
The parameters which may impact upon China's compliance with its 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement also include basic characteristics of the 
country such as the size and variation of the country. Clearly China is a huge country, 
with great variation between the highly developed and industrialised seaboard and the 
largely rural and underdeveloped western interior. Indeed it has been recognised that, 
"the sheer size of China's landmass inhibits effective monitoring of compliance with 
Chinese intellectual property laws." 321 This characteristic may affect the 
implementation of intellectual property protection in China. Moreover, there is also an 
acknowledgement that certain areas of China, notably Beijing and Shanghai, are better 
at protecting IP than other smaller cities, or inland areas. 
As a matter of fact, one respondent from a multinational operating in China 
stated: 
"It's much better in some areas of China than others - China is not 
a single country but more like a series of smaller countries!,,322 
Consequently, it is difficult to make sweeping generalisations about the entire 
intellectual property system in China as there are massive variations between major 
cities such as Beijing and Shanghai and smaller cities or inland areas. This 
characteristic of China could be classified as one of the primary parameters of 
significance under the comprehensive model of compliance applied in this study. 
5.1.3.1 The Division between Central and Local Government 
In the context of China's physical size and variation, there are vanous 
considerations which may influence the operation of the contemporary intellectual 
property system, one of the most significant of which is the divide between the central 
321 Feder, "Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China: You Can Lead a Horse to Water But 
You Can't Make it Drink", 253. 
322 Questionnaire comments from respondent FOOD02. 
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and the local levels of government. As China is so large, many local and provincial 
governments are physically very far away from the central government in Beijing. 
Thus, even if Beijing shows strong commitment to the protection of intellectual 
property rights, is that commitment always respected in the provinces? 
It has been claimed that, "there is some doubt that the central government has 
enough influence over the local governments to effectuate their cooperation. ,,323 It 
has even been asserted that provincial or local level governments "sometimes 
disregard orders from the national government.,,324 These problems are not new in 
China; in fact, "perennial problems" of tensions between central and regional 
authorities and of crosscutting bureaucratic lines "had plagued China since the late 
Ming dynasty. ,,325 
These concerns over the ability of local level government to strongly enforce 
intellectual property rights were also voiced by several respondents. For example, 
this respondent from a multinational enterprise drew a clear distinction between the 
central government's commitment to IP protection and the reality in many provinces: 
"The central government starts to realize the importance of IP 
protection. It starts to realize a better IP protection mechanism is 
essential for China to move to higher value added service. 
However, the municiple ((sic)) do not see it the same way.,,326 
A luxury goods manufacturer contradicted this perception by identifying: 
"Unwillingness from central as well as local authorities," 
323 Jenckes, "Protection of Foreign Copyrights in China: The Intellectual Property Courts and 
Alternative Avenues of Protection", 569. 
324 Kolton, "Copyright Law and the People's C ~ ~ s s in the People's Republic of China: A Review and 
Critique of China's Intellectual Property Courts, 459. 
325 Jonathan D. Spence, The SearchJor Modern China, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1999): 498. 
326 Questionnaire comments from respondent FOODO 1. 
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as the primary factor in the ineffective enforcement they had experienced.327 
However, by distinguishing the central and local authorities, this respondent is also 
implicitly acknowledging that the different levels of government may not always 
place the same level of emphasis on enforcing IP rights. Therefore, there seems to be 
overall agreement amongst various respondents that there may be differences between 
the policies of the central and local levels of government and that all levels of 
government need to be fully committed to enforcing intellectual property rights in 
order for an effective system to be established. 
5.1.4 Number of Neighbours 
The number of neighbours that a country has is also posited as a factor 
influencing that country's compliance with their international obligations. In the 
context of intellectual property obligations, the number of neighbours that China has 
may have two effects; fIrstly, in connection with the vast physical size of China, the 
customs enforcement of IP at China's borders may be an issue and secondly, China 
may use the example of the intellectual property system in neighbouring countries as a 
model for development. 
5.1.4.1 Customs Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
China has a large number of bordering countries; fourteen countries share land 
borders with China. As a direct result of this, China has a long border to defend 
against imports and exports of goods which may be infringing intellectual property 
rights. Customs enforcement of IP is also contained within the TRIPS Agreement at 
section 4, part III. The US customs authorities estimate that 81 % of all IP infringing 
327 Questionnaire comments from respondent F ASmON02. 
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goods seized in 2006 came from China 328 and the Chinese customs authorities 
declared a total of 1210 infringement cases in 2005, involving goods with a total value 
of almost 100 million RMB Yuan. 329 Therefore, exports of goods which infringe IP 
rights are clearly a significant problem for the customs authorities to tackle. 
However, customs enforcement of intellectual property rights is highlighted by 
several respondents as an area of some improvement in the past few years. For 
instance, one respondent from a multinational company cited: 
"Expanded IPR protection channels (like customs protection),,,33o 
as the key positive change that they had noticed in the IP system in the past 
few years. Furthermore, two legal respondents cited key regulations expanding the 
powers of customs authorities in IP enforcement as notable improvements that they 
had observed. 331 Moreover, no respondents specifically criticised the customs 
personnel as ineffective at IP enforcement. This would suggest that the difficult task 
facing China's customs authorities as a result of the number of bordering countries is 
not a significant factor in the current IP system overall. 
5.1.4.2 The Example of IP Systems in Neighbouring Countries 
In addition to the impact of China's lengthy borders on the protection of 
intellectual property rights, China's neighbouring countries may also have an impact 
on the IP system by providing an example for China to follow. Taiwan and Korea are 
specific examples of countries that may be used a model of comparison for China's 
328 US Customs and Border Protection, "Seizure Statistics for Intellectual Property Rights", 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgovlimport!commercial enforcementliprlseizure/, accessed January 18th 
2007. 
329 General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China, "2005 nian zhongguo 
haiguan zhishichanquan zhifa tongji biao" (Statistics for China Customs IPR Seizures 2005), 
http://wwwl.customs.gov.cnIPortals/Olhgzs zfslhgzs zfs ipr/2005 ~ 7 C H . d o c , , accessed November 20th 
2006. 
330 Follow-up comments from respondent MANU02. 
331 Follow-up comments from respondent LAW29T and interview with respondent LAW05. 
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intellectual property development. This is because, in the 1960s and 1970s, both 
focused on duplicative imitation of mature technologies from abroad, utilising their 
highly skilled, but cheap labour force. At this time, lax IPR helped to nurture 
economic development, especially through reverse engineering. 332 
In the 1980s and 1990s, both Taiwan and Korea began to lose their 
comparative advantage in the face of rising labour costs and increased competition 
from second-tier newly-industrialised economies such as Thailand and Malaysia. As 
a result, both shifted towards more technology intensive industries.333 In this 'creative 
imitation' phase of economic development, IPR became more important, for local 
fIrms as well as foreign fIrms. This increased use of innovation in neighbouring 
countries as an important tool of economic development may have important 
implications for the development of intellectual property protection in China. 
The influence of other countries' IP systems is mentioned in passing by some 
respondents, who directly compare China's IP system to the development of 
intellectual property protection in neighbouring countries such as Taiwan, Japan and 
South Korea. For example, it is implicit in this Chinese respondent's comments that 
China needs to look at neighbouring countries and their path of economic 
development: 
"A lot of people call China a manufacturing base of the world, but it 
can start from this base and become other things like, uh ... to 
become a base of creating more technology, innovation. We don't 
say we copy the way or approach from Japan or others, but they do 
really quite good job in the past 20 years or 40 years. We have to 
. d d ,,334 learn something from a vance economy. 
332 Linsu Kim, Technology Transfer and IPRs: The Korean experience, (UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on 
IPRs and Sustainable Development, 2003): 17. 
333 Roger Van Hoesel, New Multinational Enterprisesfrom Korea and Taiwan: Beyond Export-Led 
Growth, (London: Routledge, 1999): 46,56-7. 
334 Interview with respondent LA W16. 
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This notion that China should look at neighbouring countries and follow their 
example of economic development is expressed more defmitely by this respondent: 
" Y ~ u u can't (rely on) factories, you've got to (adapt), just look at 
Taiwan, Korea, even building a domestic market, you need to have 
i n ~ o v a t i o n n to go to the next level. Without it ( ... ), every country in 
ASia, I mean look at Japan, no matter what you think of it or say, it 
sits there at the edge of Asia like a shining light in terms of 
economic development.,,335 
Thus, it is obvious that China's neighbouring countries may have an impact on 
the intellectual property system in China. However, these comments seem to suggest 
that this role of the neighbouring countries as an example to be applied is more to be 
desired than one that actually exists today. Therefore, this influence on the IP system 
may not be highly significant. Overall, China's neighbouring countries do not appear 
to playa major role in influencing the intellectual property system, either through the 
necessary system of customs enforcement, or through providing an example for China 
to pursue. 
5.1. 5 The Overall Significance of Parameters 
In terms of basic parameters affecting China's compliance, although the 
relatively young age of the legal system was felt to be significant, China's previous 
behaviour in the IP field was not specifically discussed. Furthermore, contrary to the 
opinion of many observers, the dual cultural influences of socialism and 
Confucianism were not judged to be highly significant in contemporary China by 
respondents in this study, although this suggestion needs further verification. 
However, the physical size and variation of China as a country is clearly significant as 
China's sheer size inhibits enforcement efforts and the gap between central and local 
government, which exists primarily as a result of China's vastness, is directly linked 
335 Interview with respondent LA WO 1. 
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to inconsistent IP enforcement. The sheer SIze of China also makes customs 
enforcement problematic. The number of neighbours may also have a minor impact 
on compliance through providing a positive model of a relatively effective IP system 
for China to emulate. In general, China's basic parameters offer several minor 
influences on the current IP system, but respondents believed that other factors were 
much more significant overall. 
5.2 Fundamental Factors 
In addition to basic parameters of the specific country such as the size of the 
country, there are various fundamental factors which, according to the comprehensive 
model of compliance being applied, may influence China's overall compliance with 
the TRIPS Agreement. These include societal attitudes and values, political and 
institutional factors and economic considerations. These factors will now be 
considered in the context of China's IP system. 
5.2.1 Attitudes and Values 
One of the most important categories of fundamental factors in the model of 
compliance is that of attitudes and values. These influences are strongly linked to the 
influence of Confucianism and socialism considered under the category of history and 
culture above at section 5.1.2. Attitudes and values in China may play an especially 
significant role in influencing the effectiveness of the IP system as much of the new 
IP system is directly imported from foreign systems. As most intellectual property 
laws are transplanted straight from foreign legal systems, the framework they impose 
may not necessarily fit entrenched societal values.336 This may militate against the 
successful adoption of TRIPS-compliant laws, as the WTO jurisprudence is well 
336 Qu, Copyright in China, ii. 
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recognised to spring from Western liberal legal systems, as these countries dominated 
the TRIPS drafting process.337 
5.2.1.1 Lack of the Concept of Individual Rights 
Both Confucianism and Socialism have been discussed above in terms of their 
possible impact on the concept of individual rights in China. It has been suggested by 
some observers that intellectual property protection is weak in China due to the lack 
of a strong belief in individual rights, which is felt to exist in other jurisdictions where 
IPR is more effectively protected. In order to examine this factor in isolation from the 
concepts of Confucianism and socialism, it was included as a separate factor on the 
questionnaire. On the who Ie, it was felt by respondents to be more significant than 
either Confucianism or socialism, but was still not ranked highly in terms of overall 
significance. It was scored an average of 3 on the scale of 0 to 6 and was thus ranked 
tenth out of the sixteenth factors overall. However, some respondents did deem the 
lack of the concept of individual rights to be: 
"A fundamental factor- for example, most people will not feel guilty 
for buying pirated CDS.,,338 
Another respondent went further in emphasising the significance of individual 
rights to the functioning of the intellectual property system in China: 
"I think that awareness of individual rights is the driving force 
behind our society's protection of intellectual property rights. 
Without this, it means that the car does not have enough 
speed and forward momentum ((Bold in original».,,339 
It is clear from these comments that the concept of individual rights is 
regarded as a crucial factor by some respondents. However, there may be a blurring 
between this emphasis on the concept of individual rights and public awareness of 
337 As discussed above at page 105. 
338 Email follow-up correspondence with respondent LAW12T. 
339 Email follow-up correspondence with respondent LA W29T. 
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intellectual property rights more generally. This is evident in the quote above from 
respondent LA W29T about the importance of "awareness of individual rights" as the 
"driving force" behind China's IP protection. The lack of public awareness of 
intellectual property rights more generally was highlighted by almost all respondents 
as a crucial factor in the current state of the intellectual protection system in China. 
Therefore, there did not appear to be a clear distinction between awareness of 
individual rights and the awareness of intellectual property rights more generally. 
5.2.1.2 Lack of Public Awareness of IP Rights 
It has rather improbably been claimed that as the concept of intellectual 
property protection is "unknown to the majority of the Chinese population ... many 
infringers simply do not know that what they are doing is illegal. ,,340 Although the 
level of public awareness of intellectual property is nowhere near as low as this 
comment would suggest, the lack of education regarding intellectual property 
protection is still regarded as a major problem. 341 Lack of awareness of IP rights 
causes problems with implementation of IP protection as the law requires most 
citizens to both understand and respect the laws in order for them to be effectively 
implemented. 
Generally, respondents highlighted the lack of public awareness of intellectual 
property rights as the most significant factor in contributing to the current IP system 
in China. On the scale of 0 to 6, it scored an average of 4.44 and was ranked most 
significant overall out of the sixteen given factors in the questionnaire. Thus, lack of 
awareness ofIPR is clearly perceived to be a serious problem in the modern IP system 
340 Jenckes, "Protection of Foreign Copyrights in China: The Intellectual Property Courts and 
Alternative Avenues of Protection", 556. . . . 
341 Kolton, "Copyright Law and the People's C ~ ~ s s in the People's Repubbc ofChma: A ReVIew and 
Critique of China's Intellectual Property Courts, 456. 
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and many of the respondents' comments reflect this. For example, a common view 
expressed was that: 
" P ~ o p l e e don't see IPR infringement [as] a disgrace and a very 
serious problem (the awareness is improving however).,,342 
This was echoed by a Chinese respondent, who felt strongly that: 
"Public awareness of IPR is not yet widespread, which directly 
leads to frequent infringements. In many places in China, the 
concept of IPR lacks public support. Infringers do not feel guilty for 
their wrongdoings.,,343 
However, it was noticeable that several of the foreign respondents were 
sceptical about the true extent of the ignorance of intellectual property rights. One 
respondent went so far as to call the notion that ineffective IP protection could be 
attributed to cultural factors: 
"Complete crap.,,344 
Other respondents suggested that infringers were well aware of intellectual 
property rights, but chose to infringe them; 
"I don't think, I think the public is aware of IP rights [uh-huh], but 
they just don't care [uh-huh] and it's not, I think most people, most 
infringers that I see are aware that they are (crossing) and that they 
are infringing on other people's rights [uh-huh], but uh ... , they 
deem it necessary [uh-huh].,,345 
Thus, although lack of public awareness was emphasized by respondents as 
the key factor behind the ineffectiveness of the modem IP system, this view was not 
unanImous. 
5.2.1.3 Perception that IP Only Benefits Foreigners 
A further factor which deserves consideration under the category of attitudes 
and values is the notion that intellectual property protection only benefits foreigners. 
342 Questionnaire comments from respondent MANU02. 
343 Questionnaire comments from respondent MANUOI T. 
344 Interview with respondent LAWOI. 
345 Telephone interview with respondent LA W31. 
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This perception may act as a disincentive for China to enforce intellectual property 
rights; as China is seen as having little intellectual property of its own, there is a 
suspicion that intellectual property protection "only fills the coffers of foreign IPR 
holders with Chinese funds. ,,346 This unfounded perception that intellectual property 
protection is more beneficial to foreigners is stated to create resentment in local 
enforcement agencies and thus generates a powerful deterrent against enforcement. 
Overall, this factor was not ranked particularly highly by respondents, scoring 
an average of 2.42 on the scale of 0 to 6 and ranked fourteenth out of sixteen factors 
in total. However, there is an interesting contrast between the Chinese and foreign 
respondents when asked about the significance of this factor. Whilst Chinese 
respondents only scored this factor with an average of 1.53, foreign respondents 
scored it with an average of 3.36. It is interesting that this difference emerges in the 
views of the respondents; Chinese respondents clearly do not consider the perception 
that IP only benefits foreigners to be of any significance whereas foreign respondents 
perhaps feel that this perception still affects the operation of the IP system to their 
detriment. This perception may also be linked to the potential role of domestic 
Chinese companies to change the IP system in China, a link explicitly made by 
respondent LAW07, who claimed that: 
"Chinese companies' growth is going to gradually change such 
situation.,,347 
5.2.1.4 The Influence of Guanxi 
A further element of the Chinese attitudes and values that may affect the 
operation of the intellectual property system is the influence of guanxi or the use of 
informal networks or relationships to achieve specific aims. 'Guanxi' generally refers 
346 Feder, "Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China: You Can Lead a Horse to Water But 
You Can't Make it Drink", 253. 
347 Email follow-up correspondence with respondent LA W07. 
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to "interpersonal connections", but more specifically often carries a more pejorative 
meaning, especially to foreigners, of the unethical use of someone' s authority to 
obtain political or economic benefit. 348 Although guanxi is not specifically referred to 
by most respondents, there are several references made to 'relationships.' For 
instance, one respondent directly attributes his dissatisfaction with the current IP 
system in terms of these 'relationships': 
"Generally the efficiency is not very uh ... satisfying. I couldn't 
understand the reasons, but sometimes it is because China is a 
(city), is a society full of relationships [Yeah.] OK? So in some of 
the cases, like IP cases, we could say the legal enforcement 
people are also, let's say, indulged with this kind of relationship.,,349 
Benefiting from an informal connection with an official could be seen as an 
initial step on the slippery slope to corruption as another respondent makes clear: 
"the temptation to corruption is huge and it starts very (simply) I'm 
sure, ( ... ) a friend who's a private lawyer, you're a judge, he's 
making a hundred thousand or Whatever, and you're making ten or 
whatever it is, they're going to of course treat you [um] to dinner 
and take you out and say don't worry about it ( ... ), but it comes to a 
very fine line of when it crosses to corruption. If you can't afford a 
(house) and they say we'll lend you the money, we'll work it out 
later on, you know, and the Chinese are very good at building 
relationships in that way.,,350 
This further mention of relationships exemplifies the underlying attitude of 
many respondents that these 'relationships' are at the heart of many interactions 
throughout the legal system, including the IP system and indeed, many respondents 
seemed resigned to this fact. 
5.2.2 Political and Institutional Factors 
In addition to the influence of attitudes and values, the Brown Weiss and 
Jacobson comprehensive model of compliance also features political/institutional 
348 Ying Fan, "Questioning Guanxi: Definition, Classification and Implications", International Business 
Review, 11: 546. 
349 Interview with respondent LA W16. 
350 Interview with respondent LA WO 1. 
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factors as part of the category of fundamental factors which may influence a country's 
compliance. The impact of the divisions between central and local government has 
already been analysed above at section 5.1.3.1 as it arises as a direct consequence of 
China's physical characteristics. Other political and institutional factors which may 
be particularly relevant to China include the status of law as policy; a lack of 
transparency and consistency in the legal system; and a preference for public 
enforcement mechanisms. 
5.2.2.1 Law as Policy 
A major factor to consider in the context of political and institutional 
influences on the IP system is the role of law in China generally. Despite committing 
to establishing a rule of law state in a Constitutional amendment in 1999351 , there is 
still evidence to suggest that China follows a rule by law, rather than rule of law 
system. A legal system based on the rule by law principle sees law as a means by 
which the state's policies may be implemented, rather than as an end in itself "Law 
then becomes a tool of the Party to be used to serve the interests of the people and to 
attack the enemy. ,,352 
The implications of this instrumentalist model are that "the line between law 
and policy in China is often said to be blurred,,353, as the law is simply seen as a 
mechanism for implementing Party policy. 354 In other words, enforcement of any 
particular law is subject to conformity with the government's latest policies. In fact, 
d 1 · 355 H policies can often have the same effect as formal laws an regu ahons. owever, 
the respondents in this study did not explicitly refer to the overall status of law in 
351 Full text of the Constitution available at: "Zhonghua renroin gongheguo xianfa" (Constitution of the 
PRC), http://www.gov.cn/ziliaolflfg/2005-06/14;content 631O.htm accessed August 30th 2005. 
352 Peerenboom China's Long March toward Rule of Law, 10. 
353 Donald C. Clarke, "Private Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China", National Bureau 
of Asian Research, 32. . . ." 
354 Yu "The Second Coming oflntellectual Property Rights m Chma ,24. 
355 CI;rke, "Private Enforcement oflntellectual Property Rights in China", 33. 
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China and this characteristic of the legal system may be largely academic rather than a 
concern to the end-users of the contemporary IP system. 
5.2.2.2 Lack of Transparency 
This blurring between official policy and law may have multiple influences on 
the operation of the intellectual property system in China. Firstly, this lack of a clear 
hierarchy of legislation can lead to a lack of transparency in the intellectual property 
system generally. Overall, respondents had mixed feelings about the continuing 
influence of a lack of transparency on the intellectual property system in China. On a 
scale of 0 to 6, lack of transparency scored an average of 3.11 and was ranked ninth 
out of the sixteen suggested influences. 
There were two noticeable opmlOns on transparency amongst most 
respondents' more detailed comments. Several respondents cited greater transparency 
as one of the improvements they have noticed in the IP system in the past few years, 
in response to question lOon the questionnaire. There respondents included one 
member of the Quality Brands Protection Committee (QBPC), who cited as the main 
change they had observed: 
"More transparency on legislation" 
and another multinational respondent who simply cited: 
"Increased transparency" 
as an important change they had witnessed in the IP system. 356 One of the 
legal respondents based in Hong Kong gave more detail on the improvements in 
transparency they had witnessed: 
"Lack of transparency, I think is OK, I mean, the legal system is 
getting more transparent especially with the Trademark Office now 
356 Questionnaire comments from respondents MANU02 and FOOD02. 
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publishing their internal guidelines, they're making an effort there. 
[Uh-huh] It is getting better.,,357 
In contrast to these respondents who cited transparency as an area of 
improvement, other respondents claimed a lack of transparency was still harmful to 
their interactions with the IP system and that increased transparency would be a 
considerable improvement. These respondents included a lawyer based in Shanghai 
who stated that a system of watchdogs would improve the system greatly: 
"If we had a system in place that we could trust, that would be, you 
know, that would be tremendously helpful.,,358 
Another Shanghai-based lawyer went further and said that: 
"I think the biggest thing people don't do and the argument about it 
is I think there needs to be more openness about these problems," 
because "transparency in every system improves enforcement.,,359 
Consequently, although there is an overall impression that transparency has 
improved in the past few years, transparency in terms of the way the system is 
enforced is still stressed as an area that could be improved. Thus, it is crucial to 
recognise that transparency relates to two separate areas of the IP system, the 
substantive laws and regulations; and the enforcement of these laws and regulations. 
Whilst it is generally acknowledged that transparency in terms of the legislative 
framework is now much better, transparency in the implementation of this framework 
is still alleged to be poor. This is reflected in the repeated requests by trading partners 
such the US that China produce enforcement statistics for intellectual property 
protection. 360 
357 Telephone interview with respondent LAW31. 
358 Interview with respondent LAWI0. 
359 Interview with respondent LA WO 1. 
360 Emma Barraclough, "China Urged to Provide IP Enforcement Data", Managing Intellectual 
Property, (January 30th 2006). 
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5.2.2.3 Preference for Public Enforcement Mechanisms 
The role of law as an instrument for implementing Party policy could also be 
said to have led to a preference for public rather than private enforcement mechanisms. 
This remains true for the enforcement of intellectual property, as "IPR enforcement 
remains largely a government, rather than a private-sector matter,,361 and as illustrated 
by the table below. 
Table 5-2 Number of cases dealt with by administrative and judicial enforcement in 2004362 
CogjIight Trademark Patent Judicial Judicial 
Administrative Administrative Administrative Enforcement- Enforcement-
Enforcement Enforcement Enforcement Criminal Civil Cases 
Cases 
2004 9,691 51,851 1,455 385 8,332 
Total Administrative = 62997 Judicial = 8717 
cases cases 
This emphasis on administrative and criminal sanctions for IP infringers 
reinforces the government's central role in enforcement, rather than empowering 
economic actors to enforce their own rights. Furthermore, greater use of private 
enforcement is strongly advocated by several commentators, "because such a system 
would not rely ... on government policy priorities at any given moment.,,363 By 
emphasising private enforcement, it is hoped by some commentators that greater 
consistency could be introduced to the protection of intellectual property. 
However, although respondents did raise some problems with the system of 
criminal enforcement of IP, specifically the thresholds used to decide criminal 
liability, there was strong praise for the public enforcement mechanisms overall. This 
361 Pitman B. Potter and Michel Oksenberg, "A Patchwork ofIPR Protection", China Business Review, 
26 (1). h d "inzh b ' , h' ~ ~ b "(Ch' 
362 Statistics taken from: "«Zhongguo zhishichanquan bao u e xrnJ an» alpls 11a u rna 
White Paper on New Progress in IPR Protection published), available at: 
http://\vww.gov.cn/xwfbI2005-04/211content 321.htm a c c ~ s s e d d !'1ay ~ 3 t ~ ~ 2006. 
363 Clarke, "Private Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights rn Chrna , 31. 
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is reflected in the results regarding the possible influence of over-reliance on public 
enforcement mechanisms; this factor was ranked twelfth out of the sixteen suggested 
factors on the questionnaire and scored an average of2.76 overall for its contribution 
to the current IP system, on a scale of 0 to 6. Thus, the overall preference for criminal 
and administrative enforcement in the IP system was not seen as a problem by 
respondents in this study. In fact, the operation of the administrative system, 
particularly the Administration of Industry and Commerce (AlC) responsible for 
trademark infringements, was expressly commended for swift enforcement actions.364 
5.2.2.4 Lack a/Consistency 
The lack of a clear distinction between government policy and the law may 
also contribute to a lack of consistency in the implementation of the system of 
intellectual property protection in China. Furthermore, consistency is often 
recognised as a significant problem in the enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
Enforcement actions are often praised as "waves of coordinated actions, each targeted 
on specific types of infringement activities.,,365 An example of a campaign against 
piracy being hailed as successful enforcement is provided by the Deputy Director-
General of the Copyright Bureau: 
"On April 19, 1994, the copyright administration department in 
Guangdong cooperated with the police, administration departments of 
industry and commerce, press, and publication departments to mobilize 
over 4,000 people to carry out raids in twenty cities on illegal compact 
discs. This started the national campaign against piracy. Ten compact 
disc factories were closed in the action. In the winter action of 1996, the 
Guangdong province took strong and resolute measures including offering 
a large reward of 300,000 Yuan, and digging out twenty-eight 
364 Interview with respondent LAW05. 
365 Ruichun Duan "China's Intellectual Property Rights Protection towards the 21st Century", Duke 
Journal o f C o m p ~ r a t i v e e and International Law, 9 (1998-1999),2.17. As ?irector General of the Office 
of Intellectual Property Executive Conference of the State CounCIl, Duan s statement can be seen as 
reflecting the official government's view of enforcement. 
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underground production lines in addition to the eight lines dug out before 
the concentrated action. ,,366 
Although this follows a typically Chinese model of enforcement III 
'crackdowns', it is at odds with the basic rule of law concept that laws should be 
enforced consistently. Symbolic crackdowns are also frequently highlighted in the 
media when intellectual property protection is under international scrutiny, as was the 
case in the first quarter of 1995, before the Memorandum of Understanding with the 
United States was signed in March 1995, leading to the suspicion that IP rights are 
only respected when absolutely necessary for geopolitical reasons. 367 
On the whole, most respondents in this study did show concern about the 
impact of inconsistency in the IP system. Out of the sixteen suggested factors 
included in the initial survey, lack of consistency was ranked fourth and scored an 
average of3.8 on a scale of 0 to 6. Thus, consistency is clearly of interest to many of 
the respondents. This concern with consistency was frequently expressed in terms of 
frustration with infringers not being pursued consistently: 
"Relevant agencies work hard to achieve something during certain 
period, and thereafter loose up, and this gives the infringer a 
misleading signal that after the periodical "fire", their life would 
become easy.,,368 
This concern is echoed by a Chinese lawyer who painted the following picture 
of IP enforcement in China: 
"You could say that enforcement is mainly focused on those big 
cities now, for the middle and smaller cities are not very much to 
feel this enforcement and sometimes we can also feel that 
enforcement are not become day-to-day work or day-to-day 
operation, it's just a few times in the year. Just a few times in the 
366 Zhaokuan Chen, "Administrative Management and Enforcement of Copyright in China", Duke 
Journal o/Comparative and International Law, 9 (1998-1999), 252. 
367 Endeshaw, Intellectual Property in China: The Roots o/the Problem o/Enforcement, 44-5. 
368 Email follow-up comments from respondent MANU02. 
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year and also a certain period of the year. So this sometimes it's a 
formality, you feel something like a formality.,,369 
Hence, lawyers and business-people alike share concerns about the impact of 
inconsistent enforcement of the IP laws and regulations, particularly in terms of 
strongly enforcing IP rights at certain specified times and not at others; IP 
enforcement thus becomes a mere "formality." 
The final aspect of political and institutional factors that needs to be 
considered is the continuing influence of the pre-reform structure of government on 
the intellectual property system today. As the pre-reform command economy was 
split into vertical sectors, with separate agencies having full control over their sector, 
but with few links to other sectors, this can still have implications for the bureaucratic 
structure of power in contemporary China. Specifically, this influence can still be 
witnessed in the lack of a unified agency for handling intellectual property; weak 
judicial enforcement compared to administrative enforcement; and local protectionism, 
which will all be considered in more detail below. 370 
5.2.3 Economic Factors 
It is clear that IP enforcement is uneven because, in many cases, respect for 
intellectual property is replaced by more urgent economic interests. 371 This 
prioritising of economic goals by the government influences the IP system through the 
close links between law and policy. Furthermore, one of the major reasons behind the 
overriding importance of economic factors in the implementation of IP law is the 
nature of the economy itself 
369 Interview with respondent LA WI6. 
370 See pages 177, 183, and 171. 
371 Lagerqvist and Riley, "How to Protect Intellectual Property Rights in China", 11. 
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As discussed in the preceding section, enforcement problems are widely seen 
as arising from the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. 372 
"Certain structural arrangements, suitable to China's pre-reform economy, are ill-
suited to China's present transition economy and have contributed to the rise of the 
counterfeit trade.,,373 This is due to the economic system in place before the start of 
reforms, when "most Chinese enterprises did not heed intellectual property rights 
because the absence of market competition under a centrally planned economy made 
the protection of intellectual property rights dispensable.,,374 
5.2.3.1 The Role a/the Government in the Economy 
Despite reforms introducing market forces into the Chinese economy, the 
government still has a significant role to play in economic development. The 
government even now has "multiple roles as regulator, entrepreneur, and law 
enforcer", which "may create conflict of interest issues. ,,375 With such a large degree 
of control over the commercial sector, it is little wonder that intellectual property 
protection concerns have taken a back seat to the economic aims of the government. 
The government's control over the economy "undermines private property rights-
especially the intangible kind. This creates economic instability that makes it difficult 
for innovation by domestic companies to be rewarded, and thus be sustained. ,,376 
Furthermore, as government ownership of the loss-making state sector still 
dominates the economy, it can hardly be surprising that the government will try to 
protect these enterprises at all costS.377 In other words, the problem may not be a lack 
of power to enforce intellectual property rights; the problem may be a reluctance to 
372 Ibid. 3. 
373 Chow "Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China", 29. 
374 X i a o ~ e n n Tian and Vai 10 Lo, Law & Investment in China: The Legal and Business Environments 
after China's WTO Accession, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 
375 Chow "Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China", 27. 
376 S t e v e ~ s o n - Y a n g g and DeWoskin, "China Destroys the IP Paradigm". 
377 Endeshaw, Intellectual Property in China: The Roots oj the Problem oj EnJorcement, 151. 
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initiate enforcement actions. It has been observed that enforcement IS "more 
energetically pursued when governmental interests are at stake." 378 As one 
commentator succinctly put it, "the instinct to protect what you own is basic.,,379 
Despite these commentators stating that the economic priorities of the central 
government are to blame for problems in the IP system, opinions amongst respondents 
in this study regarding the significance of the government's role in the economy were 
somewhat mixed. Out of the sixteen suggested factors on the questionnaire, the role 
of the government in the economy was ranked eleventh, with an average score of2.89 
on a scale of 0 to 6. This would suggest that most respondents do not share these 
concerns about the government's role in the economy. 
However, more detailed comments from certain respondents do reflect the 
notion that there is a certain amount of resentment about unequal treatment for state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies. For example, one Chinese lawyer 
commented: 
"The interests of the state and the SOEs are over-protected and 
over-emphasised, while private rights are usually neglected. If the 
state or SOEs breach the IPR of an individual, often they will not be 
severely punished.,,38o 
These comments reflect the impression of poor enforcement where SOEs are 
the infringers, but as another respondent notes, unequal treatment may also apply 
where an SOE is the injured party: 
"There'll be state-owned enterprises that are being killed and yes, 
they've got more methods for enforcing their IPR; the larger yo.u are, 
the more close to government if you, if you go to your local police 
and say, we want to investigate this, it happens.,,381 
378 Lagerqvist and Riley, "How to Protect Intellectual Property Rights in China", 61. 
379 Stevenson-Yang and DeWoskin, "China Destroys the IP Paradigm". 
380 Questionnaire comments from respondent LAW15T. 
381 Interview comments from respondent LA WO 1. 
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Thus, it would appear that although government ownership of the economy is 
not as problematic as suggested by some commentators, a minority of respondents 
have perceived inequalities between state-owned enterprises and private companies, 
both in tenns of infringements by SOEs not being pursued and infringements against 
SOEs being vigorously confronted. However, there is not enough evidence to suggest 
this bias is inherent throughout the IP system. 
5.2.3.2 Local Protectionism 
Local protectionism could also be considered as an economic influence on the 
implementation of the intellectual property system in China and must be 
acknowledged as a major issue in the non-enforcement of intellectual property 
rights. 382 However, local protectionism is a complex issue and thus incorporates 
elements of political factors as well. Even government officials admit that "local 
protectionism is the real culprit" behind problems in the enforcement system. 383 
Local protectionism acts against effective enforcement in various ways, for example, 
"in most cases, IP owners are required to bring ... proceedings in the infringer's home 
court, rather than in the jurisdiction where counterfeit products have been sold. This 
significantly increases the risk ofbias.,,384 
In addition to bias in the courts, local protectionism can also be crucial issue in 
administrative enforcement. Intellectual property infringement is often part of the 
local economy, as is the case in Yiwu city in Zhejiang province: 
"The trade in counterfeit goods there has been integrated significantly into 
the legitimate local economy of this city with the consequence that 
382 Susan Finder "The Protection ofIntellectual Property Rights through the Courts", Cohen, Bang and 
Mitchell Chine;e Intellectual Law and Practice, (London: Kluwer Law International, 1999): 261. 
383 Duan' "China's Intellectual Property Rights Protection towards the 21st Century", 217. 
384 Joseph T. Simone, "China's IPR Enforcement Mechanisms", China Business Review, 26 (1), 
(JanuarylFebruary 1999). 
171 
shutting down counterfeiting is functionally equivalent to shutting down 
the local economy with all of its attendant social and political costS.,,385 
Although Yiwu city represents an extreme example of the reliance of a local 
economy on IPR infringements, there are many other places in China where 
intellectual property infringement does play a major role in the local economy and 
enforcement agencies in these areas will therefore be extremely reluctant to enforce 
intellectual property rights, at the expense of their own interests. 
On the whole, local protectionism is cited by many respondents as one of the 
primary problems with the IP system in China. Out of the sixteen potential factors 
presented to respondents in the questionnaire, local protectionism ranked second only 
to a lack of awareness as an influence on the intellectual property system, with an 
average score of 4.13 on a scale of 0 to 6. As the only two factors with average scores 
above 4, it is clear that both a lack of public awareness of IP rights and local 
protectionism are major concerns for respondents. 
Respondents use the term 'local protectionism' to refer to a number of 
behaviours, including difficulties in initiating cases with local agencies; bias in the 
enforcement process and trivial penalties for local infringers. As one respondent 
defmed the issue: 
"Local protectionism, I think is the code word that people use for all 
these different types of things,,,386 
The significance of local protectionism is also highlighted by these comments 
from a local lawyer in Guangdong province: 
"Local protectionism in the intellectual p r o p ~ r t y . . protecti?n s,ystem 
has a very negative impact. It undermines Justice, ,not Just In 
individual cases, but in the entire legal system. This has an 
385 Chow, "Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China", 41. 
386 Interview with respondent LA WO 1. 
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adverse impact on China: it's prejudicial to the import of foreign 
advanced technologies into China.,,387 
Two respondents both working for multinationals in China commented on the 
impact of local protectionism that they had experienced on their enforcement efforts. 
The fIrst respondent commented: 
"It is hard to get a good catch, and even when caught, the infringer 
may not be punished to the severest extent possible.,,388 
This shows that local protectionism impacts not only on the infringers that 
may be targeted by local operations, but also the level of penalties awarded against 
local infringers. The second respondent from a multinational manufacturer related 
their experiences of pursuing two Chinese companies for copying their designs: 
"Although we stopped the companies no financial compensation or 
costs were given. This was because we are a foreign company 
and the two companies were local. In general if legal proceedings 
are followed outside one's own area, the legal system in another 
area favours their own.,,389 
This frustration with the impact of local protectionism on enforcement efforts 
is echoed by comments by several of the lawyers who responded. For example, one 
remarked on the difficulties of pursuing large-scale infringers, in contrast to 
individual infringers: 
"They have whole cities that specialise in car parts ... You're talking 
about a whole city you're fighting or a whole region, then it gets 
really difficult.,,39o 
Another local lawyer claimed that: 
"The administrative people will prefer to hear the local one's first. 
Their story. So they are influenced. And then when they hear the 
other side, from the outsiders from other provinces, uh ... in practice, 
I I I ,,391 they protect the oca peop e. 
387 Follow-up comments from respondent LA W29T. 
388 Email follow-up comments from respondent MANU02. 
389 Questionnaire comments from respondent MANU03. 
390 Telephone interview with respondent LA W31. 
391 Interview with respondent LAW16. 
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Consequently, it is clear that local protectionism is a major issue in the system 
of protection for intellectual property in contemporary China. 
5.2.4 The Significance of Fundamental Factors Overall 
Fundamental factors have been considered under the headings of attitudes and 
values, political and institutional factors, and economic factors. There is clearly some 
overlap between the discussion of attitudes and values relevant to IP in China and the 
discussion of China's history and culture in the parameters section. However, 
although the cultural influences of Confucianism and socialism were ranked as 
insignificant in this study, some aspects of contemporary attitudes and values were 
highlighted by respondents as important contributors to the current IP system. 
The lack of awareness of IP rights was ranked as the most significant 
contributing factor by respondents, although these was some scepticism over the true 
extent of ignorance amongst the general public in China. This lack of awareness was 
linked to a lack of the concept of individual rights in general, identified by a small 
number of respondents as significant, but overall this factor was less significant than 
the lack of IP awareness. In addition, several respondents identified 'relationships' as 
influential, which could be seen as a metaphor for the influence of guanxi. 
Political and institutional factors were widely discussed by respondents. Lack 
of transparency was expected to be cited as a major influence on China's TRIPS 
compliance based on previous observers of China's IP system, but there appeared to 
be a distinction between transparency regarding the substantive laws and regulations, 
which was felt to be much improved, and transparency regarding enforcement, which 
was still felt to be a source of much frustration. Although public enforcement 
mechanisms are preferred to private enforcement by individual rights holders, this 
was not felt to be a problem by respondents. On the contrary, public enforcement, 
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particularly administrative enforcement was often praised by respondents. The fmal 
political or institutional factor which was ranked as important by respondents was the 
lack of consistency; many respondents expressed frustration at the inconsistent 
prosecution of IP infringers in China. 
Economic factors were also found to be significant in influencing overall 
TRIPS compliance. Local protectionism in particular was identified as a highly 
significant problem, second only to a lack of awareness of IP rights. Local 
protectionism was used as a so-called 'code word' to encompass various behaviours 
such as reluctance to initiate actions, bias in the enforcement process and inadequate 
penalties awarded against infringers. On the other hand, the dominant role of the 
government in the economy was not felt to be of great significance, although the 
unequal treatment of SOEs and private enterprises was isolated as a concern. Thus, 
overall several fundamental factors were identified by respondents in this study as 
significant influences upon the effectiveness of the current IP system in China, 
particularly lack of awareness of IP rights, local protectionism and a lack of 
consistency and transparency in enforcement actions. 
5.3 Proximate Factors 
-
The final category of factors to consider under Brown Weiss and Jacobson's 
detailed model of compliance is proximate factors. These factors are specific to the 
system under analysis and incorporate influences such as the capacity of the existing 
agencies to implement the system effectively and the role of other organisations in 
pressurising for or monitoring changes in the system. 
5.3.1 Administrative Capacity 
The legal system in China is basically the product of twenty-five years of 
rebuilding, as "decimated by the Cultural Revolution and decades of neglect and 
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abuse, the legal system had to be rebuilt virtually from scratch." 392 Despite the 
government swiftly reassembling the rudiments of a legal system,393 systemic 
problems in the legal system are still the subject of intense criticism. 
5.3.1.1 Lack of Trained and Experienced Legal Personnel 
Resources are one of the problems haunting the legal system, specifically the 
lack of trained, experienced legal personnel. A lack of lawyers qualified to deal with 
intellectual property cases has been identified as one of the major forces preventing 
full enforcement of intellectual property rights. 394 Despite the establishment of 
specialised intellectual property tribunals from the early 1990s, "Western lawyers cite 
a lack of legal training amongst judges, interference in lawsuits by local and 
Communist Party officials, and the susceptibility of judges and court officials to 
bribes as some of the biggest problems facing the new intellectual property courtS.,,395 
Although these problems stem partly from the position of the legal system in 
the Chinese political system as a mere instrument of governance, they can also be 
largely attributed to the professionally under qualified, and in some cases perhaps 
even incompetent, legal personnel administering the law. 396 Clearly, many 
commentators believe that better trained lawyers and judges are needed to handle 
. 11 1 397 mte ectua property cases. 
In general, respondents agreed that a lack of trained and experienced legal 
personnel contributed to problems with the intellectual property system in China. 
392 Peerenboom, China's Long March toward Rule of Law, 6. 
393 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 670. 
394 Endeshaw, Intellectual Property in China: The Roots of the Problem of Enforcement, 38. 
395 Jenckes, "Protection of Foreign Copyrights in China: The Intellectual Property Courts and 
Alternative Avenues of Protection", 561. 
396 Jianfu Chen, "Implementation of Law in China: An Introduction", Chen, Li and Otto, 
Implementation of Law in the People's Republic of China, (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002): 8. 
397 Qu, Copyright in China, 390. 
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This factor was ranked seventh out of sixteen potential factors presented to 
respondents, with an average score of 3.71 on a scale of 0 to 6, where 6 is a major 
contribution. This concern over the quality of some of the personnel responsible for 
enforcing the framework of intellectual property laws and regulations was shared by 
several of the respondents. The following comments are typical of the opinions 
expressed: 
"The government employees' understanding of intellectual property 
rights is far from proficient,,,398 or: 
"You know a lot of it's the education and the training of the people 
in the legal system and I think that's a, you know, very, uh ... 
sufficient point.,,399 
Accordingly, it is obvious that the knowledge levels of the legal personnel 
involved in enforcing intellectual property rights may be a significant concern to some 
respondents. 
5.3.1.2 Lack of a Unified IP Agency 
Enforcement of intellectual property rights is complicated by the bureaucratic 
structure of power in China. There is no unified agency to deal with intellectual 
property; "authority over IPR enforcement in China remains spread across various 
administrative agencies." 400 These agencies include the State Administration 0 f 
Industry and Commerce (SAIC or AlC) responsible for trademarks, the National 
Copyright Administration (NCA) responsible for copyright and the State Intellectual 
Property Office, which is primarily responsible for patents. 
398 Follow-up comments from respondent LA WI2T. 
399 Interview with respondent LA WID. 
400 Potter and Oksenberg, "A Patchwork oflPR Protection". 
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Consequently, there is a considerable lack of communication and coordination , 
as well as a great deal of rivalry between the various agencies.401 This bureaucratic 
muddle has been attributed to the pre-reform socialist economy, which as discussed 
above at page 168 divided the economy into vertical sectors. Each administrative 
entity would have full control over its particular sector. However, as intellectual 
property cuts across multiple sectors, "several authorities will have concurrent 
enforcement authority over counterfeiting, leading to a series of parallel enforcement 
mechanisms. ,,402 
Moreover, the overlapping of enforcement authority does not only lead to 
bureaucratic confusion. It may even actively discourage the agencies from 
cooperating, as they may lose fmes and bonuses if they transfer a case to another 
agency. 403 Therefore, would a unified intellectual property agency resolve some of 
these bureaucratic issues? It is recognised by a couple of respondents that these 
multiple agencies can cause problems in IP enforcement. For instance: 
"Concurrence of several IPR enforcement authorities, such as 
TSBs, AICs, Patent offices, copyright offices and PSB leads to be 
unefficient.,,404 
However, the majority of respondents do not agree that this would be an 
improvement to the existing framework of agencies. For instance, one respondent 
pointed out: 
"It wouldn't be workable to just have one [uh-huh] to have one 
national uh ... type of an agency to deal with it, because it's so 
diverse you have to break it down and so we do have the copyright, 
the trademark, the patent, you know, the different organs that deal 
with it and then under those organs, is generally local, their local 
401 Joseph T. Simone, "China's IPR Enforcement Mechanisms", 14-16. 
402 Chow, "Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China", 22. 
403 Ibid. 
404 Questionnaire comments from respondent MANU08. 
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counterparts that actually deal with it, so the fact that they don't 
have one IP office dealing with everything I just don't think is ... ,,405 
Thus, there is recognition that the issue of intellectual property enforcement is 
too complex to be handled by only one agency. This also relates to China's size; one 
agency would have to be broken down into smaller regional or local branches anyway. 
On the whole, unifying the separate agencies into one overall body responsible for 
intellectual property was not regarded as a priority by respondents. Out of the sixteen 
factors suggested as factors which contribute to problems in the current IP system in 
China, the lack of a unified agency was ranked thirteenth by respondents. On a scale 
of 0 to 6, ranking the significance of the contribution it made, this factor scored an 
average of2.76. 
5.3.1.3 The Length of the Process 
Another barrier that has been identified in the enforcement process is the 
length of the process. It is claimed that courts are often slow in pursuing their claims; 
there are "extended waiting periods, so securing relief may be protracted. ,,406 There is 
a feeling that "in practice, remedies are more likely to be forthcoming through the 
State Administration of Industry and Commerce in the form of raids and confiscation 
than through the courts. ,,407 
However, this impression that administrative authorities are not also subject to 
delays in enforcement may be misleading. Local AlCs have also been accused of 
delaying enforcement actions to give infringers enough time to dispose of infringing 
goods and machinery used to produce counterfeit products. Therefore, according to 
405 Interview with respondent LA WI O. . 
406 Kolton, "Copyright Law and the People's Courts in the People's Republic of China: A ReVIew and 
Critique of China's Intellectual Property Courts", 451. 
407 Ibid. 451, fu.223. 
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some observers, there can be costly delays ill both the civil and administrative 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
Conversely, the length of the enforcement process was not felt to be a major 
concern for the majority of respondents. This factor scored an average of 3.24 on a 
scale of 0 to 6 representing the contribution it makes to the IP system and ranked 
eighth out of the sixteen potential factors that were presented to respondents on the 
questionnaire. Although it is recognised by many respondents that: 
"A lot of time and money have to be put into the IP 
enforcement ,,408 , 
it is also suggested that this may not always be the case and this is merely a 
perception that some rights holders have: 
"Foreign rights holders are not willing to litigate in order to protect 
their rights; firstly, because they think it takes too much time and 
money and secondly, they don't really believe in China's courtS.,,409 
Consequently, the length of the process may not actually act as a barrier to a 
rights holder seeking to uphold their rights, but rather as a perception that may 
discourage some rights holders from initiating the enforcement process in the fIrst 
place. As a matter of fact, lawyers with a lot of experience in the fIeld of IP actually 
commend the speed with which some IP enforcement actions can be concluded. For 
instance, this Chinese lawyer working for a large international law firm commented 
on the administrative system of IP enforcement: 
"One good thing about the administrative approach besides the 
speediness of resolution will be the fact that you can (seize) the 
infringing goods or even the tools use.d, to m a k ~ ~ the i n f r i n ~ , ~ ~ ~
goods really quickly and that actually It s a tangible result. 
408 Follow-up comments from respondent LA W07. 
409 Follow-up comments from respondent LAW12T. 
410 Interview with respondent LAW05. 
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Furthermore, the length of the enforcement process does not appear to be a 
problem in other areas of IP enforcement either: 
"The fact here is the length of the process is much ( ... ) here than 
you have in most other countries so civil matters in the courts are 
probably dealt with in six to nine, or one year, [uh-huh] from the 
outset, you know, and the way that administratively it's dealt with is 
quite quick [uh-huh]. 
So that's a positive part of China, I think. It's fairly unique here, that 
they can deal with things quite quickly.,,411 
Thus, the length of the enforcement process does not appear to be a major 
problem in the IP system once an action has been initiated. It is possible that the 
preparation to start an action is more time-consuming, due to the difficulties of 
collecting evidence and so on. 
5.3.1.4 Inadequate Penalties 
A further proximate factor influencing the effectiveness of the Chinese IP 
system is the level of penalties awarded against infringers. Even if a plaintiff 
succeeds in an enforcement action, damages awarded to successful plaintiffs have 
been generally low by western standards. 412 Moreover, these paltry damage awards 
may not even be sufficient to cover the substantial fees, payable by the plaintiff to the 
intellectual property court in advance.413 Fines and compensation awarded through 
the administrative enforcement system are also criticised as insufficient, as they are 
not perceived as high enough to act as a deterrent to infringers. 
Inadequate penalties are identified by many respondents as a key area of 
dissatisfaction with the existing system of intellectual property protection in China. 
This factor scored an average of 3.96 on a scale of 0 to 6 with 6 representing a major 
411 Interview with respondent LAWIO. 
412 Clarke "Private Enforcement ofIntellectual Property Rights in China", 40. 
413 KOlton', "Copyright Law and the People's Courts in the People's Republic of China: A Review and 
Critique of China's Intellectual Property Courts", 451. 
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contribution, which shows that it is perceived as having a significant contribution to 
the ineffectiveness of the current system. Inadequate penalties were also ranked as 
third overall, out of the sixteen suggested factors which influence the current IP 
system. 
It is clear from respondents' comments that there is a certain amount of 
dissatisfaction with the current levels of penalties imposed on infringers, as the 
following typical comments illustrates. The main problem with the IP system is felt 
to be the: 
"Lack of punitive compensation for IP infringement"414; and: 
"The power to produce a ruling is too large, while the punishment is 
not enough to act as a deterrent.,,415 
More detail about the effects of inadequate penalties was given by another 
respondent who explained: 
"Although they're starting to impose criminal liability, (those) are 
hard to get and then, civil liability or remedies awarded by 
administrative agencies, they're minimal ... they basically just come 
out to make an announcement, to me, thet don't have a significant 
deterrent effect [uh-huh] to the infringers." 16 
It is clear from these comments that respondents feel frustrated at the level of 
penalties awarded against the infringers and appear to feel that appearances in 
enforcement are more important than actually deterring infringers. Thus, it is 
apparent that inadequate penalties remains an area of concern ill the current 
intellectual property system and may also be a key area for potential improvement. 
414 Questionnaire comments from respondent LA W03. 
415 Questionnaire comments from respondent LAW13T. 
416 Interview with respondent LAW05. 
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5.3.1.5 Weak Judicial Enforcement and Lack of Powers to Enforce Court 
Judgments 
A further consequence of the pre-reform structure of power in China, closely 
linked to the continuing preference for administrative enforcement of intellectual 
property rights is weak judicial enforcement. This is a direct consequence of the 
preference for public enforcement mechanisms discussed above at page 165 and could 
also be considered as a direct consequence of the developing nature of the entire legal 
system in China. As the modem legal system has essentially been constructed only 
since the late 1970s, it is perhaps inevitable that expertise is still lacking in the judicial 
system. 
Overall, respondents did show concern over the judicial enforcement system; 
weak judicial enforcement was ranked fifth out of the sixteen possible factors 
contained on the questionnaire. This factor scored an average of 3.76 on a scale of 0 
to 6, representing the strength of the contribution this factor makes to the current IP 
system. It is noticeable that weak judicial enforcement is thus considered to be a 
much more important aspect in the IP system than the preference for public 
enforcement mechanisms which is only a minor concern. 
In general, launching a case through the judicial system is perceived as more 
problematic than pursuing a straightforward claim through administrative agencies. 
An example of this kind of opinion is illustrated by the following comment: 
"I think China's court lack authority and protection of their 
power.,,417 
Strengthening the judicial system of enforcement is also seen as key by several 
respondents: 
417 Follow-up comments from respondent LAW29T. 
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" W ~ a t . t ~ e y y need to do, is put more of a, you know, to develop more 
their cIvil court system [uh-huh], and their, the civil side of it, 
because that's still fairly weak.,,418 
One of the main ways that the weakness in the judicial enforcement system is 
manifested is in the lack of powers that the courts have to enforce their judgments. 
Estimates suggest that around 500/0 of all civil judgments cannot be enforced.419 The 
primary reason for the non-execution of so many judgments is that the courts have 
little 'weaponry' to back up their commands.42o Without sufficient powers to enforce 
their judgments, court decisions become increasingly meaningless. In other words, 
even if a judgment is passed against an infringer, the court lacks powers to compel the 
infringer to hand over assets. This problem is identified by a number of respondents, 
all of whom express frustration at the inability of the court to enforce judgments made 
against infringers: 
"Ineffective implementation of court decisions is a problem. 
Fundamentally speaking, it's a general lack of credibility. Debtors 
evade the enforcement of court judgments. If defendants fail to 
provide assistance in the implementation, the court very rarely 
resorts to coercive measures and very rarely brings them to 
justice.,,421 
This frustration with the ineffectiveness of judicial enforcement is also echoed 
by a respondent from a large Chinese company who makes a suggestion for how the 
IP system could be improved which explicitly recognises the problems of enforcing 
court judgments: 
"Promote the coexistence of administrative remedies and judicial 
remedies; however, the latter is often difficult to implement in 
reality.,,422 
418 Interview with respondent LAWlO. . 
419 Yahong Li, "Pushing for Greater Protection: The T r ~ n d d ~ o w a r d d Greater P r o t e ~ t I O n n ? f ~ t e l l e . c t u a l . .
Property in the Chinese Software Industry and the ImphcatIOns for ~ u l e e of Law m Chma , UmverSIty 
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, 2 ~ ~ (4), . ( W m ~ e r r , ~ 0 0 2 ) , , 652. 
420 Clarke, "Private Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights m Chma ,39. 
421 Follow-up comments from respondent LAW29T. 
422 Questionnaire comments from respondent MANUOIT. 
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On the whole, respondents did show concern over the lack of effective powers 
used to enforce court judgments; this factor scored an average of 3.73 on a scale of 0 
to 6, similar to the score for weak judicial enforcement in general. Out of the sixteen 
suggested factors, it was ranked as sixth most significant by respondents. This overall 
weakness in the judicial system has even been attributed to a reluctance to create a 
truly independent judiciary despite official commitment to this: 
"No-one wants to give the court that power because if the courts 
have power, you're creating an independent judiciary and not 
completely, but you know, you're creating more-, the more power 
you give judges, the closer you get to an independent judiciary and 
that is not what the Communist Party wants. They want a judiciarY 
that resolves disputes, but is still under the control of the Party."42 
Accordingly, although the weakness of judicial enforcement is usually 
attributed to the immature nature of the legal system in China, these comments go 
further and suggest that the judicial system is deliberately enfeebled for political 
reasons. Whatever the reason, it is clear that the judicial system of intellectual 
property enforcement is still problematic, despite recent improvements and a lot of 
room remains for further improvements. 
5.3.2 Knowledge and Information 
In addition to China's administrative capacity to deal with intellectual property 
enforcement, the comprehensive model of compliance applied in this study contains 
other proximate factors which also need to be considered. Knowledge and 
information is another key area of proximate factors that may influence China's 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. There is a clear overlap between the impact 
of knowledge and information on TRIPS compliance and the discussion above at 
section 5.3.1.1 concerning the lack of trained and experienced personnel in China's IP 
system. 
423 Interview with respondent LA WO 1. 
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5.3.2.1 Expertise of Personnel 
Several respondents share a belief that some IP personnel lack the knowledge 
to be able to effectively enforce intellectual property rights. The personnel in 
question could include legal personnel such as lawyers and judges, but also include 
prosecutors and the police; administrative personnel in agencies such as the AlC and 
NCA; and customs personnel responsible for enforcing IP at the border. 
Comments concerning the knowledge levels of IP personnel were expressed 
by respondents when discussing the problems in the system, influences on the current 
system, as well as potential improvements that could be made to the IP system. For 
example, the consequence of judges lacking detailed knowledge of intellectual 
property is explained as follows: 
"If people don't understand IP laws, there's a (price), if you're a 
judge and you don't understand patent law and there's all this 
political pressure and stuff around you, you can be convinced pretty 
easily by someone who says black is white or white is black.,,424 
In other words, lacking sufficient knowledge of the legal basis for intellectual 
property could either leave the judge more open to reaching inconsistent decisions or 
not reaching the correct decision at alL 
This lack of knowledge is explained by a different respondent, who attributes 
the continuing lack of expertise to a lack of experienced teachers at university level: 
"A lot of them have not historically had the opportunity of receiving 
training with regard to IP, for example, (university) might offer some 
IP course, but have those people teaching those courses had any 
experience with IP work? [Um] 
They might only have book learning, so you get professors 
experienced at teaching, but I don't know how extensive their 
. . 'th d t IP ,,425 experience IS WI regar 0 . 
424 Interview with respondent LA WO 1. 
425 Interview with respondent LAW05. 
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Thus, so-called 'book learning' of intellectual property is distinguished from 
real-life 'experience' and is seen as insufficient to allow for true understanding of the 
system in action. This issue of inexperienced teachers may also stem from the 
developing nature of the Chinese legal system; as there were virtually no lawyers at 
the end of the Cultural Revolution and the start of the reform period, there are not yet 
any senior professionals to pass their experiences onto trainee lawyers and other 
professionals. Furthermore, increasing the knowledge level of personnel involved in 
intellectual property enforcement is also seen as crucial by several respondents. For 
examp Ie, one respondent claims it is vital: 
"To keep increasing the quality of personnel from related 
professions. ,,426 
This is echoed by another respondent who sees the key to improvement in the 
IP system as follows: 
"By improving the allocation of human and material resources, 
especially human resources, the government can equip the 
Intellectual Property Office with more personnel who understand 
intellectual property law, to strengthen the fight against IP infringers 
as a team.,,427 
Consequently, the knowledge levels of personnel involved in the intellectual 
property system is acknowledged to be a concern for many respondents. 
5.3.3 Leadership 
The attitude of the central government in Beijing is acknowledged as key to 
the effective enforcement of intellectual property rights in China. Indeed, this was 
recognised as an area of change in recent years by some respondents. In response to 
questioning regarding changes they have witnessed in the IP system in China in the 
past few years, one respondent noted: 
426 Questionnaire comments from respondent LA W30T. 
427 Follow-up comments from respondent LA W29T. 
187 
"Attention of the IP right from the government bodies,,,428 and 
another that: 
"China's leaders emphasizes the importance of IPR.,,429 
There also appeared to be a strong belief amongst respondents that change in 
the legal system generally and the intellectual property system more specifically was 
often driven from the attitudes of the central leadership. For instance, one respondent 
o bserved that: 
"And also in the latest (successions) of the leadership, central 
leadership, they travel a lot overseas; have a lot of exchange with 
overseas. Uh ... this created the internal desire or drive to open 
China more and logically, how to 0rcen, how to protect IP, I think 
maybe this is one of the aspects.,,4 0 
The logical consequence of this belief that change in the intellectual property 
system is driven by the leadership is the belief that non-enforcement is also a direct 
consequence of the policies of the central leadership. Several respondents expressed 
this idea that the central leadership could effectively enforce intellectual property 
rights if it chose to: 
"And as to ... they will ... when the economy will actually lose more 
than they will gain because of that blatant IP infringement, then the 
central government will actually go into force. [Uh-huh] At the 
moment, as I've said, some industries, they're not really interested 
in it. [Uh-huh] I don't believe that. But I believe that if, if the central 
government is taking an interest, then something will happen in the 
whole country [uh_huh].,,431 
Therefore, leadership from the central government is seen as crucial to the 
effective enforcement of intellectual property rights in China. 
428 Questionnaire comments from respondent MANU05. 
429 Questionnaire comments from respondent LAW12T. 
430 Interview with respondent LA W16. 
431 Telephone interview with respondent LAW3l. 
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5.3.4 The Influence of NGOs 
The fmal category of proximate factors that may influence China's compliance 
with the TRIPs Agreement is the influence of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). Domestic NGOs are a challenging topic in China due to the political and 
practical barriers that they face. Specifically, the political culture in China is said not 
to be conducive to civil society activism. 432 Moreover, NGOs may have more 
relevance to other areas of international obligations in which a state's compliance may 
be considered; for instance, environmental protection is strongly influenced by 
pressure from both domestic and international NGOs. However, intellectual property 
protection does not elicit similar NGO involvement. On the contrary, organisations 
concerned with intellectual property protection tend to be commercial groups, often 
consisting of businesses with strong intellectual property rights. Therefore, the 
influence of NGOs in the intellectual property arena is based on pressure from key 
groups of companies, both domestic and international. 
5.3.4.1 International Business Organisations in China 
With regard to intellectual property in China, the mam organisation 
pressurising for better protection is the Quality Brands Protection Committee (QBPC). 
The QBPC is a group of more than 160 multinational companies concerned with 
counterfeiting in China and their stated aim is "to work cooperatively with the 
Chinese central and local governments, local industry, and other organisations to 
make positive contributions to intellectual property protection in the People's 
Republic of China.,,433 Several foreign respondents independently mentioned the 
QBPC in connection with their views on the intellectual property system in China and 
this shows that the Committee is fairly well-known amongst practitioners in the IP 
432 Yiyi Lu, "The Growth of Civil Society in China: Key Challenges for NGOs" available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uklpd£'research/asia/China.pdf, accessed February 2005. 
433 Quality Brands Protection Committee, "Factsheet". 
189 
field in China. One respondent from a professional services company stated that the 
QBPC: 
"Have been working very hard in China to make the case for IP 
and design protection, and to get enforcement.,,434 
One lawyer based in Hong Kong mentioned the role of the QBPC III 
connection with a client who was struggling to stop infringers of their IP: 
"What they do now is they join forces with other car makers and 
spare part makers ... [Uh-huh] through the OBPC.,,435 
This respondent goes on to explain that through the QBPC, this manufacturer 
can contact other manufacturers of similar products and join together in enforcement 
actions, thus saving costs. This role of the QBPC as a network for companies to join 
together to tackle infringements thus seems to be an important one for some 
respondents. However, another respondent expressed some frustration at the 
consistently 'positive' approach taken by the QBPC. The QBPC hosts annual award 
ceremonies where officials are recognised for special achievements in IP enforcement, 
but this respondent did not agree with this approach, claiming, 
"You know you get the OBPC [uh-huh], there have been some 
people in there talking about blacklists and things like that but (the 
basic position is) say no, no we can't do that, we have to reward, 
we should do it by positive encouragement, you know, like best 
cases and best officials ... (and I'm thinking) this sucks, you see the 
most corrupt officials in the business getting awards for their great 
cases and stuff, we should be outing them, you know, as 
crooks.,,436 
Accordingly, although the QBPC was praised by some respondents for its role 
in IP in China, this praise was not universal. It is also noteworthy that the QBPC was 
only mentioned by foreign respondents and was not commented on by any of the 
Chinese respondents. Therefore, the QBPC appears to serve a specific purpose of 
434 Questionnaire comments from respondent SERVICES02. 
435 Telephone interview with respondent LAW31. 
436 Interview with respondent LA WO 1. 
190 
bringing multinational companies together and raising awareness of IP issues amongst 
them, but may not be so successful in a wider role of pressuring for stronger IP 
enforcement overall. 
5.3.4.2 Domestic Business Organisations in China 
Although formal organisations of domestic businesses are limited in China, the 
role of Chinese companies in pressing for change in the intellectual property system is 
recognised as increasingly important. The experience of Taiwan and Korea has been 
used by several commentators to argue that a combination of external and internal 
pressure is truly necessary to bring about genuine change in IPR protection. 437 
Consequently, many observers believe that if Chinese private companies possessed 
more intellectual property, stronger IP protection would be sought and obtained.438 
Indeed, a few optimistic observers claim to have already witnessed the start of this 
change towards greater domestic protection for intellectual property: 
"Recent discussions ... have suggested that Chinese technology developers 
increasingly favor a stronger IPR regime. As more of these voices are 
heard, changes to the country's IPR system will become more responsive 
to local interests and less driven by the terms of international 
agreements. ,,439 
More generally, Chinese citizens are beginning to use the courts more and 
more, instead of the traditional reliance on mediation or administrative agencies. This 
is also seen as a positive step for the prospects of enhanced enforcement of 
. 11 1 . h 440 mte ectua property ng ts. However, this theory of intellectual property 
development has been criticised as a form of "historical determinism" that: 
437 Maruyama, "US-China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual Property and the Rule of Law in a 
Global Economy", 167. 
438 Endeshaw, Intellectual Property in China: The Roots of the Problem of Enforcement, 79. 
439 Potter and Oksenberg, "A Patchwork ofIPR Protection". 
440 Jenckes, "Protection of Foreign Copyrights in China: The Intellectual Property Courts and 
Alternative Avenues of Protection", 560. 
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"Developing countries mount a deterministic development ladder, from 
light assembly to heavy manufacturing and on to high-tech products, and, 
having achieved this degree of industrialization, they begin to create, and 
protect IP. ,,441 
Therefore, the role of Chinese companies is seen as crucial to achieving 
sustained change in the IP system in China. Although formal organisations of 
Chinese companies are limited to a few industries, Chinese companies in general are 
cited by most respondents as one of the key influences on the Chinese legal system. 
Some respondents assert that this shift towards greater pressure from domestic 
companies has already taken place. For example, when discussing recent changes in 
the IP system in China, one respondent declared that: 
"Chinese companies are more aware of IP issues and register in 
mass, ,,442 while another stated that: 
"Chinese companies are now suffering from IP problems and are 
calling for effective protection measures to be available.,,443 
Pressure from Chinese companies is also cited by several respondents when 
discussing the future for the intellectual property system in China and is even 
described as the "main driver" for change by one respondent.444 For instance: 
"Improved IP protection would mostly benefit foreign companies at 
present, though it would benefit domestic companies in a long-term 
view. With the request and demand of I P protection from domestic 
companies and consumers becoming stronger, the IP protection 
would be improved more and faster.,,445 
Overall, most respondents declared Chinese companies to be a highly 
significant influence on the IP system in China, although one respondent was sceptical 
of the weight that should be attached to their pronouncements: 
"[could Chinese companies pressure for [yes] better IP protection?] 
441 Stevenson-Yang and DeWoskin, "China Destroys the IP Paradigm". 
442 Questionnaire comments from respondent SERVICESOI. 
443 Questionnaire comments from respondent SERVICES02. 
444 Questionnaire comments from respondent LA W06. 
445 Questionnaire comments from respondent LA W07. 
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They could, but (foreign) companies, for example, will have a better, 
louder voice [uh-huh] because they have more resources and they 
have more appreciation of IP and they have more experience in 
how to protect IP so I think they will be better than Chinese 
companies to push this forward, although I'm not saying that 
Chinese parties should not bother, should not contribute to this 
[yeah] (pressure ).,,446 
As a consequence, although pressure from Chinese companies is seen as 
critical for the future of the Chinese intellectual property system, the political 
structure of government in China may be hindering the impact of their collective 
VOIce. 
5.3.5 The Significance of Proximate Factors Overall 
The proximate factors considered in this study included administrative 
capacity, knowledge and information, leadership and the influence ofNGOs. Of these, 
administrative capacity was clearly the most significant. Inadequate penalties were 
identified as a specific concern of many of the respondents, who were frustrated that 
levels of penalties are inadequate to deter infringers. Weak judicial enforcement and 
an associated lack of powers to enforce judgments passed by the courts was also a 
concern to some respondents, which demonstrates that judicial enforcement is still 
seen as problematic by respondents. However, there was some disagreement over 
whether the judiciary is weak due to a lack of experience or whether the judiciary is 
denied full independence and stronger powers for political reasons. 
The length of the process was a minor concern to a few respondents. 
Conversely, the short length of the administrative enforcement process was praised 
and the civil litigation process was judged to be similar to other countries. In reality, 
the problem thus may be a perception that the process is too long which deters rights 
holders from pursuing infringers rather than problems with the length of the 
446 Interview with respondent LAW05. 
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enforcement process itself. The lack of a unified IP agency is also linked to the 
administrative capacity within the IP system, but was not seen as a priority. It was 
also recognised that any such agency would necessarily be broken down in local or 
regional branches to be effective. 
Arguably the most significant element of administrative capacity which was 
discussed by respondents was the lack of trained and experienced legal personnel. 
However, respondents focused more on the quality of the existing personnel rather 
than citing insufficient quantities of personnel. This is reflected in the discussion of 
the expertise of personnel under the heading of knowledge and information, and was 
largely explained by respondents as resulting from the immature nature of the legal 
system in China. 
The influence of NGOs was discussed, but was not significant in the context 
of IP protection in China. The role of the QBPC was discussed, mostly in positive 
terms and many respondents urged Chinese enterprises to form similar organisations 
to press for sustained improvements in the IP system. The attitude of the central 
leadership was also highlighted as a key recent improvement, but some respondents 
still claimed that enforcement problems existed as a result of government 
intransigence and that the government could improve enforcement if it chose to. 
5.4 Summary and Conclusion 
The various factors influencing compliance with the TRIPS Agreement which 
are specific to China have been considered under three main headings: basic 
parameters of China, fundamental factors such as political and institutional factors, 
and proximate factors such as administrative capacity. Some of the factors identified 
above are more significant than others. In terms of parameters overall, survey 
responses indicate that China's previous behaviour and historical and cultural factors 
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were not felt to be major influences on the current IP system, but the size and number 
of neighbours of China may have a minor influence on compliance. Therefore, basic 
parameters should not be ignored in assessing China's compliance, but they are 
certainly not the most significant influences on the current framework of intellectual 
property protection and enforcement. 
Turning to fundamental factors impacting upon China's TRIPS compliance, 
these were considered under the headings of attitudes and values, political and 
institutional factors and economic factors. Overall, several of the fundamental factors 
were identified as crucial contributing factors to the current IP system in China, 
particularly the lack of awareness of IP rights, local protectionism and a lack of 
consistency in enforcement, which were all identified as highly significant by 
respondents. 
Several proximate factors were also identified as key contributors to the 
current state of the IP system in China. These were, most importantly, the inadequate 
level of penalties imposed on infringers and the judiciary's lack of strength in dealing 
with IP issues. In addition, the personnel in the IP system were subject to many 
comments from respondents, but the focus of these comments was primarily on the 
quality, rather than the quantity of the personnel. Furthermore, more minor proximate 
factors identified by respondents which may have a positive influence included the 
committed attitude of the leadership and the role played by pressure groups such as 
the QBPC in the IP field. 
Overall, a variety of factors were identified and discussed by the respondents. 
However, these factors may vary in the impact that they have upon the IP system and 
how easily they may be manipulated. Therefore, it is essential to fully examine the 
detailed implementation and subsequent compliance with the TRIPS Agreement that 
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China has demonstrated and the resulting effectiveness of the current system of 
protection. Consequently, the implementation, compliance and effectiveness of the 
current system will all be analysed in the following chapter before detailed 
recommendations can be made about how to change the most significant factors 
identified above. 
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6 The Intellectual Property System in China: 
Implementation, Effectiveness and Compliance with the 
TRIPS Agreement 
China's interactions with the TRIPS Agreement will now be considered in 
more detail. Under the model of compliance applied in this study, both non-country 
specific and country-specific factors combine to affect implementation, compliance 
and effectiveness. These three elements need to be distinguished. Implementation 
refers to the passing of international obligations into formal domestic law. 
Compliance can have different implications; compliance can include compliance with 
the specific obligations of the treaty, both procedural and substantive, as well as 
compliance with the spirit of the treaty. Finally, the effectiveness of the TRIPS 
Agreement in tackling the problem of IP infringements must be considered. 
Effectiveness may also include different aspects: effectiveness in achieving the stated 
objectives of the treaty, but also in addressing the problems that led to the treaty. 
In this chapter, China's compliance with the obligations associated with the 
TRIPS Agreement will be discussed. China's implementation of the TRIPS 
Agreement into domestic IP legislation will first be introduced, and then overall 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement will be evaluated. Compliance will 
incorporate both procedural and substantive compliance as well as compliance with 
the spirit of the treaty. Finally, the effectiveness of the TRIPS Agreement in tackling 
intellectual property infringements in China will be analysed. Respondents' 
experiences of the intellectual property system in action will primarily inform this 
discussion about the effectiveness of the current system. 
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6.1 China's Efforts to Implement the TRIPS Agreement 
According to research conducted on China's pre-WTO entry compliance with 
TRIPS, China needed to make substantial changes to the law to comply with the 
TRIPS norms. Almost forty substantive TRIPS requirements were identified, of 
which China was already compliant with less than half 447 Consequently, China 
needed to take action to comply with the remaining requirements. 
The actions required to comply with the remaining provisions included: 
• Removing discrimination to uphold the national treatment principle; 
• Restricting compulsory licenses; 
• Copyright: introducing rental rights and clarifying/enhancing performer rights 
and broadcast rights; 
• Trademarks: establishing protection for well-known marks, clarifying 
provisions on prior use and ineligible signs; 
• Introducing protection for geographical indications; 
• Patents: clarifying basic exemptions and coverage of plant and animal 
varieties; 
• Enforcement: sanctions to be enhanced, particularly preliminary injunctions 
and seizures, as well as levels of damages. 
• Ensuring the availability of judicial review. 
With such a multitude of changes necessary, it is clear that China faced a 
major legislative task to fully comply with all the TRIPS standards. 
447 Maskus, "Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO Accession Package: Assessing China's Reforms". 
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6.1.1 The Impact of the TRIPS Agreement on the IP System in China 
It is immediately clear that China's IP system has changed dramatically in the 
past few years in response to the TRIPS Agreement. On the initial questionnaire, 
respondents were asked if they had noticed any changes in the intellectual property 
system in China in the past five years. Of the 45 valid responses, 43 stated that they 
had noticed a change, with only 2 respondents noticing no change. Furthermore, 
when asked to characterise this change as positive or negative on a scale of -2 to 2 (-2 
representing strong negative changes and 2 representing strong positive changes), the 
changes were ranked 1.26 by respondents, which suggests that respondents felt the 
recent changes observed were positive. Moreover, it is notable that only one 
respondent judged recent changes to be negative. The details of the respondents' 
answers are in the table below: 
Table 6-1 Responses regarding recent changes observed in the IP system 
ChanQ"e Observed Number of Respondents 
-2 1 
-1 0 
0 4 
1 23 
2 19 
However, the influence of the TRIPS Agreement on the framework of 
intellectual property protection in China predates WTO accession by several years. 
Despite not being a full member, China did participate in the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations as an observer and had used the TRIPS Agreement as a model law to 
improve the IP legislation throughout the 1990s.448 Moreover, the influence of the 
TRIPS Agreement on the intellectual property system in China is not limited to 
substantive changes in the formal laws and regulations. Besides the role of TRIPS as a 
448 Deli Yang, "The Development of Intellectual Property in China", World Patent Information, 25 (2), 
139. 
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model for China's legislative improvements of the IP protection system, TRIPS 
implementation has also raised the prospect of using the formal dispute settlement 
proceedings provided by the WTO to make "an objective determination on the 
efficacy of enforcement measures." 449 This possibility has further increased the 
emphasis on enforcement of substantive rights that was already being stressed by 
foreign rights holders and trade partners alike. 
Indeed, several respondents did explicitly refer to this function of the WTO, as: 
"The threat of the WTO dispute settlement procedures.,,45o 
Another respondent felt that: 
"The dispute resolution mechanism in there probably does have a 
little bit of fear factor and also (pulling) factor.,,451 
Thus, the impact of WTO entry in terms of China's TRIPS commitments is 
multifaceted. Firstly, the TRIPS Agreement is said to have been influential during 
legal revisions of the 1990s. Secondly, the threat of the dispute resolution mechanism 
that is part of the WTO framework may also hold a bit of a 'fear factor' for China. 
More importantly, the TRIPS Agreement led directly to wide-ranging legislative 
changes in intellectual property protection and [mally, there were also important 
changes in the IP enforcement system directly linked to WTO accession. These 
important legislative changes and changes to the enforcement system made as part of 
China's attempts to observe its TRIPS obligations, as well as an outline of the current 
system of protection, will be presented in the section below. 
449 Antony S. Taubman, "TRIPS Goes East: Chinese Interests and International Trade in I n t e l 1 ~ c t u a l l
Property", Cass, China and the World Trading System: Entering the New Millennium, (Cambndge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003): 347. 
450 Follow-up comments from respondent LAW12T. 
451 Interview comments with respondent LAWOI. 
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6.1.2 Implementing the TRIPS Agreement in the IP Legislation 
In order to comply with the substantial obligations associated with WTO entry, 
China undertook a massive overhaul of its intellectual property laws beginning in 
1999, before official accession. During the period 1999-2002, many laws and 
regulations were considerably amended, while others were introduced for the first 
time. To illustrate this huge legislative effort, a selection of the major laws and 
regulations passed during this term are outlined in the table below. 
Legislation Date and change 
Copyright Law Aunended and carne into effect 2ih October 2001 452 
Implementing Regulations of the Copyright Law Carne into force on September 15th 2002 
Decisions on Safeguarding of Security on the Adopted 28th December 2000 Internet 
Regulations on Computer Software Protection Aunended and carne into effect 1 st January 2002 
Regulations on Publications Carne into effect 1 st February 2002 
Regulations on Motion Pictures Carne into effect 1 st February 2002 
Regulations on Sound and Video Recordings Carne into effect 1 st February 2002 
Patent Law Aunended and carne into effect 1st July 2001'1)j 
Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law Carne into force on 1 st July 2001 
Patent Examination Guidelines Republished 1 st July 2001 
Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits Protection Carne into force on 1 st October 2001 Regulations (IC Regulations) 
Implementing Rules of the IC Regulations Carne into force on 1 st October 2001 
Regulations on Administration of Imports or Carne into force on 1 st January 2002 Exports of Technologies 
Rules on Registration of Technology Import or Carne into force on 1 st January 2002 
Export Contracts 
Rules on Technologies prohibited or restricted Carne into force on 1st January 2002 from importation 
Rules on Technologies prohibited or restricted Carne into force on 1 st January 2002 
from exp_ortation 
Trademark Law 
Aunended and carne into effect 1 st December 
2001454 
Implementing Regulations of the Trademark Law Carne into force on 15th September 2002 
Trademark Examination Guidelines Revised 1 ih October 2002 
. Figure 6-2 Selection of major laws, regulations and rules amended or passed to comply WIth 
TRIPS requirements 
In addition to the main period of legislative revision from 1999-2002, the 
process of review and modification continued after this time in China. For example, 
452 Promulgated by: "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan gongbao" (Gazette ofthe State Council 
of the People's Republic of China), Issue 33, 30th November 2001. 
453 Promulgated by: "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan gongbao" (Gazette ofthe State Council 
of the People's Republic of China), Issue 4, 10th February 2003. 
454 "Gazette of the State Council of the People's Republic of China", Issue 33, 2001. 
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according to the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), in 2003, "a total of 26 
regulations and documents, which were not in accordance with the rules of WTO , 
were revised or cancelled." 455 Some examples of amendments made in the 
legislation 456 specifically to implement the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 
include the provision of rental and broadcast rights for copyright. The TRIPS 
Agreement provides a right to prohibit rental of computer programs and movies under 
Article 11; this was implemented by the Copyright Law 2001 revised Article 10, 
which provides rental rights. The TRIPS Agreement also provides the right to prevent 
fixation, reproduction or broadcasting for 20 years, or copyright under Article 14; the 
amendments to Article 10 of the 2001 Copyright Law include these rights of 
reproduction, broadcasting and communication. 
Other key revisions to implement the TRIPS Agreement included extending 
the symbols which may be protected as trademarks and codifying the protection for 
well-known marks. The signs that may be subject to trademark under the TRIPS 
Agreement include distinguishing names, letters, numerals and colours; this provision 
was implemented by the revised Trademark Law 2001 Article 8. The TRIPS 
Agreement also requires protection for well-known marks without registration in the 
Member country. Well-known marks were protected in China prior to the revisions of 
1999-2002, but this protection was strengthened and formalised by the inclusion of 
two new Articles in the revised Trademark Law 2001. Articles 13 and 14 prohibit 
registration of trademarks which are a reproduction, imitation or translation of a well-
455 State Intellectual Property Office, "White Paper on the Intellectual Property Rights Protection in 
China in 2003", http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipoEnglish/gftxe/zscgbhbpse/t2004060329734.htm. 
accessed 3rd June 2004. 
456 For details see: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhuanliJa, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shangbiaofa, 
zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhuzuoquanJa (Patent Law of the PRC, Trademark Law of the PRC, 
Copyright Law of the PRC), (Beijing: Law Press China, 2002). 
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known trademark not registered in China and provide criteria for determining whether 
a trademark is well-known. 
The major legislative changes that China undertook in connection with WTO 
accessIon are also frequently mentioned by several respondents, when asked to 
comment on recent changes in the intellectual property system that they have 
observed. It is noticeable that these comments on specific legislative changes were 
predominantly made by lawyers, whereas respondents from business tended to focus 
more on changes in enforcement or attitude that they had observed. 
For example, when asked to comment on recent changes they had observed in 
the IP system in China, one legal respondent described: 
Revision of the relevant laws and regulations, such as the copyright 
law, trademark law, patent law and other IP-related laws and 
regulations.457 
The connection between the amendments and China's WTO entry was made 
more explicitly by other respondents: 
A series of IP laws and regulations have been amended to fulfil 
China's commitment to the WTO. IP-related clauses have been 
added into various laws and regulations accordingly.458 
Furthermore, the revision of China's IP laws associated with WTO entry was 
described as a "milestone" 459 and [mally, a further respondent also linked the 
substantive amendments to ''the requirements of TRIPS.,,46o 
Therefore, it is clear from the various respondents' comments, as well as the 
quantity of amendments carried out, that the legislative changes that China has made 
to comply with the TRIPS Agreement have been substantial. 
457 Questionnaire comments from respondent LA W07. 
458 Questionnaire comments from respondent LAW03. 
459 Questionnaire comments from respondent LA WI8. 
460 Questionnaire comments from respondent LAWI2T. 
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6.1.3 Implementing the TRIPS Agreement in the Enforcement System 
In addition to amendments to substantive provisions of the IP legislation, 
accession to the TRlPS Agreement has also led to changes in the enforcement of IPR 
in China. The TRlPS Agreement is often said to add teeth to the previous 
international intellectual property Conventions, such as the Paris Convention and the 
Berne Convention, which lacked provisions on enforcement standards. 461 Thus, 
countries could comply with their previous commitments by merely passing a law, 
even if the law was not applied in practice. Consequently, "one of the key initiatives 
of the TRlPS Agreement was to resolve the enforcement issues left by the existing IP 
protection regime.,,462 
As enforcement provisions of the TRlPS Agreement were deemed to be so 
crucial by WTO Members,463 it is important to examine some of the specific changes 
that implementation of the TRlPS Agreement have brought to China's IP enforcement 
system. These changes include the availability of judicial review; wider 
implementation of the national treatment principle; increases in the level of fmes; the 
availability of injunctions; and the use of criminal prosecutions. These changes will 
now be considered in more detail. 
6.1.3.1 a. Judicial Review 
One of the main changes that the TRlPS regIme has brought to the 
administrative system specifically is the addition of the possibility of judicial review 
offmal administrative decisions. Under TRlPS Article 41(4), "parties to a proceeding 
shall have an opportunity for review by a judicial authority of fmal administrative 
decisions". Previously, no independent review was available for appellants from 
461 Andy Y. Sun, "Reforming the Protection ofIntellectual Property: The Case of China and Taiwan in 
Light ofWTO Accession", Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, (4), (2001), 26. 
462 Gregory, "Chinese Trademark Law and the TRIPS Agreement- Confucius Meets the WTO", 338. 
463 As discussed above at section 4.2.2. 
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administrative decisions. The amendments of the specific intellectual property laws 
undertaken in 2000 and 2001 provide for judicial review of administrative decisions 
under Articles 33, 49 and 50 of the Trademark Law; Articles 41 and 55 of the Patent 
Law and Article 55 of the Copyright Law. China is thus now in compliance with 
Article 41 (4). This has had a major impact on the enforcement system overall; as all 
fmal administrative decisions are now subject to external scrutiny, authorities are less 
likely to resort to arbitrary decision-making. 
6.1.3.2 h. National Treatment 
Another key principle of the TRIPS Agreement is the principle of national 
treatment under Article 3, "that each member shall accord to the nationals of other 
members' treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with 
regard to the protection of intellectual property." The formalization of the national 
treatment principle did lead to some minor legislative changes. For example, Article 
18 of the revised Trademark Law 2001 forces foreign enterprises or individuals 
applying for registration of a trademark or handling other trademark matters to use a 
State-approved trademark agent. This is arguably in breach of the national treatment 
principle as domestic applicants can apply directly to the Trademark Office of the 
SAlC. AlCs previously would only accept infringement actions from foreign rights 
holders through a trademark agent. Although these restrictions have now been 
relaxed under the influence of the TRIPS Agreement, in practice, many foreign rights 
holders still use the services of an agent to navigate the enforcement process, which 
can inflate the cost of bringing an enforcement action. 
6.1.3.3 c. Levelo/Fines and Damages 
A further aspect of enforcement in which TRIPS implementation has had an 
impact is the level of filles imposed by the administrative authorities or damages 
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awarded by the civil courts. Under Article 41 (1) of TRIPS, there is a general 
obligation that remedies should "constitute a deterrent to further infringements." 
However, fines do not appear to have increased significantly since WTO entry, as 
shown in the table below. Despite a significant increase in the average fme in 2003 
from 5761 RMB to 7414 RMB, this dropped back in 2004 to 5499 RMB. 
Table 6-3 Fines imposed by the Trademark Office of the SAle for trademark infringements and 
counterfeiting, 2002_4464 
Total Number of Total Amount of Fines 
Year 
Cases (RMB) Average Fine (RMB) 
2002 23539 135612506 5761 
2003 26488 196394094 7414 
2004 40171 220884500 5498 
Under the Patent Law, Article 58, the administrative authorities can confiscate 
any illegal earnings and impose a fme of not more than three times the illegal earnings 
or not more than RMB 50,000. The level of fmes for both trademark and copyright 
infringement are governed by implementing regulations. Article 42 of the 
Implementing Regulations of the Trademark Law 2001 states that the fme imposed 
shall be not more than 20% of the illegal business or not more than two times the 
profit illegally earned. Article 36 of the Implementing Regulations of the Copyright 
Law 2001 provides the administrative authority with the power to impose a fme not 
exceeding three times the amount of the illegal business gains, or a maximum ofRMB 
100,000. Despite these generous limits for levels of fmes imposed for IP 
infringements, there is still evidence to suggest that authorities are reluctant to impose 
high fmes and that the fmancial penalties imposed do not constitute an effective 
deterrent in line with the TRIPS provision. 
464 Compiled from statistics available at: Zhongguo Shangbiao Wang, (Trademark Office)," 2002-2004 
nian du quanguo chachu shangbiao qinquan jiamao anjian tongjibiao" (2002-4 National Statistics on 
Trademark Infringement and Counterfeiting Cases), http://sbj.saic.gov.cnlenglish/tjxxltjxx.asp, 
accessed June 12th 2006. 
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From respondents' comments, it is clear that both fines imposed by 
administrative authorities and damages awarded by the courts are perceived as still 
too low. This is evident in the high ranking given to inadequate penalties in the 
questionnaire as a significant factor contributing to the problems in the current IP 
system in China as discussed in the previous chapter at page 181. 
In terms of damages, it was expressed by different respondents that: 
"damages for intentional infringements are far from enough.,,465 
This issue was expanded on by a foreign lawyer working for a Chinese fIrm: 
"You can't get damages here very easily, it's so difficult to prove 
damages so then they just have, you know, a statutory ceiling on 
most of the damages." 66 
Therefore, the issue of inadequate damages appears to be linked to the issue of 
evidence. This was reflected in the comments of at least four respondents who all 
emphasised the need for "a reasonable Evidence Law.,,467 This problem with 
evidence is due to the burden of proof, which remains on the plaintiff: 
"It's a huge problem anywhere in the world, getting evidence in IP 
cases, but the way the Chinese system is reliant almost exclusively 
on documentary evidence and will not draw inferences, put(s) the 
burden of proof on the plaintiff at all times.,,468 
Consequently, the issue of low fmes and damages is more complex than it 
initially appears and simply raising the maximum levels available in the primary 
legislation may not be sufficient to ameliorate this problem. Furthermore, the issue of 
penalties is also linked to the lack of court powers to compel infringers to meet the 
terms of any orders as discussed above at page 183. 
465 Questionnaire comments from respondent LA W28T. 
466 Interview comments from respondent LAWIO. 
467 Questionnaire comments from respondent LA WI8. 
468 Interview comments from respondent LA WO 1. 
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6.1.3.4 d. Availability of Injunctions 
Under Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement, injunctions should be available "to 
order a party to desist from an infringement". Prior to WTO entry, China's 
intellectual property enforcement system was often criticised for non-compliance with 
this provision; "for many years a glaring omission in the IP enforcement system in 
China was the lack of preliminary injunctions. ,,469 However, the main intellectual 
property laws have now been amended to provide authorities with the power to issue 
injunctions. In China, preliminary injunctions were frrst permitted under the Patent 
Law 2000, Article 61, and subsequently by the amended Trademark Law 2001, 
Article 57, and the Copyright Law 2001, Article 49. 
As these powers are still quite new, there remains some doubt about how 
willing the courts will be to issue preliminary injunctions. It has been suggested that 
there are still some teething problems in the new preliminary procedures and that the 
courts have so far taken a tough stance on the issuing of these orders. However, as 
these problems are resolved and the courts begin to become accustomed to issuing 
injunctions, pre-trial injunctions could offer a useful alternative to administrative 
actions. 470 Thus, the introduction of these orders is overwhelmingly seen as a 
positive step for the IP enforcement system in China. "The Supreme People's Court 
clarification of these procedures should lead to civil IP cases becoming more common, 
either as the primary means of enforcement of rights or as an adjunct to administrative 
enforcement. ,,471 
469 Tim Browning and Carol Wang, "Ten Years of Enforcement in China", Managing Intellectual 
Property, 136 (Supplement 1), 39. 
470 Matthew Murphy, "Supreme People's Court Widens Litigation Options" available at 
http://www.managingip.com!default.asp?Page=5&ISS= 12532, accessed September 2004. 
471 Sara Holder, "Preliminary Injunctions for Intellectual Property Infringements in the PRC", 
http://www.iprights.com!publications/articles/article.asp?articleID= 163, accessed November 16th 
2005. 
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Consequently, the effect of the availability of pre-trial injunctions could be the 
increased use of civil enforcement and the rejection of administrative enforcement as 
the primary means of enforcing IP rights in China. It is too soon to see this effect but , 
long-term, it is promising for rights holders to have more enforcement options to 
consider. Indeed, the introduction of injunctions to the court system is cited by 
several respondents as one of the key recent changes in the IP system in China. For 
example, when asked to identify the most significant change, this respondent cited: 
"The civil injunction system is introduced to the Chinese legal 
system. ,,472 
6.1.3.5 e. Criminal Prosecutions 
A further area where the TRIPS Agreement may have some impact is the issue 
of criminal IP enforcement. Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that 
criminal procedures should "be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark 
counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale." It is undeniable that 
criminal penalties are available under China's Criminal Law 1997 for serious 
trademark counterfeiting (Article 213) or copyright piracy (Article 217). However, 
the relationship between 'serious' in China's Criminal Law and 'wilful' in TRIPS is 
not clear. Despite a Supreme People's Court interpretation issued in December 2004 
which lowered the thresholds for criminal liability, it is not certain that all cases of 
'wilful' infringement would be classed as 'serious'. The administrative authorities are 
supposed to transfer serious infringement cases to be considered for criminal liability 
under Article 54 of the Trademark Law 2001 and Article 47 of the Copyright Law 
2001, in practice, such a transfer is rarely made. 
Year Number of cases transferred to Total number of cases 
judicial authorities 
472 Questionnaire comments from respondent LA W29T. 
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2002 59 23539 
2003 45 26488 
2004 96 40171 
Figure 6-4 Number of cases transferred from the Trademark Office ofthe SAle to judicial 
organs for criminal liability, 2002_4473 
From the table above, it is evident that the TRIPS Agreement has had a 
minimal impact on the number of cases transferred to judicial authorities for criminal 
prosecution in the fIrst three years following WTO accession in December 2001. 
Despite a notable increase in the overall number of cases transferred, the proportion of 
cases transferred has not grown and has remained constant at around 1 in 400 cases. 
However, the revised thresholds for criminal liability amended in late 2004 may have 
an impact on the transfer of cases from administrative to judicial authorities.474 This 
important modifIcation in the regulations was explained as follows: 
"In November 2004, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme 
People's Procuratorate promulgated the «Provisions concerning 
the handling of criminal cases of IP infringement to address a 
number of questions concerning the specific application of the 
law». These provisions aim to make the rules more concrete and 
easier for the judiciary to operate in order to fight against IP 
infringers.,,475 
Indeed, this change towards greater use of criminal enforcement for IP 
infringements was noted by a respondent from a foreign invested enterprise in the 
manufacturing sector: 
"The Chinese government strengthens attack on IP criminals.,,476 
473 Compiled from statistics available at: Zhongguo Shangbiao Wang (Trademark Office), "2004 nian 
du guanguo chachu shangbiao qinguan iiamao anjian tongjibiao" (Statistics of Trademark Infringement 
and Counterfeiting Cases Throughout the Country in 2004), 
http://sbj.saic.gov.cnitjxxffJTableQGCCSBQQ2004.asp, accessed June 13th 2006. 
474 As noted in questionnaire comments from respondent LA W28T. Full text of the interpretation taken 
from: "Gaofa gaojian guanyu banli qinfan zhishichanguan xingshi anjian iu ti ying yong falu ruogan 
wenti de jieshi (quan wen)" (Transcript of the Supreme People's Court interpretation of the application 
of the law to criminal cases ofIP infringement), http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/lawI734357.htm. 
accessed April 15th 2006. 
475 Follow-up comments from respondent LA W29T. 
476 Questionnaire comments from respondent MANU06. 
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However, criminal enforcement is still seen as problematic in China despite 
the revised thresholds for liability: 
"Criminal thresholds continue to make criminal enforcement 
difficult. ,,477 
This may be because bureaucratic rivalries between the administrative and 
judicial agencies still exist and may continue to discourage the prompt transfer of 
cases for criminal prosecution. As the administrative agencies rely directly on 
revenue from confiscated goods to operate, they are extremely reluctant to transfer 
cases for criminal prosecution as they would lose the revenue associated with that 
case.
478 
6.2 Assessing China's Overall Compliance with TRIPS Obligations 
Clearly China has taken significant steps to implement the obligations of the 
TRIPS Agreement in both the legislative framework and enforcement systems. 
However, the implementation of TRIPS obligations into the domestic legislation is not 
enough to be in full compliance with the Agreement. Therefore, China's consequent 
compliance with the specific provisions of TRIPS will now be analysed (see Figure 
6-5 below for a summary of China's compliance with some of the major substantive 
TRIPS provisions on enforcement). China appears to be in substantive compliance 
with the majority of its TRIPS obligations. However, there are still a handful of 
provisions where China's compliance is in doubt. The most significant provisions 
under scrutiny involve enforcement measures as these are the primary focus of the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
The frrst of these areas of possible non-compliance is Article 45( 1), which 
expresses the principle that "the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order 
477 Questionnaire comments from respondent LA WO 1. 
478 Daniel Chow, A Primer on Foreign Investment Enterprises and Protection of Intellectual Property 
in China, (London: K1uwer Law International, 2002): 217. 
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the infringer to pay the rights holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury 
the rights holder has suffered." Compliance with this provision is not easy to assess 
in China. The Trademark Law Article 56 provides that there are two tests for the 
amount of compensation awarded: either the profits the infringer has earned or the 
losses to the rights holder. Article 48 of the Copyright Law is similar: it states that 
compensation shall be the actual losses suffered or unlawful gains where the actual 
losses are difficult to calculate. Therefore, although in most cases, the calculation of 
damages should be based on the actual losses suffered by the rights holder, in practice 
many rights holders still complain about the inadequacy of damages awarded. Thus, 
this remains a possible area of non-compliance for China. 
The second substantive TRIPS provision on enforcement that China possibly 
does not comply with is the requirement in Article 61 that criminal penalties should 
be available "at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy 
on a commercial scale." Furthermore, "remedies available shall include 
imprisonment and/or monetary filles sufficient to provide a deterrent." This is another 
difficult area in which to measure China's compliance. As outlined above at page 205, 
criminal penalties are available under the Criminal Law 1997 for serious trademark 
counterfeiting (Article 213) or copyright piracy (Article 217). Furthermore, 
imprisonment and fines are both available as remedies. However, the relationship 
between 'serious' in China's Criminal Law and 'wilful' in TRIPS may be problematic. 
The other issue of possible non-compliance under Article 61 is whether the penalties 
provided are sufficient to provide a deterrent. 
Art. TRIPS Provision Chinese Provisions TRIPS Com12liance 
41(2) No unreasonable time- Cases should be concluded Compliant 
limits or delays within 6 months, or 3 months 
for summary cases. 
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41(3) Decisions should be Judgments issued Compliant 
reasoned and in writing immediately or within 10 
days; must include reasons 
for judgment. 
41(4) Judicial review Patent Law, Trademark Law Compliant 
available for fmal and Copyright Lawall 
administrative provide for judicial review of 
decisions administrative decisions. 
42 Defendant's right to Defendant receives complaint Compliant 
timely written notice of within 5 days offiling, must 
the claim include grounds of complaint. 
44 Availability of Injunctions available from Compliant 
injunctions 2000 
45(1) Damages should be Calculation of damages Possible non-
adequate to compensate usually based on actual losses compliance- issue 
for the injury suffered suffered by the rights ho lder of inadequate 
damages 
45(2) Award of damages can Reasonable expenses can Compliant 
include expenses, such include investigative costs 
as attorney's fees and legal fees 
46 Infringing goods can be Infringing goods can be Possible non-
confiscated and confiscated comp liance-
destroyed provisions not clear 
if the goods are 
destroyed 
50(1) Availability of 'Property preservation' Compliant 
provisional measures orders available 
51 Customs authorities Rights holders can apply to Compliant 
can suspend the release the customs authorities to 
of infringing goods hold infringing goods 
61 Criminal penalties Criminal penalties available Possible non-
should be available for under the Criminal Law 1997 compliance- not 
wilful trademark for serious counterfeiting and clear how 'serious' 
counterfeiting or piracy range from 3-7 years relates to 'wilful' in 
copyright piracy on a imprisonment and fmes. TRIPS and whether 
commercial scale, penalties are 
sufficient enough to act serious enough to 
as a deterrent. act as a deterrent. 
Figure 6-5 Summary of China's compliance with key TRIPS provisions 
Assessing China's compliance with TRIPS provisions is not straightforward 
and Article 64 of TRIPS makes disputes about TRIPS obligations subject to the 
WTO's dispute resolution procedures. Up until 2006, there had been 24 cases brought 
to the WTO dispute settlement body concerning the TRIPS Agreement, with four 
cases dealing with the enforcement provisions in TRIPS. The respondents in these 
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cases were Denmark and Sweden (for failing to make provisional measures available 
in the context of civil proceedings involving intellectual property rights) and the 
European Community and Greece (involving the regular broadcast in Greece of 
copyrighted motion pictures and television programs without the authorisation of the 
copyright owners). The complainant in all cases was the US, alleging breach of 
Article 50 in the case of Denmark and Sweden and breaches of Articles 41 and 61 in 
the case of Greece. All four cases were eventually resolved through negotiation and 
the dispute settlement body was notified of the relevant mutually agreed solutions.479 
These cases demonstrate that it is difficult to establish non-compliance with 
the TRIPS provisions on enforcement. In all disputes, it is necessary to show clear 
evidence of systemic failing, not just anecdotal weaknesses. This procedural 
difficulty is highlighted by the request made in October 2005 by the US, Japan and 
Swiss governments for China to provide enforcement data to help them to assess 
China's TRIPS compliance. 48o This must be borne in mind when considering China's 
compliance with these provisions. 
The difficulties in bringing a formal complaint to the WTO are also illustrated 
by the USTR's annual reports to Congress on China's WTO compliance. These 
reports can offer a useful supplementary source of data regarding China's TRIPS 
compliance as they are largely based upon reports from rights holders in China. 
Indeed, the USTR's reports confirm that despite efforts to implement TRIPS 
obligations into domestic legislation being "largely satisfactory... enforcement 
479 Details on these cases are available at: World Trade Organisation, "Index of Disputes Issues", 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispusubjectsindexe.htm#trips enforcement, accessed 
October 15th 2006. 
480 Barraclough, "China Urged to Provide IP Enforcement Data". 
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remained ineffective" (according to the 2003 report). 481 It is noticeable that the tone 
of these reports grows increasing bullish in the past two or three years as promised 
improvements in reducing IPR infringements proved unforthcoming. Indeed, this 
reflects the notion that initial reforms made by China to comply with WTO 
obligations generally were substantial, but when further, deeper reforms were required 
in subsequent years, the pace of reform slowed considerably. 
Furthermore, criticisms of the IP system in China initially focused on the poor 
enforcement system in general and bemoaned the lack of transparency (in the 2003 
and 2004 reports), before focusing on the specific problem of the "chronic 
underutilization of deterrent criminal remedies" (2006 and 2007 reports). This also 
reinforces the impression that the US was forced to focus on a substantive failing in 
the IP enforcement system in order to bring a WTO dispute, rather than just rely on 
reported inadequacies from rights ho Iders. 
It is perhaps surprising that China had not been the respondent ill a case 
involving compliance with TRIPS obligations before April 2007, given the publicity 
surrounding China's poor intellectual property enforcement. Therefore, this implies 
that despite the failings in the intellectual property enforcement system in China, it is 
difficult to compile clear evidence of systemic non-compliance with the TRIPS 
prOVISIOns. Furthermore, the request for consultations of April 2007 makes it clear 
that the complaint refers to specific failings in the system, rather than mere 
inconsistencies in enforcement. 
481 The full text of the Annual Reports to Congress on China's WTO Compliance is available at: 
www.ustr.gov 
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6.2.1 Details of the April 2007 Dispute 
On loth April 2007, the US circulated two requests for consultations with 
China. The ftrst of these concerned measures affecting trading rights and distribution 
services for certain publications and audiovisual entertainment products. 482 This 
dispute is not directly connected with China's obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement, rather it concerns commitments made in China's Protocol of Accession. 
However, the second dispute does specifically concern commitments made under the 
TRIPS Agreement. The second dispute concerns measures affecting the protection 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights.483 Within this broad complaint, four 
separate areas are identified for further consultations. First, that the thresholds for 
criminal procedures and penalties appear to be inconsistent with TRIPS Articles 41.1 
and 61. This has already been discussed above at page 209. 
The second element of intellectual property enforcement that is subject to 
consultations following the US's complaint is that the disposal of goods conftscated 
by the Customs authorities which infringe IP rights, is inconsistent with TRIPS 
Articles 46 and 59. This is because the Chinese Customs Regulations would appear to 
endorse the practice of removing the infringing features of the products and then 
allowing then to enter channels of commerce instead of destroying them. TRIPS 
Article 46 on judicial remedies and Article 59 on Customs authorities' remedies make 
it clear that goods seized may only be destroyed or disposed of outside of the channels 
of commerce. 
The third element of the complaint is that existing Chinese laws and 
regulations deny copyright and related rights protection and enforcement to works that 
482 World Trade Organisation, "China- Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services 
for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products", Document WTIDS363/1, 2007. 
483 World Trade Organisation, "China- Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights: Request for Consultations by the United States", Document WTIDS36211, 
2007. 
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have not been authorised for publication or distribution within China. In essence, the 
US alleges that works are not protected by copyright legislation until they are 
authorised for publication or distribution. This would appear to be inconsistent with 
TRIPS Article 9.1 which obliges Members to comply with Articles 1 to 21 of the 
Berne Convention (1971); Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention states that copyright 
granted to foreign authors should not be subject to any formality. Furthermore, if 
foreign authors are indeed not granted copyright protection prior to approval of their 
works, this may also be inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the TRIPS Agreement on the 
national treatment principle. 
The fourth and final element of the US's complaint concerns the unavailability 
of criminal procedures and penalties for a person who engages in either unauthorised 
reproduction or unauthorised distribution of copyrighted works. The current Criminal 
Law and associated regulations appear to subject unauthorised reproduction and 
distribution to criminal liability, but not only one or the other. This would appear to 
be inconsistent with TRIPS Articles 41.1 and 61. 
Following the circulation of the request for consultations by the United States, 
several other Members also requested to join the consultations. They include Japan, 
Mexico, Canada and the European Communities.484 Thus, the issue of protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights in China is clearly of concern to many 
WTO Members, not only the United States. China's reaction to the initiation of these 
WTO complaints has been strenuous denial and disappointment that the US has 
d d h·· 485 eeme t IS actIOn necessary. 
484 Japan submitted a request on 24th April 2007 (Document WTIDS362/2), the European Communities, 
Canada and Mexico all submitted requests on 27th April 2007 (Documents WTIDS362/3, WTIDS362/4 
and WTIDS362/5). 
485 "Shangwubu dui meijiu zhishichanquan wenti suzhu WTO biaoshi yihan" (The Ministry of 
Commerce expresses regret over the WTO dispute over IPR brought by the US), available at: 
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The US and China held consultations specifically concerning these issues on 
June 7 _8 th 2007 , but although "those consultations provided some helpful 
clarifications but [they] unfortunately did not resolve the dispute." 486 The 
consultations resolved the issue of confusion about whether unauthorised reproduction 
and distribution were necessary for criminal liability to arise, but the other issues 
remain in dispute. As a result, a Panel has now been appointed to consider the 
d· 487 0 11 Ispute. vera , the focus of the United States' submission is on fairly minor 
procedural aspects of the intellectual property system in China. Several of the 
grounds for complaint may simply have arisen from imprecise language in the 
primary legislation, such as the doubt over whether prohibiting illegal reproduction 
and distribution includes illegal reproduction or distribution only. However, the 
complaint does confrrm the need to identify specific failings in the system rather than 
merely complaining about inadequate or inconsistent enforcement. Moreover, if 
China does change the IP system in response to this complaint, these changes may 
certainly make a significant difference to outstanding areas of non-compliance, 
particularly with regard to the thresholds for criminal liability. 
In general, as discussed in the previous section, China appears to be in 
compliance with the majority of its TRIPS obligations on enforcement. The most 
significant areas where compliance appears to be in doubt are the issues of damages 
and the availability of criminal penalties. Assessing compliance in these areas seems 
to be dependent on how the wording of the relevant articles is interpreted. The 
difficulties of identifying non-compliance appear to be confrrmed by the recent 
complaint to the WTO dispute resolution body by the United States; criminal 
http://int.ipr.gov.cniipr inter/infol Article.jsp?a no= 107297 &co1 no=774&dir=20070S, accessed 
August 20 th 2007. 
486 According to Document WTIDS36217, 21 st August 2007. 
487 According to Document WTIDS362/S, 13 th December 2007. 
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thresholds were a target of the complaint as they are fixed and evident, whereas 
problems of inadequate damages or lack of a deterrent are too imprecise to be the 
focus of a formal WTO complaint. Consequently, this reflects the problem of judging 
compliance in general; as a relative concept, distinguishing compliance from non-
compliance is a largely subjective process.488 
6.3 The Effectiveness of the Current System of IP Protection 
Having considered the implementation of China's obligations arising from the 
TRIPS Agreement and compliance with those obligations, the [mal aspect to assess is 
the effectiveness of the current system. In this section, the current intellectual 
property system in post-WTO China will be outlined and then the effectiveness of this 
system appraised. The effectiveness of the system will be principally judged using 
responses from the questionnaire and interview comments illustrating respondents' 
experiences of the IP system in action. 
6.3.1 Outline of the Current Intellectual Property System 
Following the massive overhaul of the intellectual property protection system 
associated with WTO entry, the current system of protection offers a myriad of 
choices for rights holders in China.489 The system of intellectual property protection 
has been described as a "triple IP system, comprising legislative guidance, 
administrative control and judicial enforcement of IP.,,49o However, it has also been 
noted that the lines between the categories may be blurred and "any particular 
488 Chan, China's Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection, 
Human Rights, 66. 
489 As can be seen by the host of IP agencies discussed in Section 1.3 and illustrated by Figure 1-1. 
490 Deli Yang and Peter Clarke, "Review ofthe Current Intellectual Property System in China", 
International Journal of Technology Transfer and Commercialisation, 3 (1), 14. 
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enforcement measure may partake of the characteristics of more than one 
,,491 
category. 
Essentially, an intellectual property rights holder has several choices in the 
method they choose to enforce their rights. Administrative enforcement is often the 
mechanism chosen, as quick raids of the infringer's premises can often be 
1· h d 492 accomp IS e . There are various bodies responsible for the administrative 
enforcement of intellectual property. "The Trademark Office under the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAlC) is responsible for trademarks, the 
China Patent Office oversees patent protection, and the National Copyright 
Administration handles copyright. ,,493 
Judicial enforcement is also an option to pursue. Judicial enforcement can 
take two forms, civil litigation or criminal prosecutions. Although it is possible to 
bring a private prosecution of offenders, this method of enforcement is subject to a 
wealth of problems. 494 Therefore, civil litigation is more popular. "Any individual or 
organisation can bring a lawsuit to a people's court, such as an Intermediate People's 
Court. If they do not agree with the judicial verdict of that court, the case can be 
pursued to a higher court.,,495 There are four levels of People's Courts in China, 
Supreme, Higher, Intermediate and Basic. Specialised intellectual property courts 
were established at the intermediate level and above from early 1990s. "China's 
specialized Intellectual Property Courts were first established in Beijing at both the 
Intermediate and Higher People's Court levels on August 5, 1993.',496 Following their 
491 Clarke, "Private Enforcement oflntellectual Property Rights in China", 31. 
492 Chow, "Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China", 24. 
493 Potter and Oksenberg, "A Patchwork ofIPRProtection". 
494 Joseph T. Simone, "China's IPR Enforcement Mechanisms". 
495 Yang and Clarke, "Review ofthe Current Intellectual Property System in China", 20. • 
496 Kolton, "Copyright Law and the People's Courts in the People's Republic of China: A Review and 
Critique of China's Intellectual Property Courts", 436. 
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introduction, specialised IP courts were rapidly introduced to other areas outside 
Beijing. Intellectual property disputes were previously heard by civil or economic 
divisions and the specialised courts were intended to go some way towards countering 
accusations of poorly trained judicial personnel. 
Therefore, there are a host of alternatives available to IP rights holders in 
China, but there is still some scepticism about how effective these different channels 
of enforcement actually are at enforcing intellectual property rights. Respondents' 
experiences of the IP system will be discussed below, in order to analyse how 
effective these different channels of enforcement are in practice. 
6.3.2 The System in Action 
The questionnaire and follow-up interviews included discussion of the 
effectiveness of the current system of intellectual property protection in China. When 
respondents were asked to rank the current system on a scale from 1 to 6, with 1 
representing completely ineffective and 6 representing completely effective, the 
average rank was 3.3. Unsurprisingly, the system was ranked as neither completely 
ineffective nor completely effective, with a breakdown of the results as follows: 
Table 6 Efti -6 ectiveness 0 t e current f h sys em as ran e !yresJ!1 IP t k db ondents 
Rank of Effectiveness Number o f R e s ~ o n d e n t s s
1 2 
2 6 
3 18 
4 18 
5 3 
6 0 
TOTAL 47 
Furthermore, when asked whether the main cause of any remaining problems 
in the current system was poor legislation, poor enforcement, a combination of both, 
221 
or neither, of the 44 valid responses collected, poor enforcement was overwhelmingly 
seen as the main cause. 
Table 6-7 M . f bl am cause 0 pro h ems m t e current IP system as ranked bv r espondents 
Main cause of or obi ems Number of Res non dents 
Poor Enforcement 25 
Poor Legislation I 
Both 16 
Neither 2 
TOTAL 44 
Thus, these responses confIrm the overall judgement that while China's IP 
legislation is much improved, problems still remain in the enforcement of these laws 
and regulations. 
Respondents were also asked if they had experienced any problems with the IP 
system. Only two respondents answered no, out of a total of 47 valid responses, 
clearly showing that the system may still have problems to resolve. Those 45 
respondents who responded that they had experienced problems with the IP system 
were then asked to rank those problems. On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 represents not 
at all serious and 6 represents extremely serious, the average rank for the problems 
experienced was 4.02. Thus, respondents have experienced considerable problems 
with the IP system in China. The responses regarding the severity of the problems 
experienced are detailed in the chart below: 
Figure 6-8- Severity of problems in the current IP system as ranked by respondents 
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As many of the respondents ranked the problems they had experienced as at 
least moderately severe, it is clear that there may be some problems with the overall 
effectiveness of the IP system in China. Despite improvements in both the legislative 
framework of IP protection and the enforcement system, many respondents still 
complained about certain aspects of the intellectual property system overall. 
6.3.3 Respondents' Experiences of the Current System 
A few examples of respondents' experiences will now be detailed to evaluate 
how effective the current system is in practice. The fIrst experience comes from a 
Chinese lawyer based in Guangzhou: 
"I acted in the case of a patent infringement dispute. I represented 
clients in Guangzhou to take quick and effective action. At my 
request, the court ordered the preservation of evidence and found 
evidence of violations and the illegal transfer of profits. However, 
we hadn't yet gone to trial and the invention patent was quickly 
declared invalid by the patent re-examination board. I took the 
case to Beijing to appeal the administrative proceeding of the 
Patent Re-examination Commission. I met two experts in the field 
of technology patents, who were both very well prepared; I thought 
with these experts, we would definitely win the case. However, we 
lost. This is very common, but not normal. We later heard that we 
lost because our client is a foreign company. But of course we 
have no evidence of this.,,497 
The experiences of this lawyer highlight several points. Firstly, patent 
disputes are more often resolved through the courts as they are frequently too 
complicated for administrative personnel to adjudicate. Secondly, there is still a 
perception that foreign and local rights ho lders receive different treatment, although 
there is no evidence available that there is a systemic bias. Finally, there is also a 
perception that pursuing a case in a different city may result in a different outcome 
than if the case is pursued in the 'home' city. This links to the supposed problem of 
497 Follow-up comments from respondent LAW29T. 
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local protectionism and also highlights the inconsistency that may exist m 
enforcement. 
The second example of the system in action is taken from a foreign lawyer 
working for a major law firm in Shanghai: 
"I can give you a specific example, ( ... ) to give you an example of 
the problems we have. We raided a factory in Ningbo? [Uh-huh] 
They had counterfeits there, we looked into (searching) their 
records and found another invoice for the same model numbers, so 
we sued these people for the damages, when the ( ... ) found ( ... ) 
suing not just for the damages, but (the issue was) how much were 
the damages, it was actually quite (tragic), because the court gave 
us damages for the products that had been seized, which I can 
actually think theoretically, we shouldn't get damages because they 
haven't been sold, [ ... ] but refused to give us damages for the 
goods which were shipped out, on the basis that the invoice did not 
say that the products had the trademark on it.,,498 
This second account of the system in action also highlights several problems 
that may remain in the current IP system in China. First, it confrrms the first 
respondent's comments regarding different treatment of infringement claims in 
different cities, echoing the common complaint of local protectionism. Second and 
perhaps most important, these comments highlight the perception of judicial 
incompetence, that the judges do not have the training or knowledge to make 
competent and reasoned decisions. Finally, the problem that damages were awarded 
for goods not sold, but denied for goods already shipped confrrms the comments of 
several other respondents discussed above at page 207 that the rules regarding 
evidence are far from satisfactory. 
A fmal example of the system in action comes from a respondent in the 
services sector: 
"One customer who for the 1 st time came to China to attend an 
exhibition had his company name and Chinese website hijacked by 
498 Interview comments with respondent LA WO 1. 
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a Chinese competitor within 1 month of the exhibition. We already 
told him in advance this might happen. But as usual they didn't 
heed our suggestion. For them the battle is already lost before 
they really could enter the Chi nese market. ,,499 
This third account of the system in action also confIfms previous observations. 
Although this respondent does not explicitly refer to seeking to protect intellectual 
property rights in China, these comments do reflect the feelings of frustration that 
were expressed by several of the respondents. Moreover, they highlight the 
continuing prevalence of the problem of intellectual property infringements and the 
need for extreme vigilance in seeking to protect IP rights. This would also suggest 
that a major element of the effectiveness of the system, that of addressing the problem 
that led to the agreement in question, namely intellectual property infringements, is 
ineffective as the problem is still pervasive. 
Despite these anecdotes concerning the effectiveness of the system in action, 
there were also positive comments regarding the operation of the IP system, most 
notably praise for the system of administrative enforcement. For example, this 
Chinese lawyer working for a major intemationallaw [Ifm stated: 
"The big advantages between administrative approaches to judicial 
proceedings are that administrative measures tend to be more 
expedited and more cost-effective, then they can take, the 
agencies themselves can take initiative in investigating the 
infringing activities so that saves costs for the client also.,,500 
Thus, both the speed of administrative action and the lower costs involved for 
the rights holder are stressed as significant advantages of pursuing infringers through 
administrative enforcement. 
Therefore, overall, despite continuing problems in certain aspects of the 
system, such as perceptions of local protectionism, poor quality of some judicial 
499 Questionnaire comments from respondent SERVICESOI. 
500 Interview comments from respondent LA WOS. 
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personnel and inadequate laws regarding evidence, it must be stressed that the system 
is not completely ineffective. As the mix of comments from respondents shows, 
although there are some problematic areas particularly linked to the issues of local 
protectionism and assessment of damages, the system does also have some strong 
features, particularly the administrative enforcement system. Thus, the effectiveness 
of the current system would appear to be approaching satisfactory, reflecting the 
overall judgment of the effectiveness of the system as reasonably effective, according 
to most questionnaire responses. 
6.3.4 Evaluating Effectiveness Overall 
According to the comprehensive model of compliance applied in this study, 
effectiveness needs to be examined both in terms of effectiveness in achieving the 
stated objectives of the treaty and in addressing the problems that led to the treaty. 
Therefore, effectiveness will now be considered in the specific context of the stated 
objectives of the TRIPS Agreement and in addressing the problems that the TRIPS 
Agreement was seeking to resolve. 
6.3.4.1 Effectiveness in the Stated Objectives of the Treaty 
The full text of the TRIPS Agreement contains a short preamble before the 
substantive provisions are detailed. This preamble could be said to encapsulate the 
objectives of the treaty as summarized in the table below.501 
Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into 
account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property 
rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property 
rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade; 
Recognizing, to this end, the need for new rules and disciplines; 
R e c o ~ n i z i n g g the need for a multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines 
501 Adopted from World Trade Organisation, "Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual 
Property Rights". 
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dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods; 
Recognizing that intellectual property rights are private rights; 
Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the 
protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological 
objectives; 
Recognizing also the special needs of the least-developed country Members in respect 
of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in 
order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base; 
Emphasizing the importance of reducing tensions by reaching strengthened 
commitments to resolve disputes on trade-related intellectual property issues through 
multilateral procedures; 
Desiring to establish a mutually supportive relationship between the WTO and the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (referred to in this Agreement as "WIPO") 
as well as other relevant international organizations; 
Figure 6-9 Stated objectives of the TRIPS Agreement 
Hence, the stated objectives of the TRIPS Agreement could be summarised 
under various headings. First, Members aim to reduce distortions and impediments to 
international trade, and second, to establish a multilateral framework of rules 
concerning trade in counterfeit goods and to reduce tension by resolving disputes 
multilaterally. A further aim is to recognize the needs of different national systems in 
terms of public policy objectives and economic development and fmally, to build 
relationships with WIPO and other international organizations. 
Overall, the TRIPS Agreement has been reasonably successful in achieving 
these objectives. Certainly the Council for TRIPS has worked hard to establish a 
positive working relationship with WIPO, as well as with other international 
organisations. In addition, the establishment of a formal set of multilateral rules and 
disciplines has also been successful. However, perhaps the greatest success in terms 
of the stated aims of the Agreement, certainly from a Chinese perspective, is in 
reducing tensions through the establishment of the dispute resolution body. This can 
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be clearly seen in the diminishing of IP-related trade tensions between China and the 
US since China acceded to the WTO in 2001. 
Tensions between China and the US escalated in the 1990s, as the US grew 
increasingly impatient at the slow pace of IP reforms, despite China's efforts during 
the 1980s and early 1990s to establish a framework for the protection of intellectual 
property. As US impatience reached breaking point, they took drastic action. The US 
threatened massive trade sanctions under section 301 of the US Trade Act 1974, 
which empowers the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to identify countries 
with inadequate intellectual property protection and impose sanctions if necessary. 
Section 301 action is so serious; it has even been described as the "H-bomb of trade 
policy. ,,502 In November 1991, the United States threatened China "with reciprocal 
sanctions in the form of 100% tariffs imposed upon a list of $1.5 billion worth of 
goods", later scaled down to $750 million. 503 
Under this threat of sanctions based on section 301, China narrowly averted an 
outright trade war by agreeing to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the 
Protection of Intellectual Property in January 1992.504 To comply with this MOU, 
China amended the Patent Law in 1992, the Trademark Law in 1993 and passed the 
Unfair Competition Law in 1993 to protect business secrets. Under the 1992 MOU, 
China also agreed to join the Berne Convention and the Geneva Convention, which it 
did on October 15 th 1992 and September 1993 respectively. Although the 1992 MOU 
was successful at establishing a comprehensive framework for intellectual property 
protection, tensions with the US escalated again in 1994 and both sides threatened 
502 Yu, "From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First 
Century", 138. 
503 Feder, "Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China: You Can Lead a Horse to Water But 
You Can't Make it Drink", 240. 
504 Endeshaw, Intellectual Property in China: The Roots of the Problem of Enforcement, 36. 
228 
major trade sanctions. This was contrary to Chinese expectations; "[t]he Chinese 
expected that the constant stream of laws would ... stop or at least, minimise any 
criticism from foreign investors, particularly the United States... Yet, rather than 
subsiding, United States critiques only changed direction. ,,505 
On June 30th 1994, the USTR cited China as a Priority Foreign Country under 
the Section 301 provisions and again threatened that if an acceptable agreement could 
not be reached by December 31 S\ then 1000/0 tariffs would be imposed on a broad 
selection of Chinese exports. As negotiations failed to reach a swift conclusion, this 
deadline was extended to February 26th 1995.506 As a consequence, China and the US 
reached a second agreement in late February 1995, only hours before the deadline, 
which specifically dealt with "improving the enforcement structure, ,,507 through an 
agreement letter and a detailed action plan. Despite noted improvements in IP 
protection following the 1995 Agreement, by April 1996, China was once agam 
designated as a Priority Foreign Country by the USTR, which again triggered the 
investigation process and associated threat of sanctions. Subsequently, a new Accord 
was also reached in 1996, just before the deadline of June 18th, which reaffirmed 
China's commitments to protecting intellectual property. Specifically, the 1996 
Agreement dealt with implementation of the 1995 Action Plan, rather than including 
b · . 508 new su stantlve requrrements. 
505 Ibid. 37. 
506 Feder, "Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China: You Can Lead a Horse to Water But 
You Can't Make it Drink", 242. 
507yu "From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First , 
Century", 146. . 
508 QJ Kong, "Intellectual Property Rights protection in post-WTO China: still an incurable bllght on 
Sino-US trade relations?" Issues & Studies, 38 (3), (September 2002), 63. 
229 
The United States' policy of pushing for IP reform in China through coercive 
unilateral action was heavily criticised in the late 1990s.509 The cycle of threatened 
sanctions and negotiated agreements led to hostility among the Chinese people and 
lost credibility for the US. It has been argued that the 1992 MOU, 1995 Agreement 
and 1996 Accord are unequal and are merely designed to pressure China into 
accepting an American model of IP law and that their unequal nature "will prove to be 
the undoing of the agreement.,,510 Therefore, an alternative mechanism for initiating 
and nurturing intellectual property law reform became necessary by the end of the 
twentieth century. 
The alternative that emerged is the TRIPS framework offered by the WTO, 
which, as a multilateral trading body, can offer a more credible and sustained 
alternative to the US' unilateral pressure, without creating such resentment. 511 It is 
clear that in comparison with the repeated pattern of IP-related tensions with the US 
in the 1990s, since WTO entry in 2001, China has not experienced such intense 
pressure. Furthermore, the US has followed the processes set down by the WTO 
dispute resolution body to raise concerns about China's intellectual property system. 
Thus, the filing of the complaint to the WTO in April 2007512 could actually be seen 
as a positive step as it shows that the multilateral dispute resolution mechanism 
provided by the WTO is diverting disputes which would previously have led to 
bilateral tensions and possible sanctions. However, the US claims that China has 
reacted to the filing of this complaint with the WTO by limiting its cooperation and 
509 For an overview of Sino-US relations with regards to intellectual property see: SJ & Konan La 
Croix, DE, "Intellectual property rights in China: The changing political economy of Chinese-
American interests", World Economy, 25 (6), (June 2002), 759-788. 
510 Endeshaw, Intellectual Property in China: The Roots of the Problem of Enforcement, 18. 
511 M.N. Schlesinger, "Intellectual Property law in China: Part 1- Complying with TRIPs requirements", 
East Asian Executive Reports, 19 (1), 19. 
512 Discussed above at page 216. 
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bl k · h' 513 even oc mg t e Import of US films. Therefore, the use of the WTO's dispute 
settlement mechanism has clearly not eliminated all hostility associated with IP-
related trade disputes. 
On the other hand, although it is a stated objective of the TRIPS Agreement to 
recognise the needs of different national systems, in practice, national systems that do 
not accord with some Members' expectations can expect heavy criticism. In the case 
of intellectual property protection in China, this can clearly be seen in the emphasis 
placed by trading partners on reforms to increase the use of criminal and civil 
penalties. As China's legal system has historically relied on administrative 
enforcement, criminal and civil enforcement are unsurprisingly less developed. China 
could still be meeting its TRIPS obligations, but because the system does not match 
the expectations of some WTO Members, it comes under strong pressure to reform 
the system. Some Members have also criticised the US for pressurising for so-called 
TRIPS-plus reforms and pressurising developing country Members to comply before 
the expiration of their transition period.514 Therefore, in terms of respecting the need 
for flexibility in implementation, the TRIPS Agreement may not be completely 
fulfilling its objectives. 
Overall, the TRIPS Agreement could be said to be successful in its stated 
objectives, particularly in providing a multilateral process for dispute resolution and a 
multilateral framework of rules, as well as providing links with WIPO and other 
international organisations. However, the Agreement is arguably less successful in its 
513 Peter OIlier, "China accused of blocking US films", MIP Week, December 14th 2007, available at 
http: \\\\\\.manm!ingip.com Article.aspx? Artic1eID=1787489&LS=EMSI54047 accessed December 
16th 2007. 
514 Mohammed EI-Said, "The road from TRIPS-minus to TRIPS, to TRIPS-plus: Implications ofIPRs 
for the Arab world", Journal of World Intellectual Property, 8 (1), 53. 
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stated objective of recogmsmg the needs of different Members, particularly 
developing country Members, and the need for flexibility in implementation. 
6.3.4.2 Effectiveness in Tackling the Problem of Intellectual Property 
Infringements 
The second element of effectiveness that should be considered is the 
effectiveness of the TRIPS Agreement in tackling the problem that it was drafted to 
combat, namely the problem of intellectual property infringements. It is difficult to 
assess the incidence of intellectual property infringements due to the obscure nature of 
the activity. However, various estimates are made of the extent of the problem 
globally and this may give some indication of the piracy level overall, although any 
changes cannot be directly linked to the TRIPS Agreement. For example, the 
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) compiles statistics for the level of 
piracy in specific countries and the estimated losses suffered as a consequence. 
Table 6-10 Estimated losses from piracy in China according to the IIPA515 
Year Estimated losses (in millions of US dollars) 
2002 1893.3 
2003 2859.2 
2004 2530.9 
2005 2643.9 
2006 2207.0 
As Table 6-10 demonstrates, there has not been a significant decrease in 
estimated losses due to piracy since China acceded to the WTO in 2001. Therefore, it 
is doubtful that accession to the TRIPS Agreement has been effective at tackling 
intellectual property infringements in China. However, these figures are in stark 
contrast to Chinese figures which show a continuing decline in piracy rates and 
515 Source: Intemationallntellectual Property Alliance, "2007 Special 301 Report: People's Republic of 
China (PRC)", http://www.iipa.comlpdf72007SPEC301PRC.pdf. accessed June 14th 2007. 
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associated losses. For example, figures from the China Internet Network Information 
Centre show that pirated software accounted for 24% of the Chinese market in 2006 a 
, 
2% decrease from 2005. 516 Officials claim the discrepancy between the low rates 
found by their study and considerably higher rates estimated by international bodies is 
largely due to the exclusion of free software in their calculations. 
However, despite significant discrepancies in the piracy rates found by 
international and domestic Chinese bodies, official Chinese estimates still recognise 
counterfeits as a major part of the Chinese economy, as demonstrated by a July 2003 
report by the State Council's Development Research Centre, which estimated the 
market value of counterfeits in China in 2001 as between $19 and $24 billion 
dollars. 517 In addition, a recent study by the American Chamber of Commerce in 
Beijing found that "forty percent of companies surveyed said that the volume of 
counterfeiting of their products in China increased, while only 4 percent saw a 
decline".518 Furthermore, as many respondents in this study did not rank the current 
IP system as highly effective and almost all respondents had experienced problems 
with the IP system, it is undeniable that problems with effectiveness may still exist, 
although assessing the level of IP infringements is always going to be a matter of 
estimation due to the opaque and illegal nature of the activity. 
6.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement in 
China, the compliance of China's amended IP system with the TRIPS Agreement, and 
the effectiveness of this revised system at meeting the stated aims of the TRIPS 
516 Xinhua, "China claims to be repelling software pirates", August 11th 2007, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-08 /1 O/content 6509504.htm accessed October 21st 2007. 
517 USTR, "2003 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance", available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets.Document LibrarylReports Publications/'003/asset upload file4 J :; 4313. 
pdf accessed October 17th 2007: 51. 
518 "US business groups say Chinese product piracy rising despite enforcement", International Herald 
Tribune, April 26th 2007. 
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Agreement and at tackling the problem of IP infringements more generally. In terms 
of the changes made in response to TRIPS accession, it was found that almost all 
respondents have noticed a positive change in the IP system in the past five years. In 
addition, the sheer quantity of laws and regulations amended or enacted during the 
main period of revision from 1999-2002 illustrates the significant effort that China 
has taken to implement TRIPS obligations into domestic legislation. It is also clear 
that TRIPS accession led to major changes in the enforcement system such as the 
introduction of injunctions and the possibility of judicial review of [mal 
administrative decisions and thus, implementation of TRIPS provisions in China is 
satisfactory overall. 
However, compliance with the TRIPS Agreement is more difficult to assess. 
Although China appears to be in substantive compliance with the majority of its 
TRIPS obligations, compliance is in doubt with some provisions, as illustrated by the 
recent WTO complaint initiated by the US against China. These outstanding areas of 
possible non-compliance include whether the level of damages awarded is sufficient 
to compensate the rights holder for damage suffered under TRIPS Article 45(1) and 
whether the availability of criminal penalties and penalties awarded are sufficient to 
act as a deterrent under TRIPS Article 61. Ultimately, determination of these areas of 
TRIPS compliance is a matter of judgement. 
Turning to the effectiveness of the current system, anecdotes from respondents 
detailing their experiences with the system in practice highlight some ineffective 
features of the current enforcement framework. Respondents have experienced local 
protectionism, judicial incompetence, perceived discrimination against foreign rights 
holders and problems with evidence. Overall, many respondents expressed frustration 
with seeking to enforce IP rights in the Chinese system, but some respondents were 
234 
also keen to point out certain strengths of the current IP system, particularly in 
administrative proceedings. Thus, the effectiveness of the current system is extremely 
difficult to assess; in any jurisdiction, the IP system may not be perfect and minor 
problems may exist. However, although improvements have obviously been made in 
China's IP system since WTO accession, significant barriers still exist to inhibit 
effective enforcement. In general, although the TRIPS Agreement has been largely 
successful in meeting its aims, the problem of intellectual property infringements has 
not diminished and consequently, effectiveness is still a problem in the IP system in 
China. 
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7 Revisiting the Model and Devising Solutions 
7.1 Introduction 
-
The previous three chapters have applied a comprehensive model of 
compliance to China's implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the consequent 
effectiveness of the current IP system in China. Clearly there are both non-country 
specific factors relating to the TRIPS Agreement itself and the international 
environment, as well as factors specific to China which impact upon China's overall 
compliance with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Consequently, this chapter will frrst revisit the key concepts of legal 
development and the comprehensive model of compliance outlined in the literature 
review and then modify this model for the specific context of China's compliance 
with the TRIPS Agreement. This will draw together the findings of the previous three 
chapters. Next, improvements discussed by respondents which can positively 
influence China's compliance will then be identified and the future for IP protection 
in China considered. Then, the future for the IP system in China will be exp lored. 
Finally, the dynamic processes of change which actually impact upon compliance will 
be considered from the perspectives of China's intention and capacity to comply with 
its commitments. 
7.2 Analysing IP in China using Key Concepts of Legal 
Development 
In the literature review, several key concepts which have previously been used 
to analyse the development of law in China were discussed. It is useful to return to 
these concepts to see how well they can explain the specific development of IP 
protection in China. 
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7.2.1 Legal Transplants 
In the literature review chapter, the fIrst key concept of legal development to 
be outlined was that of legal transplantation. According to Watson, foreign legal rules 
can be transplanted into countries with very different traditions, such as the adoption 
of Roman law in various European nations. However, this does not appear to be the 
case in the example of IP development, as problems still exist with the 
implementation and enforcement of the transplanted IP laws in China. 
On the other hand, Montesquieu emphasised environmental and social factors 
as the key barriers to successful legal transplants. Kahn-Freund adapted 
Montesquieu's work for the twentieth century, by shifting the emphasis to political 
factors. Do political factors act as the main barrier to successful transplants of 
TRIPS-complaint laws into China? Although political factors are undoubtedly a 
contributing factor as the TRIPS Agreement was primarily drafted by key WTO 
Members sharing liberal democratic backgrounds, many other factors also playa 
signifIcant role in China's current IP system as discussed in chapter 5. Therefore, 
existing discussions of legal transplantations are insufficient to completely explain the 
failure of China's current IP system to fully comply with TRIPS standards. 
7.2.2 Legal Legitimation 
The second key concept of legal development examined in the literature 
review was that of legal legitimation. According to Haley, the legitimacy of the 
imported laws is contingent upon the legitimacy of the authority promulgating or 
enforcing the new rules. Therefore, it is necessary to consider lawmaking and 
enforcement as separate components to fully understand the process of legal 
transplantation. 
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In the case of China's transplantation of TRIPS-compliant IP laws and 
regulations, it is essential to consider implementation into domestic legislation and 
enforcement of these laws separately, which would suggest that legitimation is a 
relevant concept in the development of TRIPS compliance. However, discussion of 
legal legitimation again focuses on the political authority of the body imposing the 
legal rules, to the exclusion of other significant non-political factors. Therefore, 
although the legitimacy of the laws is a significant factor, the concept of legal 
legitimation alone is inadequate to fully explain China's current IP system and the 
influence of the TRIPS Agreement. 
7.2.3 Selective Adaptation 
The third and final key concept of legal development outlined in the literature 
review was that of selective adaptation. Selective adaptation is the strategy adopted 
by countries seeking to balance the demands of externally-imposed international 
norms and pre-existing local legal norms. The initial use of selective adaptation as 
witnessed in the development of laws in Asia, including IP laws, was that laws were 
implemented into domestic legislation, but not consistently enforced, if at all. In the 
specific context of IP development in China, it is clear that IP laws cannot merely be 
promulgated and not enforced. Particularly since the 1990s, there has been a strong 
emphasis on enforcement of IP laws, which demonstrates that international partners 
are much more aware of this previous strategy and mere passing of laws is no longer 
seen as sufficient. This is reflected in the [mal text of the TRIPS Agreement which 
emphasises procedural provisions on enforcement as well as incorporating substantive 
provisions from existing IP conventions. 
Consequently, again selective adaptation is an interesting concept with which 
to analyse the development of IP protection in China. However, similar to legal 
238 
transplantation and legitimation theory, the focus is exclusively on the power of the 
central government to enforce IP legislation. Although the central government in 
Beijing does playa key role in the current IP system in China, it would be short-
sighted to ignore other key contributing factors. Thus, all three key concepts of legal 
development considered here are insufficient to fully understand the complex nature 
of China's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. 
Therefore, theories of compliance, which have not previously been applied 
specifically to IP development in China, offer a broader perspective on the issue of 
implementing TRIPS obligations into the domestic legal system. By broadening the 
factors under consideration, it is possible to construct a more comprehensive model of 
China's interactions with international norms such as those imposed by the WTO. 
7.3 Analysing IP in China using Theories of Compliance 
In general, it is widely recognised that operationalising compliance IS 
problematic as there is a need to differentiate between implementation, compliance 
and effectiveness. This is confrrmed by preliminary analysis of China's compliance 
with the TRIPS Agreement. Although the majority of TRIPS obligations have been 
implemented into domestic legislation, there is still some uncertainty about whether 
this constitutes compliance. Furthermore, China may be fully complying with its 
TRIPS commitments, but the IP system may be ineffective at tackling the underlying 
problem of infringements. Thus, the issue may not be one of China's compliance, but 
rather one of the efficacy of the TRIPS Agreement in combating the problem it was 
designed to resolve. Clearly, wider issues than merely China's TRIPS compliance are 
involved in analysis of the current condition of IP protection in China. Therefore, 
existing theories of compliance discussed in the literature review chapter will now be 
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revisited to assess how well they can explain compliance by China with the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
7.4 Revisiting Existing Theories of Compliance 
Henkin was one of the fIrst to consider compliance with international 
obligations and proposed that states choose whether or not to comply based on 
calculations of cost and advantage discussed above at page 39. In the context of IP in 
China, Henkin would thus hold that the Chinese government decides whether to 
comply with the TRIPS Agreement based on a calculation of associated costs 
(possible sanctions which may be imposed) versus potential benefIts (rapid economic 
development through imitation). This approach is interesting for focusing on strategic 
incentives to comply, but faces the same criticism as the key concepts of legal 
development considered in the preceding section, namely that the narrow focus on the 
role of the state excludes consideration of other signifIcant factors. 
Turning to the approach taken by Franck discussed above at page 40, that 
legitimacy and fairness, both substantive and procedural, of the specifIc international 
obligations may be crucial to ensure compliance. In the case of IP protection in China, 
following Franck's approach would shift the focus of analysis to the TRIPS 
Agreement. Clearly, chapter 4 demonstrates that the perceived legitimacy and equity 
of the TRIPS Agreement can have a major impact on a WTO Member's compliance. 
However, Franck's approach is also problematic as there is no explanation for how 
the TRIPS Agreement acquires legitimacy. Furthermore, Franck's theory of 
compliance could also be considered to be too narrow; by focusing solely on the 
international obligations in question, country-specific factors relevant to that 
individual Member are ignored. 
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As considered at page 41, Chayes and Chayes sought to move away from cost-
benefit analysis to a managerial theory of compliance that incorporates a state's 
capacity to comply as well as their intention to comply. This shift in emphasis is a 
useful contribution to discussion of China's TRIPS compliance as it is important to 
recognise that coercion towards China cannot induce TRIPS compliance without 
corresponding improvements in China's capacity to comply. However, Chayes and 
Chayes still offer an incomplete model of compliance that cannot fully explain 
China's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. 
Turning to discussion of legal norms, Koh proposed that legal norms need to 
be internalised by the recipient country before they can be fully incorporated into the 
domestic legal system. It could be argued that China has not yet internalised legal 
norms associated with the WTO, despite interacting with the international trade 
system in the form of the WTO and its predecessor GATT for almost 20 years. 
Furthermore, Koh's theory as outlined at page 42 offers an explanation for the 
distinction between formal implementation into substantive law and acceptance into 
domestic norms, as this reflects the current condition of the IP system in China, that 
TRIPS obligations have been adopted but not yet accepted into domestic norms. On 
the other hand, there is no explanation offered by Koh of the process of internal is at ion 
and there seems to be little differentiation between internalisation of relevant norms 
by the state and by individuals or groups in society. 
Guzman focused on reputational considerations as the predominant factor in 
compliance. Taking this approach, China would choose to comply with the TRIPS 
Agreement in order to build international reputation. Although it is probable that 
reputational considerations are important to China, it does not seem an adequate 
explanation of China's TRIPS compliance and other factors found to be central to 
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TRIPS compliance in this study are omitted from analysis. More liberal theories of 
compliance, such as proposed by Slaughter and Moravcsik, move away from a state-
centred view of compliance to a 'bottom-up' perspective with individuals and private 
groups as the key actors. Whilst it is essential to consider the role of individuals and 
private groups, particularly in IP enforcement, it is also crucial not to ignore the role 
of the state. The central government still plays a central role in the IP system in China 
and should not be discounted. 
Therefore, the major existing theories of compliance taken separately are 
insufficient to fully explain the process of compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, 
although they do raise some important points to consider regarding analysis of 
China's TRIPS compliance. Consequently, a more comprehensive approach is 
necessary, incorporating various elements of existing theories of compliance. These 
should include considerations of the role of the state from neorealist theories and the 
legitimacy and fairness of the TRIPS Agreement itself from Franck. Moreover, 
China's capacity to comply with the TRIPS Agreement from Chayes and Chayes and 
reputational factors from Guzman should be considered. Finally, the significance of 
the legal norms involved and the need to distinguish between implementation into 
domestic legislation and full acceptance or intemalisation of these associated norms 
from Koh, as well as the role of individuals and private groups from liberal theorists 
such as Slaughter and Moravcsik are also essential perspectives to include. All these 
approaches are incorporated into the comprehensive model of compliance used in this 
study, which is consequently a more appropriate tool with which to analyse China's 
TRIPS compliance and which will be revisited below at section 7.6. 
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7.5 Revisiting Previous Studies of Compliance in China 
In addition to concepts of legal development which had previously been used 
to analyse reforms in the Chinese legal system, the literature review also reviewed 
existing studies of comp liance in China. Early studies of China's comp liance, such as 
the study by Lee of China's compliance with international agreements (page 55) 
found that once China had committed to an agreement, compliance was likely to 
fo How. The results of this study would support this conclusion, but China's position 
in the international order is so changed as to render Lee's study practically 
inapplicable to contemporary TRIPS compliance. 
Oksenberg and Economy's study of China's compliance with international 
environmental agreements (at page 56) found that China succeeded most at 
implementing obligations when they converged with domestic policy aims. It is true 
that the perception of IP as benefiting foreign rights holders rather than domestic 
industries could be said to have impeded stronger IP protection in China. The results 
from this study also accord with Oksenberg and Economy's fmding that codification 
often took place very swiftly, but that enforcement was the real problem. 
Kent's analysis of China's compliance with human rights agreements (above 
page 59) concurs with Oksenberg and Economy's study that compliance needs to 
coincide with domestic pressures to be obtained. Kent also recognises the different 
stages of compliance, which can be witnessed in China's TRIPS compliance; 
implementation into domestic legislation has not led to full de facto compliance at the 
enforcement level. 
Frieman's study of compliance with arms control agreements in China (page 
59) echoes Kent's conclusion that external and internal pressures need to converge for 
compliance to follow, but Frieman also observes that China has been willing to bear 
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substantial costs in order to participate in the international regime from the inside. 
This desire could also playa part in China's accession to the WTO, although China 
has not yet become a 'leader' of developing Member countries as predicted prior to 
accession in 2001. 
Carter's evaluation of trademark enforcement in the 1990s focused on cultural 
factors and factors inherent in the Chinese legal system (discussed at page 60). 
However, contrary to Carter's fmdings, respondents in this study rejected cultural 
influences such as Confucianism and socialism as significant contributors to the 
current legal system, although this may be due to limitations in research design rather 
than an accurate reflection of reality. Chan (page 63) examined various aspects of 
compliance in China, including international trade, environmental agreements, arms 
control and human rights and concluded that overall compliance is satisfactory to 
good, but that certain problem areas remain. Chan also highlighted transparency as a 
problem area specific to compliance in global trade, a fmding which is supported to a 
certain extent by the results of this study which found that transparency in IP 
enforcement was a particular issue. 
The three-stage theory of IP development (described at page 64) as proposed 
by various commentators based on developments in other Asian jurisdictions could 
also be applicable to TRIPS compliance in China, but is clearly too simplistic to offer 
a complete interpretation of the current IP system. Therefore, the results from this 
study do largely concur with the main conclusions of existing studies of compliance in 
China. However, the comprehensive model of compliance applied in this study draws 
together some of these previous fmdings into a more complete model of compliance. 
This comprehensive model will now be revisited in order to modify it for the specific 
context of TRIPS compliance in China. 
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7.6 Revisiting the Model 
The comprehensive model of compliance applied in this study was initially 
formulated to account for compliance with international environmental accords. Thus, 
it is important to consider to what extent this model may be applicable to international 
intellectual property agreements. Clearly, there are differences in the significance of 
some key factors. For example, pressure from NGOs was considered crucial to 
increased compliance in the environmental arena, but NGOs are not as powerful in the 
IP field. In addition, it is difficult to analyse all factors within the rigid framework of 
the existing model as many categories or key factors overlap. For example, the lack 
of consistency in enforcement was considered as a political/institutional factor, but 
could also be seen as attributable to a lack of administrative capacity in the 
enforcement system, or to a lack of training amongst the relevant personnel. Similarly, 
although respondents in this study did not consider cultural factors to be significant, 
attitudes and values did playa part and it is difficult to distinguish between the direct 
cultural influences of Confucianism and socialism and their indirect influence on 
contemporary values in Chinese society. 
Therefore, can the basic structure of the model of compliance, incorporating 
both non-country- and country-specific factors, as well as consideration of 
implementation, compliance and effectiveness as separate components remain valid 
for the context of IP protection? It is contended in this thesis that the basic structure 
of the model is applicable to analysis of compliance with international IP agreements, 
but that several modifications of the key factors are necessary to reflect the different 
context of compliance. The distinct elements of the model of compliance will be 
reviewed below in order to outline the specific refmements necessary to the existing 
model. 
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7.6.1 Non-country-Specijic Factors Affecting Compliance with TRIPS 
As discussed in chapter 4, there are a variety of factors which are not specific 
to China which may influence compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. These factors 
relate to the characteristics of the TRIPS Agreement itself, characteristics of the 
activity involved in the Agreement, specifically the problem of intellectual property 
infringements, and fmally factors connected with the international environment. The 
non-specific factors influencing TRIPS compliance included within the model are 
those relating to the specific activity of intellectual property infringements; the 
characteristics of the TRIPS Agreement itself, including both substantive and 
procedural provisions; and the international environment, including the role ofNGOs 
and the media. 
In terms of the characteristics of the activity involved, based on analysis of 
compliance with environmental agreements, it was previously proposed that the 
number of actors, the number of countries and any economic incentives involved 
would all have a significant effect on TRIPS compliance. However, the 
characteristics of IP infringements are markedly different from environmental actions 
and thus the characteristics of the activity involved may playa different role in the 
model of compliance. Specifically, as IP piracy and counterfeiting are global 
activities, there are both a large number of actors and countries involved in the 
activity. In addition, economic incentives actually encourage some infringements, as 
there may be short-term economic gains from IP infringements. Thus, although IP 
infringements have different characteristics from environmental damage, the specific 
characteristics involved support the notion that the fewer countries and actors 
involved in an activity, the easier it may be to encourage compliance with 
international agreements regulating that activity. 
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The international environment was one of the most significant influences on 
compliance with international environmental accords, in contrast to its role in the IP 
context, where the international environment plays a minimal part. The sole feature 
of the international environment that was found to playa significant role in TRIPS 
compliance is the number of countries involved in the WTO process, and thus obliged 
to comply with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. As more and more countries 
join this regime, the TRIPS Agreement may gain momentum towards compliance. 
Consequently, the international environment may playa minor, yet positive role in 
encouraging compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. 
The most significant non-country specific factors which have been shown to 
influence compliance with the TRIPS Agreement are those associated with the TRIPS 
Agreement itself As discussed in chapter 4, the drafting history of the Agreement has 
given rise to a certain degree of resentment amongst developing countries that the 
TRIPS framework favours developed country Members. This perceived inequity in 
the TRIPS Agreement makes it less likely that all Members, especially those from 
developing economies, will be inclined to push for full compliance. The nature of the 
TRIPS Agreement as a minimum standards agreement also has the unavoidable 
consequence that the substantive provisions contained within the Agreement lack 
precision. This imprecision also discourages full compliance from all Members. 
The perceived inequity and imprecision of the TRIPS Agreement are the most 
significant non-country specific factors influencing TRIPS compliance, but there are 
other minor factors associated with the TRIPS Agreement also affecting compliance. 
For example, the burden of fulfilling TRIPS' notification obligations and a lack of 
sufficient cooperation and rewards from developed country Members both act as a 
disincentive to compliance. However, it should also be recognised that there are 
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several features of the TRIPS Agreement and the framework associated with the 
WTO that can offer positive enticements towards compliance. For instance, the 
Council for TRIPS established by the TRIPS Agreement is recognised as playing an 
important role in monitoring and encouraging compliance and the WTO dispute 
resolution process is also an asset of the WTO framework; by encouraging countries 
to join the multilateral forum of the WTO, they can avoid unilateral actions by 
powerful trade partners. 
Overall, there are vanous factors influencing compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement which are not specific to China. Although the characteristics of IP 
infringements are unique, in general, they playa similar role in compliance as in other 
activities governed by international agreements. In contrast, the international 
environment is much less significant in the context of international intellectual 
property, perhaps because of the lack of global consensus about the importance of IP 
protection and the relationship between IPR and economic development. The non-
country specific factors which are seen as most significant in the context of 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement are summarised below in Figure 7-1. 
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Figure 7-1- Non-country specific factors influencing compliance with the TRIPS Agreement 
7.6.2 Country-specific Factors Affecting Compliance with TRIPS 
In addition to the factors affecting TRIPS compliance which are not specific to 
China, chapter 5 illustrated the factors related to China specifically that influence 
overall compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. These factors included basic 
parameters such as the short history of IP in China; fundamental factors such as the 
political system in China; and proximate factors which include the attitude of the 
central leadership in Beijing and the overall lack of trained and experienced personnel 
in the IP system. 
The basic parameters of China could be considered as significant factors 
influencing compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. However, in contrast with 
previous studies, historical and cultural factors, such as the continuing influence of 
Confucianism, were largely dismissed by respondents in this study as significant 
influences on the current IP system in China, however, this fmding needs further 
verification. China's previous behaviour in the IP field was also not perceived to be a 
significant indicator of present-day compliance. In fact, the only parameters which 
were found to have a noticeable effect on China's TRIPS compliance were the size of 
China and China's neighbours. China's sheer size has obvious implications for the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights; of particular concern is the division that 
exists between central and local levels of government in China. A more minor 
consideration is the role of China's neighbours, which may be a positive influence on 
China's IP system by providing more effective IP systems for China to emulate. 
Therefore, although China's size is a major influence on the current IP system, 
particularly IP enforcement, overall the parameters are not highly significant in the 
model of China's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. 
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In contrast to parameters, there are several fundamental factors which are of 
pnme importance for China's TRIPS compliance. Fundamental factors were 
considered under the headings of attitudes and values, political and institutional 
factors and economic factors. In terms of attitudes and values, although the cultural 
influences of Confucianism and socialism were largely rejected as strong influences 
on the contemporary IP system, the attitudes and values amongst the public in China 
were seen as important by respondents in this study. In fact, a lack of awareness of IP 
rights was highlighted as the most significant influence on the current IP system by 
respondents. This lack of awareness was also linked to a lack of the concept of 
individual rights as a 'rights culture' is not pervasive in China. The use of 
relationships or guanxi was also felt to be an influence on the operation of the IP 
system. Overall, attitudes and values in China are more significant influences on the 
development of the IP system and corresponding TRIPS compliance than the cultural 
factors which are often blamed by commentators. However, other fundamental 
factors could be considered to be more significant overall. 
Political and institutional factors are major contributors to the development of 
the current IP system in China. Previous studies had highlighted a lack of 
transparency as a significant problem, but in contrast, many respondents in this study 
cited better transparency as a key improvement they had witnessed in the IP system in 
recent years. However, transparency with regards to enforcement action was still felt 
to be a problem. The other main political and institutional factor which contributes to 
the state of the current IP system in China is the lack of consistency in enforcement. 
Frustration was expressed by many respondents at inconsistent enforcement of IP 
rights, although many respondents also praised the administrative enforcement system. 
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Turning to economIC factors, local protectionism was one of the most 
significant factors identified by respondents. Local protectionism almost defies 
classification; although it is considered here with economic factors, local 
protectionism is also strongly linked with political and institutional factors and even 
societal attitudes and values such as the influence of guanxi. The final economic 
factor which was discussed with respondents was the role of the government in the 
economy. However, this was only a minor concern to most respondents. 
Finally, proximate factors also play a crucial role in influencing the 
compliance of China's current IP system with the TRIPS Agreement. Clearly the 
most significant aspect of proximate factors analysed in this study was the 
administrative capacity within the IP system. Specifically, the level of penalties 
imposed on infringers was seen as inadequate by many respondents and judicial 
enforcement of IP rights was also seen as in need of improvement, particularly in 
terms of judicial powers to enforce judgments. The other proximate factor which has 
a crucial impact on the development of the current IP system is the lack of trained and 
experienced legal personnel. This lack was expressed as a lack of quality rather than 
a lack of quantity amongst the relevant personnel in the IP system. These factors are 
shown below in Figure 7-2. 
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Figure 7-2- Factors specific to China influencing compliance with the TRIPS Agreement 
7.7 Suggested Improvements to the Current IP System 
Given that certain key factors have been highlighted as crucial for influencing 
China's overall TRIPS compliance, it is informative to evaluate respondents' 
comments regarding possible improvements to the current system which they believe 
could increase overall compliance and effectiveness of the IP system. On the 
questionnaire used to make initial contact with the respondents, a number of possible 
improvements to the IP system were suggested and respondents were asked to choose 
the improvements that they felt would make the most significant difference to the 
current system of protection (see Appendix 3 for details). Respondents were free to 
choose more than one option as appropriate and to add their own comments on 
possible improvements. The numbers of respondents choosing each option are 
detailed in the table below. These suggested improvements to the current system will 
now be considered in more detail. 
Table 7-3 Suggested improvements in the IP system as selected by respondents 
Suggested Im12rovement Number of Res120ndents 
Campaigns for greater public awareness 33 
Stronger commitment from central government 21 
Greater international cooperation 20 
Better training for administrative personnel 20 
Better training for legal personnel 16 
More money dedicated to IP protection 15 
Better training for customs personnel 15 
Other 6 
7.7.1 Increasing Awareness 
Unsurprisingly, given that a lack of public awareness of IP rights was selected 
as the most significant contributing factor to the current system, campaigns for greater 
public awareness were highlighted by most respondents as the most important 
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improvement. This emphasis on increasing awareness of IP rights was reflected in the 
comments of many respondents. For example, when asked how the current system 
could be improved, this respondent succinctly answered: 
"Awareness of IPR nationally needs to be further promoted."s19 
The benefits of increased awareness of IP rights are obvious; infringements 
would be minimised and thus the IP system would become more efficient as the 
resources would be spread less thinly. Furthermore, increased awareness of IP rights 
by individual rights holders could directly benefit the government by lightening the 
government's enforcement burden, as recognised by this respondent: 
"China is a country which is led by the executive. As I mentioned 
earlier, rights holders are highly dependent on the government, in 
literature and the arts, let alone the general public. Improved 
awareness will be beneficial to the government, if the government 
treats the public's rights awareness as its own policy."s2o 
However, the difficulties of increasing awareness of IP rights are also 
recognised by respondents: 
"(([Kristie]: So what do you think would make them change their 
minds about buying ... counterfeit goods?)) It's hard to change 
someone because they don't have their own ( ... ), if it's their own IP 
then they will, they will, I guess protecting IP would be more 
important, but if they don't have any IP to protect, they will simply 
benefit from (these infringers of IP) so it's difficult to change their 
mindset."s21 
In addition, it is not entirely clear exactly what is meant by 'awareness' of IP 
rights: specifically, does awareness refer to awareness of an individual's rights or of 
the IP laws and regulations on the statute books or of the IP enforcement system? At 
least one respondent felt that awareness of the concept of IP rights was sufficient, but 
that awareness of the enforcement process was lacking: 
519 Questionnaire comments from respondent LAW23T. 
520 Follow-up comments from respondent LA W29T. 
521 Interview comments from respondent LAW05. 
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"Until recently there has not even been legislation that adequately 
covers IP protection. Now that this is partially in place, then it is the 
enforcement procedures and processes that companies and 
individuals are neither familiar with, or recognise the need for IP 
protection.,,522 
Therefore, although campaigns to increase awareness of IP rights were 
stressed by a majority of respondents as key to improving the current system of 
protection, there also appears to be a lack of consensus about exactly what kind of 
'awareness' is necessary and how best to enhance this awareness. 
7. 7.2 Stronger Commitment from Central Government 
The second suggested improvement that respondents felt was important is a 
stronger commitment from the central government. The role of the government was 
explicitly discussed by several respondents, such as this Western respondent from a 
multinational operating in China who felt that: 
"The government's commitment and ability to enforce IPR are 
always very important.,,523 
In fact, resolve from the central government in Beijing was seen as decisive 
for enforcement efforts nationwide: 
"I believe that if, if the central government is taking an interest, then 
something will happen in the whole country.,,524 
However, respondents were vaguer about exactly how stronger government 
commitment would contribute to a more effective IP system in China. Overall, 
determination from the central government was discussed in connection with various 
factors such as tackling the issue of local protectionism and increasing the levels of 
penalties awarded in IP infringement cases. Thus, although the attitude of the central 
government was seen as crucial for sustained improvements to the system, the process 
522 Questionnaire comments from respondent SERVICES02. 
523 Email follow-up comments from respondent MANU02. 
524 Interview comments from respondent LA W31. 
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of how this commitment would lead to more effective protection was blurred. 
Therefore, as stated above, there may be a need to broaden efforts to increase 
government commitment to provincial levels of administration, not just central 
government. 
7.7.3 Greater International Cooperation 
The third improvement that was suggested by respondents was greater use of 
international cooperation. Greater international cooperation was stressed as 
potentially benefiting the IP system in various ways, through moulding the attitude of 
the government, through improving the expertise of the personnel and through 
providing positive incentives for consistently enforcing IP laws and regulations: 
"In addition, the government may promote cooperation both 
nationally and internationally, to keep increasing the quality of 
personnel from related professions, and thus to ensure that the 
relevant laws and regulations are implemented smoothly.,,525 
Specifically, greater international cooperation was linked with exchange 
programmes for professionals and personnel working within the current IP system in 
China by several respondents: 
"I think one of the important things also is we need to send more 
and more students, or teachers, or legal experts, to go overseas to 
have more chances to exchange with overseas I P protection 
experts. To work ... this is ... if we can exchange ideas, exchange 
views, people will find better solutions to solve not only problems in 
China, but also problems concurrently met with the whole world.,,526 
These comments suggest that such programmes do not only benefit the 
effectiveness of the IP system in China, but may also have reciprocal benefits for 
enforcing IP globally. Furthermore, international cooperation was explicitly 
contrasted with the current confrontational attitude taken by some trading partners 
such as the US: 
525 Questionnaire comments from respondent LA W30T. 
526 Interview comments from respondent LAW16. 
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"Instead of criticizing only, maybe more efforts should be devoted 
to the countries working together constructively to tackle the 
problem which will ultimately benefit everyone.,,527 
Therefore, respondents indicated that they may be more receptive to 
cooperation from international partners and organisations as opposed to the current 
criticisms which provoke more resentment than improvements. International 
cooperation can thus play an important role in improving the IP system in China 
without creating tension. 
7.7.4 Training for Key Personnel 
Another area of suggested improvements discussed by respondents is the area 
of training for key personnel in the intellectual property system. Clearly, expanded 
training for legal, administrative and customs personnel would aim to overcome the 
problem of a lack of trained and experienced personnel identified as a substantial 
contributing factor to the problems in the current system. Many respondents 
expressed varying degrees of frustration that they felt with the current IP system, 
particularly in terms of inaccurate decisions being reached by inexperienced 
personnel. 528 In addition, more extensive training may confront the issues of 
inconsistency in enforcement and inadequate penalties imposed by personnel in the IP 
system, both of which were also ranked as highly significant contributors to current 
shortcomings. This link between training and a lack of consistency is made explicitly 
by this respondent: 
"And to provide education [uh-huh] to their legal people, you know, 
to the court people [uh-huh], to judges and to, to have them 
understand I think, what, what intellectual property rights are and 
you know, um ... what is an infringement, to have set standards. 
[uh-huh] 
You know one thing, it's just funny, you, you know, go to one (Ale) 
and he can look at a certain type of infringement and he'll say yeah, 
527 As illustrated by questionnaire comments from respondent LAW05, discussed above at page 186. 
528 Interview comments from respondent LA WO 1. 
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that's clearly an infringement and you'll go to another one 
somewhere else and they'll say that's not an infringement [uh-
huh].,,529 
The issue of inadequate penalties was also directly discussed in terms of 
improving the current system of protection through increasing penalties for 
infringements. Increasing the level of penalties awarded was one of the key 
suggestions of respondents of how the current system of IP protection could be 
improved. For instance, a Chinese lawyer suggested that: 
"The patent law and trademark law may be amended again; one 
proposal is to increase the amount of compensation.,,53o 
However, the likelihood of significant increases in the level of penalties issued 
is called into doubt by a respondent from a Chinese company: 
"The Chinese government will not initiate legislation for large 
amounts of compensation for IPR infringements, due to the fact 
that China is still far away from other developed countries in terms 
of economic development, especially innovation and creativity.,,531 
Consequently, although better training for legal, administrative and customs 
personnel is identified as crucial to improving the current IP system in China, there 
may be limits to how much training in isolation can achieve. Better training may need 
to be linked to changes in the allocation of resources and more basic changes in the 
political system. 
7.7.5 More resources allocated to the IP System 
Another of the key suggested improvements of the current IP system in China 
discussed by respondents was the issue of resources. Simply, there is a lingering 
perception that the IP system, particularly the enforcement system, suffers from a: 
"Shortage of manpower and finance.,,532 
529 Interview comments from respondent LAWIO. 
530 Follow-up comments from respondent LA WI2T. 
531 Questionnaire comments from respondent MANUOI T. 
532 Questionnaire comments from respondent LAW I I T. 
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In particular, the issue of fmancial resources was discussed by respondents, in 
connection with the personnel implementing the system in practice: 
"More money is a really clear under-resourcing issue ... So we need 
to allocate, say OK, you know, for a specialist IP division and give 
them money to do the investigations and the cases, it's very (rare) 
for any country in the world, to be fair, but that's what, that's the 
sort of resourcing that we need to do."s33 
This linking of the issue of resources to that of improving the standard of 
personnel operating within the current system was echoed by another respondent: 
"By improving the allocation of human and material resources, 
especially human resources, the government can equip the 
Intellectual Property Office with more personnel who understand 
intellectual property law, to strengthen the fight against IP infringers 
as a t e a m . " ~ 3 4 4
Therefore, although respondents did suggest that funding of the IP system was 
an issue, more money is not necessarily an adequate solution to the under-resourcing 
issue. The issue of resources also includes human resources and is thus closely linked 
to discussion of training of personnel in the preceding section. 
7. 7.6 Administrative Changes to the IP System 
Administrative changes discussed by respondents included the issue of 
establishing a more streamlined enforcement system to avoid overlaps and even 
rivalry between competing IP agencies and the issue of transparency. This could 
potentially improve China's capacity to fully comply with its TRIPS commitments. 
For example, one respondent stated that China should: 
"Form a unified, more authoritative system of intellectual property 
courts, and increase the uniformity of the transparency of law 
enforcement to reduce local protectionism."s3s 
However, there was no clear consensus amongst the respondents concerning 
the formation of a unified intellectual property agency in China. Indeed, as 
533 Interview comments from respondent LA WO 1. 
534 Follow-up comments from respondent LAW29T. 
535 Questionnaire comments from respondent LAW25T. 
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highlighted above at page 178, any such agency would still need to be divided at a 
local level. Therefore, the main administrative changes in the IP system would be to 
streamline the bureaucratic processes, specifically transfer of cases between 
administrative and criminal agencies, and to increase transparency, particularly in 
enforcement. This need for greater transparency in enforcement was stressed by this 
Chinese respondent: 
"There is a lack of unified information about violations and no 
nationwide tracking.,,536 
Thus, unifying enforcement statistics would provide a more transparent 
approach to tackling the complex problem of local protectionism. 
7.7.7 Strengthening the Role of the Judiciary 
Although not all respondents suggested strengthening the role of the judiciary 
as a possible improvement to the current IP system in China, the weaknesses of the 
judicial enforcement system, as opposed to the strengths of the administrative 
enforcement system were consistently emphasised by respondents. Therefore, 
improving the judicial enforcement system could be seen as a way of spreading 
enforcement actions across the IP system and possibly easing resource problems in 
the administrative system. 
Furthermore, some respondents did explicitly discuss the role of the judiciary 
and the need for greater judicial independence: 
"The court should have independent judicial power, proper 
protection of its power in practice, and financial support 
independent of the national budget. Judges should enjoy high 
. I d . t t ,,537 socia an economic s a us. 
536 Questionnaire comments from respondent LA W11 T. 
537 Questionnaire comments from respondent LAW24T. 
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Thus, although the political obstacles to granting greater judicial independence 
were raised by some respondents discussed above at page 185, there were also some 
respondents who felt this is a necessary area of reform in the current legal system. 
7. 7.8 Legislative changes 
Although the vast majority of respondents emphasised poor enforcement as 
the main cause of any problems with the current IP system in China, minor changes to 
the legislation were also discussed in the context of possible improvements to the 
system. For instance: 
"Further improve related legislation, for example, improve the 
litigation and administrative procedures laws to include discovery 
procedures. ,,538 
It should perhaps be noted that these suggestions of specific legislative 
changes which would improve the current IP system came from lawyers practising in 
this field. However, their suggestions are all valid possible improvements to the 
substantive framework of laws and regulations. These suggestions include firstly, 
developing the law of passing off, to assist a rights holder who feels their design has 
been infringed for example: 
"One of the weaknesses that they have here that they have to 
improve is a lot of their (passing off); they don't really have anything 
for that yet. They've got that under statute in the unfair practices, 
unfair competition act [uh-huh] uh ... but they, that's not 
developed .,,539 
However, this suggestion may arise from this respondent's background in a 
common law system in which passing off is a significant feature of the IP framework 
of protection. A second suggested legislative improvement is to modify the Lawyers' 
Law from 1996 in China: 
538 Follow-up comments from respondent LAW07. 
539 Interview comments from respondent LA WIO. 
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"I hope and I also wish, the laws, the attorney law will be rectified 
soon, will be changed soon, because it's more administrative 
restriction."s4o 
Arguably, a more significant legislative amendment would be to allow for the 
enforcing of injunctions and other orders issued by the court. This improvement 
would alleviate some of the frustration expressed above with the lack of court powers 
to enforce judgments as discussed previously at page 184: 
"If you could ( ... ) the rights holder with that judgment, just like you 
can in most places in the world, go back to the court and say, bang 
this guy in jail for us because he's breached the order, it would be a 
huge difference, because then we'd start really using the civil 
system a lot more because there'd be a real remedy at the end of 
it-; it's not money-, people don't ask for much money in most IP 
cases, it's an injunction that you can enforce."s41 
Finally, there are some minor legislative changes suggested by respondents 
which would improve the enforcement process. Specifically, there appears to be a 
desire to revise the rules of evidence to shift the burden of proof in civil cases and to 
further amend the rules on transferring cases for criminal liability: 
"Civil procedure rules do not allow shifting of burden of proof, which 
makes it difficult to prove damages. Criminal thresholds continue 
to make criminal enforcement difficult."s42 
Clearly, there are various improvements that respondents feel could be made 
to the current system of IP protection in China and if successful, these would have a 
major impact on the IP system. However, even without further far-reaching reforms, 
respondents remain optimistic about the future of the IP system in China as can be 
seen below. 
7.8 The Future of the IP System in China 
Respondents were not specifically asked about the future of IP on the initial 
questionnaire, but many respondents did comment on their predictions for the 
540 Interview comments from respondent LAW16. 
541 Interview comments from respondent LA WO 1. 
542 Questionnaire comments from respondent LA WO 1. 
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development of the system when asked for further comments and in addition, it was a 
key discussion point in the follow-up interviews carried out. Overall, respondents 
appeared overwhelmingly positive about the future development of the IP system in 
China, despite the many problems they had experienced with the current system. 
In general, respondents discussed the future of the IP system in connection to 
four themes: emphasising the role of domestic companies and rights holders in the 
further development of the system; comparisons (mostly favourable) with lengthy 
periods of IP development in other countries; emphasis on the timescale of reform; 
and drawing a close link between further IP reform and continuing economic 
development in China. These themes are evident in the following sample quotes 
taken from a variety of respondents. 
For example, this international lawyer highlighted the essential need for 
Chinese rights holders to sustain long-term reforms in the IP system: 
Things are improving and will continue to improve, with the main 
driver being the Chinese companies' desire to be IP creators and 
licensors and not just IP users and licensees.543 
This Chinese respondent gave a very positive overview of the IP system in 
China, particularly in comparison to the lengthy development of IP protection in 
developed countries and concluded that: 
I believe that China's intellectual property system is gradually 
improving, but due to its high starting point, China's IP system can 
achieve the level of the world's greatest countries in a relatively 
short period of time. For example, the United States and Britain 
took a century to build today's intellectual property regime, but 
h· thO 544 China may not need a century to ac leve IS. 
543 Questionnaire comments from respondent LA W06. 
544 Follow-up comments from respondent LA W29T. 
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Finally, this respondent from a large multinational also expressed optimism 
about the future of the IP system in China and linked future development explicitly to 
continued economic development: 
I have confidence for the future of China IP system - it will not stop 
improving while the overall China economy is growing, but I also 
believe that the IP system can not be in line with that in western 
countries in short time while the overall economic level is far behind. 
IP system is an integral part of Chinese social and economic life.545 
Therefore, despite detailed discussions about the ineffectiveness of the current 
system, it is important to acknowledge that the majority of respondents were not 
solely condemning the IP system. Indeed, many were keen to stress the positive 
elements in the current system and overall were also positive about the future. The 
fmal section will now further consider the possible improvements suggested and 
discussed here in terms of their impact upon China's intention to comply and capacity 
to comply with the TRIPS Agreement, in order to move towards policy 
recommendations for future reform efforts. 
7.9 Dynamic Processes of Changing Compliance 
The preceding sections summarise the most significant factors identified by 
the documentary data and from respondents' comments as influences on China's 
current IP system and consequent compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, as well as 
suggested improvements to the current system. However, a list of these factors alone 
is not particularly illuminating as to how China's TRIPS compliance has developed 
over the past few years or how it may change in the future. Therefore, it is necessary 
to tum to these dynamic processes to understand both the existing compliance with 
the TRIPS Agreement and possible changes that could increase China's compliance. 
545 Follow-up comments from respondent MANU02. 
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The dynamic process of change in compliance over time relates to the two 
aspects of intention to comply and capacity to comply. These two perspectives can be 
changed both by internal changes in the country, such as changes in leadership, and 
by external pressure, for example, offers of financial or technical assistance. In order 
to describe these dynamic processes of interaction between the factors affecting 
compliance and China's intention and capacity to comply, it is necessary to frrst 
consider: which factors that have been identified as significant for compliance are 
fixed and which can most easily be manipulated? Which of these factors affect 
China's intention to comply? And which affect China's capacity to comply? 
It is immediately apparent that several of the factors identified in Figures 
Figure 7-1 and Figure 7-2 above as significant for China's compliance with TRIPS are 
either fixed or are not easily modified. For example, although the precision of the 
obligations contained within the TRIPS Agreement was identified as one of the prime 
characteristics of the Agreement that influenced compliance, these obligations are 
fixed and could not easily be changed to increase compliance. Similarly, the 
characteristics associated with the international environment are also fixed or difficult 
to manipulate. For example, the short-term economic rewards associated with 
intellectual property infringements are long-standing, but could not be easily 
minimised to discourage IP infringements. 
On the other hand, of the factors identified above as significant influences on 
China's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, there are several factors which may 
be shaped more readily. It is essential to focus on these factors if China's compliance 
with the TRIPS Agreement is to be maintained and improved further, rather than 
waste efforts on attempting to manipulate factors which are fixed or of little 
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consequence. Some of the factors under scrutiny influence China's intention to 
comply with the TRIPS Agreement and others affect China's capacity to comply. 
There are five key factors which most influence China's intention to comply 
with the TRIPS Agreement. First, increasing awareness of IP rights in general can 
assist in tackling the problem of a lack of awareness of intellectual property which 
was identified by respondents as the key cause of problems in the current system. 
This in turn can increase intention to comply by facilitating the acceptance of the 
imported norms by society in general, similar to the process of internalisation as 
described by Koh. 
The second factor which can strongly influence intention to comply in China 
is that of pressure applied to the government. It is undeniable that external pressure 
from trading partners or international organisations such as WIPO can encourage or 
maintain government commitment to fully comply with the TRIPS Agreement. 
However, it has also been recognised by many respondents that external pressure can 
create resentment in China if too heavily imposed without sufficient recognition of 
China's achievements in developing a modem IP system to date. Therefore, although 
it is important to maintain pressure on the Chinese government, it is also important 
not to overuse this mechanism for change. Indeed, spreading the use of external 
pressure to include local or provincial level governments should be promoted. As 
there is a recognised gap between central and local levels of government, pressure 
applied to the central leadership in Beijing can only achieve so much before creating 
resentment and consequently, attention should be shifted to lower levels of 
government which play such a crucial role in IP enforcement. 
The third crucial factor affecting China's intention to comply involves the role 
of domestic Chinese enterprises in supporting sustained improvements in the IP 
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system. Almost all respondents independently raised the issue of domestic rights 
holders as one which would be essential for future improvements in the current IP 
system. Therefore, as domestic Chinese enterprises continue to increase their 
innovative activity, their role as IP rights holders in China will continue to increase in 
importance and may act as a tipping point for effective enforcement of existing laws 
and regulations. 
Fourthly, although NGOs in general play a mmor role in the issue of 
intellectual property rights globally, they can have a slight positive effect on intention 
to comply with the TRIPS Agreement in China. Organisations representing MNCs in 
China such as the QBPC should maintain their role of supporting enforcement of IP 
rights and can thus help to maintain the necessary intention to comply. Finally, many 
respondents highlighted inadequate penalties for infringers as one of their main 
frustrations with the current system. Increasing the statutory levels of penalties which 
can be imposed and clarifying guidance on calculating damages should significantly 
increase intention to comply as it would act as a stronger deterrent to infringers by 
minimising short-term economic gains from infringements. 
In addition to these five key factors which influence China's intention to 
comply with the TRIPS Agreement, there are also four crucial factors which impact 
upon China's capacity to comply. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, most 
respondents highlighted China's insufficient numbers of trained and experienced 
personnel in the IP system as a key cause of current problems with effective 
enforcement. According to respondents' comments, the number of personnel is not so 
much of an issue as the quality of the personnel involved in IP enforcement. Thus, 
improving the standard of personnel in the IP system would dramatically improve 
China's capacity to fully implement its TRIPS commitments. 
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Secondly, the role of the judiciary in the IP system was frequently reported by 
respondents as influential on private enforcement of IP rights in China. Although the 
system of administrative enforcement which dominates the IP system in China 
received a lot of praise from respondents, in contrast, the system of judicial 
enforcement is weak. Thus, there is a perceived need to strengthen the role of the 
judiciary and to increase the independence of the judiciary from political influences. 
Thirdly, although some commentators had previously called for a unified IP agency to 
oversee the operation of the IP system in China, this notion was rejected by 
respondents as impractical. However, it was recognised that there is a certain amount 
of overlap and bureaucratic competition between the relevant agencies and thus, the 
system could be streamlined to simplify the bureaucratic structure of IP enforcement 
and to encourage greater cooperation and case transfer between the different IP 
agencIes. 
Finally, at the international level, there is some disquiet from developing 
country WTO Members that developed country Members are not living up to their 
promises to provide technical cooperation and technology transfers under the TRIPS 
Agreement. Increasing incentives such as technology transfer and cooperation from 
key developed country Members may also have a positive influence on China's 
overall TRIPS compliance. Overall, there are various key factors which should be the 
focus for future improvements in China's TRIPS compliance as highlighted above. 
These factors influence China's intention and capacity to comply, which in turn 
impact upon overall compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. 
This dynamic model of compliance for future reforms of China's IP system is 
represented in Figure 7-4 below and will form the basis for the implications and 
policy recommendations arising from this study which will be outlined in the 
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concluding chapter. The factors are divided into factors influencing China's intention 
and capacity to comply, but these factors are interactive and this should be borne in 
mind when considering the operation of this model of compliance. 
270 
t-.) 
--.I 
--
Factors 
Increasing public awareness of IP rights 
Maintain external pressure to encourage 
government commitment, both central and 
local 
Strengthening role of domestic Chinese 
compames 
Maintaining role ofNGOs such as the 
QBPC 
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overlaooing IP aQencies 
Increasing incentives and cooperation from 
other (developed country) WTO Members 
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CAPACITY TO 
COMPLY 
CHINA'S COMPLIANCE 
WITH TRIPS AGREEMENT 
Figure 7-4- Model of China's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement and key influences on China's intention and capacity to comply 
1lQ. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter frrst returned to key concepts of legal development outlined in the 
literature review and previously used to analyse legal reforms in China. Although the 
concepts of legal legitimation, transplantation and selective adaptation offer some useful 
insights into the process of adopting imported laws into a domestic legal system, it is 
clear that these concepts are ultimately insufficient to fully explain the IP system in China. 
Therefore, theories of compliance have been considered in this study in order to broaden 
the scope of analysis. However, any analysis of compliance must distinguish between 
implementation, compliance and effectiveness. 
Existing theories of compliance were considered in the context of China's TRIPS 
compliance, but were judged to be too narrow to fully explain the current system of 
protection and gap between formal implementation and effective enforcement. 
Consequently, a more comprehensive model of compliance devised by Brown Weiss and 
Jacobson and previously applied to international environmental obligations was chosen as 
the basis for analysis in this study. Under this comprehensive model of compliance, non-
country specific factors relating to the international environment, the activity involved 
and the specific international accord are all of central importance. In the case of the 
TRIPS Agreement, the major factors influencing compliance were found to be the 
perceived inequity and imprecision of the Agreement itself, as well as the short-term 
economic rewards associated with infringements and the large number of actors and 
countries involved in infringements. 
In addition, this study also considered China-specific factors influencing TRIPS 
compliance in some detail. Overall, China-specific factors were considered under three 
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headings: parameters, fundamental factors and proximate factors. The most significant 
parameters were found to be the short history of the IP system in China, as the modem 
system of protection has only developed since the reform period began in the late 1970s 
and the division between central and local government. It is also noteworthy that cultural 
factors which have been stressed by some previous commentators were the least 
significant influences on the current IP system according to participants in this study. 
The most significant fundamental factors were found to be the lack of public awareness 
of IP rights, local protectionism and the lack of consistency in enforcement. The most 
significant proximate factors were found to be a lack of trained and experienced 
personnel in the IP system, inadequate penalties and weak judicial powers. 
These non-country specific factors and factors exclusive to China combine to 
produce a situation, as described in Chapter 6, in which China has (almost) fully 
implemented TRIPS obligations into domestic substantive laws and regulations, but 
compliance with certain key provisions is difficult to assess and the effectiveness of the 
system is also doubted by some respondents. Therefore, certain key improvements were 
discussed by respondents as possible future developments for the current system. These 
included increasing awareness of IP rights, greater international cooperation, better 
training for key personnel, increasing resources in the IP system, minor administrative 
and legislative changes, and strengthening the role of the judiciary. However, it is 
necessary to divide these potential improvements into those which may influence China's 
capacity to comply and those which may influence China's intention to comply. It is also 
crucial to consider the feasibility of these improvements in order to recommend where 
future reform efforts would best be concentrated. 
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Thus, the dynamic processes of change in China's compliance over time were 
considered with nine key factors highlighted as of central importance to future reforms in 
China's IP system. Of these, five influence China's intention to comply with the TRIPS 
Agreement, namely: increasing public awareness; maintaining external pressure on the 
government, but expanding these efforts to include key provincial level governments; 
strengthening the role of domestic Chinese companies; maintaining the role of 
organisations such as the QBPC; and increasing penalties for infringers to act as a more 
effective deterrent. 
On the other hand, four factors were identified as crucial influences on China's 
capacity to comply with the TRIPS Agreement: increasing the quality of the personnel in 
the IP system; strengthening the role of the judiciary; simplifying the bureaucratic 
structure of enforcement and particularly increasing relations between agencies; and 
increasing available incentives and cooperation from other WTO Members. These 
factors were combined into a concise model of influences on China's TRIPS compliance 
and form the basis for the policy recommendations arising from this study, which will be 
considered in the fmal chapter below. 
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8 Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
-
This thesis has examined China's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement through 
systematic analysis of the current system of IP protection in China. As the previous 
chapter has shown, existing theories of compliance are insufficient to fully explain 
China's almost full implementation of TRIPS obligations into domestic legislation, yet 
inadequate enforcement of the resulting laws and regulations. Thus, a more 
comprehensive model of compliance must be used to fully comprehend the complex 
interplay of parameters, fundamental and proximate factors which influence China's 
TRIPS compliance. Clearly, this amended model has wide-ranging implications, for 
theories of compliance, for the WTO, for the Chinese government, for foreign 
governments and for rights holders in China. 
This chapter will fITst summarise the main fmdings of the preceding chapters 
before considering these broader policy implications. In this fmal chapter, questions that 
arise from this study for further research will also be considered before offering some 
concluding thoughts. 
8.2 Summary of Main Findings 
The introductory chapter fITst outlined the development of intellectual property 
protection in China and in the international system in order to highlight the importance of 
the TRIPS Agreement for international IP protection. This chapter also explained why 
compliance theory is a useful tool with which to analyse the development of IP rights in 
contemporary China, compared to previous studies of the legal system in China. Finally, 
this chapter concluded with the key research questions that this thesis aimed to address. 
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These key questions related to the characteristics of the TRIPS Agreement itself that may 
affect a WTO Member's compliance; the impact of WTO accession and TRIPS 
obligations on the IP system in China; China's subsequent compliance with TRIPS 
commitments; and any outstanding areas of non-compliance and why and how they can 
be reso lved. 
Consequently, the second chapter reviewed the literature regarding the key 
concepts and theories of compliance that were applied in this study and also examined 
previous work on compliance in China. The chapter concluded that previous studies into 
China's compliance with its international commitments have focused on China without 
examining the characteristics of the obligations themselves. Equally, previous studies of 
compliance have predominantly focused on the specific international accord to the 
exclusion of country-specific factors affecting compliance. Therefore, it was argued that 
these two approaches should be combined into a more comprehensive approach to 
compliance by applying the inclusive model of compliance proposed by Brown Weiss 
and Jacobson for analysis of compliance with international environmental commitments. 
This comprehensive model of compliance was thus applied to the context of IP protection 
in China in the subsequent chapters. 
The third chapter outlined the methodology and specific research methods that 
were used in this study. A qualitative research strategy was designed which combined 
different methods of data collection: an initial questionnaire; detailed follow-up 
interviews in a variety of formats; and primary documentary data. The collected data was 
then codified and analysed using NVivo software. Details of the respondents who 
participated in the study were also outlined in Chapter 3, with further details available in 
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Appendix 1. In addition, the methodology chapter examined key issues of concern which 
arose during this research, including ethical considerations, translation and linguistic 
issues and the use of computer software. 
Following discussion of the theoretical framework applicable to this study and 
details of my research strategy, Chapter 4 then examined the non-country specific factors 
influencing compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. The most significant factors were 
found to be the perceived inequity and imprecision of TRIPS obligations, which arose 
due both to the drafting history of TRIPS and the nature of the TRIPS Agreement as a 
minimum standards agreement. The TRIPS Agreement was also found to have other 
minor characteristics influencing compliance such as the burden of notifications and the 
lack of sufficient incentives and cooperation which act against full compliance and the 
role of the TRIPS Council and WTO dispute resolution body which act to encourage 
compliance. 
In terms of other non-country specific factors outside of the TRIPS Agreement, 
the international environment and the nature of IP infringements as an activity were also 
considered in the fourth chapter. As a global activity, the sheer number of countries and 
actors involved in infringements, as well as the short-term fmancial rewards from piracy 
all discourage active implementation of TRIPS commitments. In addition, there is a lack 
of consensus in global opinion and even resentment towards certain developed countries 
and MNCs over the push for stronger international IP protection which hinder the 
adoption of higher universal standards ofIP. 
In addition to general factors influencing TRIPS compliance, there are also 
various factors specific to China which were considered in chapter 5. These China-
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specific factors were considered under the categories taken directly from the 
comprehensive Brown Weiss and Jacobson model of compliance, namely the headings of 
parameters, fundamental factors and proximate factors. Parameters such as previous 
behaviour and historical factors were not found to be significant influences on the 
contemporary IP system, despite the emphasis by many previous commentators on 
Confucianism and socialism as primarily responsible for the current system. 
In contrast, several fundamental factors were held to be highly significant by 
respondents including the lack of awareness of IP rights, local protectionism and a lack of 
consistency in enforcement. Finally, several proximate factors were also identified as 
key contributors to the current framework of IP protection in China. The most important 
of these were the inadequate penalties imposed on infringers of IP rights and the lack of 
effective powers exercised by the judiciary. Furthermore, the quality of personnel in the 
IP system was also an issue of concern for many respondents. 
Chapter 6 considered the operation of the IP system in China in more detail by 
discussing the separate issues of implementation, compliance and effectiveness of TRIPS 
obligations in China. Overall, the chapter found that despite far-reaching legislative 
changes and amendments to implement TRIPS into domestic legislation, particularly 
during the period 1999-2002, full compliance with the TRIPS Agreement may still be in 
doubt in a few limited areas, as demonstrated by the recent WTO case launched against 
China by the US. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the current system is still criticised 
by many respondents who have experienced the system in action. 
Chapter 7 combined these key fmdings into a concise model of TRIPS 
compliance in China and suggested where efforts could best be focused in future to 
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encourage long-term sustained changes to the IP system. In addition, this chapter 
revisited key concepts of legal development and previous theories of compliance outlined 
in the literature review chapter in order to analyse them in the context of the development 
of IPR in China. These existing key concepts and theories were found to be too narrow 
and thus, a more inclusive approach was advocated to fully comprehend the complex mix 
of factors affecting the framework of IP protection in contemporary China. The resulting 
model of TRIPS compliance in China also differentiated between influences upon 
China's intention to comply and China's capacity to comply, as this distinction is often 
overlooked by policy-makers. This dynamic model of compliance (shown in Figure 7-4) 
forms the basis for the policy implications of this study which will now be considered. 
8.3 Implications of the Study 
8.3.1 Implications for Theories of Compliance 
There is an obvious need to move beyond traditional competing theories of 
compliance which focus on one aspect to the exclusion of other significant factors. For 
example, following Franck's concept of compliance as arising from legitimacy and 
fairness in the rules would lead to the conclusion that China chooses whether or not to 
comply with the TRIPS Agreement on the basis of TRIPS obligations alone. Equally, 
taking a more neo-realist stance would lead to the conclusion that China chooses whether 
or not to comply based on any possible sanctions that may be imposed for non-
compliance. Clearly, these limited approaches are insufficient to fully explain TRIPS 
compliance in China and thus a more comprehensive approach is necessary. 
Such a comprehensive approach would move beyond the role of the state, which 
is the preoccupation of traditional theories of compliance, but without discounting the 
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state as a key actor altogether, as recent liberal theory does. The state still plays a major 
role in compliance with international obligations, particularly in China, and in the field of 
IP, the role of the state is considerably more important than that of individuals or NGOs. 
Consequently, an inclusive model of compliance should incorporate features from several 
pre-existing theories of compliance to offer a more complete tool with which to analyse 
compliance with international obligations. This has proved to be the most useful 
approach to follow in analysing TRIPS compliance and it is proposed that this approach 
is also applicable to other international agreements. 
Equally, this study has implications for the study of the development of law in 
China. Previous studies of law in China have tended to focus on one key concept of legal 
development to the exclusion of other concepts and theories. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, central concepts such as legal legitimation and transplantation, and 
selective adaptation alone, are insufficient to fully appreciate the complex processes of 
legal development in China. Thus, one could argue that this approach is limited and 
needs to be expanded to incorporate consideration of the categories of influential factors 
used in this study. Consequently, it is proposed that the revised model of compliance 
outlined in the previous chapter is applicable not only to compliance with other areas of 
international law, but also to other aspects of law within China. 
8.3.2 Implications for the WTO 
Under the Doha Development Agenda currently being negotiated by WTO 
Members, certain revisions to the TRIPS Agreement are being discussed. Specifically, 
these issues include increasing technology transfer to least-developed countries and the 
issue of 'non-violation' complaints, that is disputes involving the loss of an expected 
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benefit even though the TRIPS Agreement has not actually been violated, as well as the 
relationship between TRIPS and public health and possible expansion of the system of 
geographical indications. 546 
It is crucial at this juncture to urge the WTO to consider the perceived equity in 
the TRIPS obligations. Clearly, the existing TRIPS Agreement suffers from a perception 
that it favours developed country Members over the interests of developing country 
Members and the current negotiations may offer the ideal opportunity to right this 
perception. Negotiators of the updated TRIPS Agreement should also consider the 
precision of the obligations when drafting the revisions and amendments to the 1994 
Agreement in order to increase compliance. 
However, although ideally the updated TRIPS Agreement would be perceived to 
be equitable to all Members, regardless of their stage of development, and the substantive 
obligations would be completely precise, in practice, this is unlikely to be achieved. 
Unfortunately, the nature of the WTO as an international trading system means that it 
encompasses many issues, not just that of intellectual property. Therefore, TRIPS 
negotiations are part of a larger game of give and take between Members and can not be 
considered in isolation and it would thus be highly improbable for major changes to be 
made to the TRIPS Agreement in isolation. In addition, although the role of the Council 
for TRIPS has largely been a positive one in encouraging compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement, the Council could further pressure developed country members to increase 
cooperation and technical assistance under Article 67 and to fully comply with Article 68, 
546 World Trade Organisation, "The Doha Agenda", 
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewtoe/whatise/tife/dohale.htm. accessed February 21st 2007. 
281 
regarding technology transfers to less developed Members. These steps would further 
boost the available incentives for compliance. 
In addition, when negotiating China's acceSSIOn protocol, China's preferred 
designation as a developing rather than developed country was a contentious issue. 
However, following WTO accession, China does not wished to be labelled as a 
developing country due to the implications for cases of alleged anti-dumping. As a result, 
the WTO needs to consider establishing a clear defmition or workable criteria for 
designating new Members as developed or developing countries consistently in order to 
avoid such wrangles in the future. 
The fmal implication for the WTO concerns the dispute settlement process. This 
process seems satisfactory as, contrary to concerns prior to China's accession in 2001, the 
process has not been swamped by China-related disputes. In fact, the dispute settlement 
process has offered a useful alternative to the threat of unilateral sanctions by trading 
partners such as the US, which were prevalent in the 1990s. The dispute settlement 
process could thus be used to encourage non-Members to join the WTO framework of 
protection as a way to avoid such disputes. If the dispute settlement process can be used 
as an incentive to accede to the WTO system, then momentum can be gathered towards 
global compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. 
8.3.3 Implications for Trading Partners 
The implications outlined above for the WTO also link closely to the implications 
for China's powerful trading partners such as the US. Firstly, it is clear from the recent 
WTO request for consultations from the US to China regarding TRIPS enforcement that 
it can be difficult to bring a dispute to the WTO dispute settlement body. Anecdotal 
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weaknesses in the enforcement system are insufficient to initiate an action' the , 
complainant must have clear evidence of systemic failures. Therefore, this reinforces the 
idea that compliance is difficult to assess objectively and that a more comprehensive 
model of TRIPS compliance is necessary to understand the complex processes of 
compliance in different countries. 
The second and arguably more important implication for the US is that the 
prevailing policy of denouncing the Chinese government in an effort to force stronger IP 
enforcement is unlikely to succeed. External pressure from the USTR and the section 
301 mechanism is unlikely to produce sustained improvements in the enforcement system 
without corresponding internal changes. This is because external pressure may increase 
central government intention to comply, but without any improvements in the capacity to 
comply. A more productive long-term strategy to improve TRIPS compliance and IP 
enforcement in China would be to work with Chinese rights holders, legal personnel and 
judges to improve their capacity to enforce IP effectively. Ultimately, without domestic 
rights holders to pressure for IP protection, the system cannot effectively operate to 
protect IP in the long-term. However, a less confrontational and more cooperative stance 
from the US may be unforthcoming due to protectionist political pressure from Congress. 
Turning to the wider implications for global IPR protection, as shown in chapter 4, 
the broad membership of the WTO was found to act as a positive influence on the 
likelihood of TRIPS compliance; it could thus be argued that key trading partners should 
encourage remaining non-Members to accede to the WTO in order to increase this effect. 
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8.3.4 Implications for the Chinese Government 
Many respondents in this study recognised that the central government in Beijing 
is strongly committed to enforcing IP rights effectively in China. It is crucial that the 
Chinese government is praised for this and encouraged to maintain this level of 
commitment to IP development in the future. However, although the central government 
may have the intention to fully comply with the TRIPS Agreement, there are issues of 
capacity that prevent full compliance. On the other hand, despite these issues of capacity 
which may not be easily resolved, there are minor changes that the government can make 
to improve the effectiveness of the current IP system. 
Two general issues which emerged from respondents' comments on IP 
enforcement are a lack of consistency and a lack of transparency. Thus, the government 
could elude complaints about inconsistency by avoiding enforcing IP in 'crackdown' 
campaigns. With regard to transparency, although transparency of the relevant laws and 
regulations is now cited by respondents as much improved, transparency concerning 
enforcement actions is still subject to some criticism. Therefore, the government could 
further improve transparency by making available detailed enforcement statistics. This 
could also help in the fight against local protectionism; if local enforcement statistics 
show a markedly low level of fines, for example, there may be reason to suspect some 
low-level corruption in that area. 
There are also a few minor substantive amendments that the government could 
consider making to the existing legislation. As discussed in the previous chapter, perhaps 
the most pressing of these would be improving the civil procedure rules and shifting the 
burden of proof to the respondent when calculating damages. Finally, the role of Chinese 
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enterprises is key to sustaining improvements in the IP system in the future. For example, 
the current restrictive rules governing the formation and operation of NGOs in China 
could be relaxed to encourage Chinese enterprises to join together to cooperate on IP 
Issues. This would also support the stated aim of developing innovation in contemporary 
China. 
At this juncture, it is imperative for the Chinese government to recognise that the 
current approach to economic development of relying on low-end manufacturing at the 
same time as attempting to develop an innovative high-tech sector is ultimately 
unsustainable. As the flood of recent news stories concerning inferior quality Chinese 
products shows,547 the label 'Made in China' is highly vulnerable to downgrading and 
consequently, efforts must be made to regulate compliance with quality regulations. In 
due course, the Chinese government may be forced to realise that prioritising innovative 
enterprises over protecting imitative manufacturing enterprises is a better strategy for 
continued economic growth. 
A [mal implication for the Chinese government to consider is that IP protection 
may not solely be an issue for international trade, but the strength of IPR in the country 
may also affect inward investment. Although many foreign companies have so far been 
willing to invest in China in order to gain a share of a potentially lucrative market, it is 
not evident that foreign companies will be willing to bear considerable losses through IP 
infringements indefmitely. This may provide further incentive for the government to 
strengthen IP protection and support the development of more innovative industries. 
547 See, for example, BBC, "'Brand China' at risk after toy recall", 15 th August 2007, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/business/6948274.stm accessed September 14th 2007. 
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8.3.5 Implications for Rights Holders 
The consistent message from respondents seems to be that although the current 
system of protection is not perfect, it is still effective enough to offer some protection 
against infringements. The key is for rights holders to seek to engage with the system 
instead of criticising from outside. Thus, rights holders should be encouraged to initially 
register their IP rights in China and if infringements subsequently arise, then infringers 
should be pursued through the various mechanisms offered. 
A further implication for rights holders in China is to consider their collective 
position. In order to pressurise for future improvements in the IP system, rights ho lders 
should support the formation of pressure groups or industry associations for Chinese 
companies, either independently or in cooperation with foreign groups. Thus, there may 
be scope, for example, for the QBPC to work with domestic holders of well-known 
trademarks to campaign together for more effective IP protection. 
8.4 Key Findings and Questions for Further Research 
This study had several intriguing or unexpected fmdings, which could be 
confrrmed by further research. For example, contrary to several previous studies and 
many observers of China's legal system, cultural influences such as Confucianism and 
socialism were not found to be major influences on the current IP system. However, this 
fmding may have several competing explanations: although it is possible that 
Confucianism and socialism are no longer strong influences, it is also possible that this 
finding is a result of the small scale of this study or the manner in which the questions 
were worded. Therefore, a wider scale study would be useful in order to further explore 
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the continuing relevance of such cultural factors in the contemporary legal system in 
China. 
In addition, a lack of transparency had previously been cited as a major flaw in 
the current system, whereas respondents in this study actually identified transparency as a 
key improvement they had recently witnessed. As a consequence, enhanced transparency 
in the legislative framework could be said to be one of the crucial fundamental changes 
brought about as a direct result of WTO accession. However, transparency in 
enforcement actions could still be enhanced and thus, this could also be an area for 
potential future scrutiny. 
The comprehensive model of compliance described in this study was applied to 
the specific context of assessing China's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. In 
order to test the reliability of this amended model and explore it further, further research 
could apply this model to the context of China's compliance with other international 
agreements such as environmental accords or arms control treaties. Alternatively, the 
model could be applied to TRIPS compliance but in other WTO Member countries. This 
may be a useful tool of analysis in newly acceded WTO Members such as Vietnam; as 
they also have to comply with TRIPS immediately upon accession, efforts regarding 
TRIPS implementation, compliance and effectiveness are crucial. 
In addition, as a reasonably small-scale initial study, it would be interesting to see 
if these results would be replicated in a larger scale quantitative study which could test 
the reliability of the results obtained. Replicating this study's [mdings with a larger 
sample would also allay linguistic concerns about the validity of the results obtained 
through bilingual responses. Alternatively, a more in-depth case study approach could be 
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taken to examine the IP system in different geographical areas. This study has taken 
quite a central approach, but it is important to recognise that China (and China's IP 
system) is not a homogenous environment. 
Another key finding of this study concerned the personnel charged with 
administering the current IP system in China. It is undeniable that previous observers 
had cited poor personnel as a contributor to problems in the IP system, but many failed to 
distinguish clearly between the quality and the quantity of IP personnel and further, 
between incompetence through a lack of training and through outright corruption. 
Comments from respondents in this study, on the other hand, clearly focus on the quality 
of the personnel and a lack of sufficient training, although low-level corruption was also 
mentioned. 
Other surprising [mdings included the discussion of the bureaucratic structure of 
IP agencies by respondents. It had previously been suggested that a unified IP agency 
could streamline the enforcement process and minimise bureaucratic rivalries. However, 
respondents recognised this to be impractical as not only is IP such a broad field, but 
China is also a huge country to administer from one central agency. There were also a 
few unexpected differences between local Chinese and international respondents in this 
study. For example, there appeared to be a clear difference between the respondents in 
terms of the perception that IP rights only benefit foreigners. Therefore, it might be 
interesting to explore the differences between domestic and international rights holders in 
China in terms of their experiences with the system in action. Finally, it must be 
recognised that many respondents were keen to point out a more balanced picture of the 
IP system in China, as many critiques of the current system only criticise the remaining 
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flaws without praIsmg the progress China has already made. On the contrary, the 
majority of respondents were optimistic about the prospect for future improvements. 
8.5 Concluding Thoughts 
Clearly, this study has raised some important questions for the study of 
compliance with international agreements, both in China and within the WTO 
international trading system. In terms of implications for theory, this study suggests that 
previous studies of legal development in China have largely overlooked the significance 
of the specific international obligations, whilst existing theories of compliance have 
mostly focused on the specific obligations rather than characteristics of the specific 
country involved. Therefore, it has been argued that by combining the strengths of these 
previous studies, a more inclusive approach can produce a more comprehensive and valid 
model of compliance, applicable to the specific context of China's TRIPS compliance. 
Turning to policy implications, this study also has significance for various sectors, 
including the WTO/TRIPS framework itself, China, key trading partners such as the US 
and individual rights holders themselves. The WTO needs to recognise that future 
reforms to the international trading system should consider the consequences for 
compliance of broad trade-related negotiations; namely that Members may agree to 
certain obligations in order to achieve concessions in another area, but subsequent 
compliance may be harder to achieve than in single-issue negotiations. This study has 
also demonstrated that the fairness and precision of the obligations are highly significant 
factors for compliance. 
The previous approach of key trading partners applying unilateral pressure on the 
central government in order to achieve reform needs to change. Not only does it produce 
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resentment, a sentiment expressed by several respondents in this study, but it also fails to 
distinguish between China's intention to comply and capacity to comply. A more 
cooperative approach focusing on building capacity, particularly in the enforcement 
framework, and within the judiciary would be more conducive to encouraging long-term 
sustained improvements in the IP system. In terms of implications for China, it is 
undeniable that China must be praised for the substantial reform efforts to date; these 
demonstrate that China will strive to fulfil international obligations as a responsible 
member of the world order, in addition to confrrming the central government recognition 
of the importance of IPR for future economic development. As well as minor legislative 
amendments, the Chinese government should be encouraged to move away from the 
irregular crackdown approach to IP enforcement and to strengthen both consistency and 
transparency in enforcement, in order to attempt to confront the major problem of local 
protectionism. 
Ultimately, sustained changes to the intellectual property system need internal 
pressure to succeed and thus, domestic rights holders should be supported in their efforts 
to monitor and improve the existing system. Overall, China has already made substantial 
improvements to the system of IP protection and respondents participating in this study 
remain optimistic about the prospect of future improvements. If cooperative efforts could 
be focused on improving China's capacity to fully comply with TRIPS, then this process 
oflong-tenn reform may be hastened. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1- Table of Respondents' Codes and Characteristics 
The table below shows the codes and primary characteristics for the 49 
respondents in this study. The first column shows their code, the second column shows 
their nationality, whether they are Chinese or foreign and the third column shows the type 
of enterprise that the respondent is from, whether a domestic foreign enterprise or a 
foreign invested enterprise. The final four columns are all based on the respondents' 
answers to the survey: whether they deal with IP; whether their enterprise has 
experienced problems with IP; and if so, how severe are those problems (on a scale of 1 
to 6). Throughout, "NA" means not applicable and is used if there was no valid response 
given to that particular question. In addition, the main form of contact with respondents 
is also shown in the table as follows: 
Symbol Primary Form of Contact 
Q Questionnaire 
F Face-to-face 
T Telephone 
E Email 
L Letter 
Fax Fax 
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(.;j 
o 
00 
Respondent Code 
LAWOl 
LAW02 
LAW03 
LAW04 
LAW05 
LAW06 
LAW07 
LAW08 
, LAW09 
LAWI0 
LAWIIT 
LAW12T 
LAW13T 
LAW14T 
LAW15T 
LAW16 
LAW17T 
LAW18 
LAW19T 
LAW20T 
LAW21T 
LAW22T 
LAW23T 
LAW24T 
LAW25T 
LAW26T 
LAW27T 
'---
Contact Nationality 
F,E,T Foreign 
Q Foreign 
Q Foreign 
Q Foreign 
F,E,T Chinese 
T Foreign 
E Foreign 
Q Foreign 
Q Foreign 
F Foreign 
Q Chinese 
E Chinese 
E Chinese 
E Chinese 
Q Chinese 
F Chinese 
Q Chinese 
Q Foreign 
Q Chinese 
Q Chinese 
Q Chinese 
Q Chinese 
Q Chinese 
Q Chinese 
Q Chinese 
Q Chinese 
Q Chinese 
Enterprise Deals Problems Severity of 1 
Status Time in China? with IP? with IP? Problems? 
Foreign More than 10 years Yes Yes 5 
Foreign 5-10 years Yes Yes 5 
Foreign 5-10 J'ears Yes Yes 4 
Foreign More than 10 years Yes Yes 5 
Foreign More than 10 years Yes No 0 
Foreign More than 10 years Yes Yes 4 
Foreign More than 10 years Yes Yes 4 
Foreign 2-5 years Yes Yes 5 
Foreign 2-5 years Yes Yes 5 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 0 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 4 
Chinese 5-10 years Yes Yes 4 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 4 
Chinese 2-5 years Yes Yes 4 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 5 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 4 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 5 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 4 
Chinese 5-10 years Yes Yes 4 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 4 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 3 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 2 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 4 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 4 
Chinese 2-5 years Yes Yes 4 
Chinese 5-10 years Yes Yes 3 
Chinese 5-10 years Yes Yes 3 
--
VJ 
o 
\0 
LAW28T 
LAW29T 
LAW30T 
LAW31 
MANUOIT 
MANU02 
MANU03 
MANU04T 
MANU05 
MANU06 
MANU07 
MANU 0 8 
FASHIONOI 
FASHION02 
FOODOI 
FOOD02 
FOOD03 
SERVICESOI 
SERVICES02 
AUTOOl 
PHARMOI 
ITOl 
E Chinese 
E Chinese 
L Chinese 
T, Fax Foreign 
F Chinese 
E Foreign 
E Foreign 
L Chinese 
Q Chinese 
Q Chinese 
Q Foreign 
Q Chinese 
Q Foreign 
Q Foreign 
Q Foreign 
Q Foreign 
L Foreign 
E Foreign 
E,F,T Foreign 
Q Foreign 
Q Chinese 
Q Chinese 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes NA 0 1 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 3 
Chinese 5-10 years Yes Yes 4 
Foreign NA NA NA NA 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes NA 0 
Foreign More than 10 years Yes Yes 5 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 3 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 1 
Foreign More than 10 years Yes Yes 4 
Foreign 2-5 years Yes Yes 2 
Foreign 5-10 years Yes Yes 2 
Foreign More than 10 years Yes Yes 6 
Foreign 2-5 years Yes Yes 5 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 6 
Foreign 2-5 years Yes Yes 6 
Foreign 5-10 years Yes Yes 5 
Foreign More than 10 years Yes NA NA 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes No 3 
Foreign More than 10 years Yes Yes 6 
Foreign More than 10 years Yes Yes 3 
Chinese More than 10 years Yes Yes 3 
Foreign More than 10 years Yes Yes 4 
--
Appendix 2- Cover Letter used for Initial Contact 
Survey on Intellectual Property Protection in China 
X19=' 00 ~ n n i ~ F t t t 1 ~ H ? ? I¥J i}Ej ~ ~
Dear Sir/Madam, . ~ I ¥ J 7 t ~ / : : 9 ; ± ±
I am a PhD r e s e ~ r c h e r r with the University of Nottingham Business School. I am currently researching the 
enforcement of mtellectual property protection in China and any barriers that exist to prevent the effective 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. f t ~ - - ! b b ~ O O * T ¥ X : : k ~ m m ~ 1 ) j G B " J t w ± l i J f n . 1 : . o o .fltiEtEWf 
~ ~ o o o o ~ ~ ~ m ~ t t ~ ~ ~ ~ M ~ , , ~ & ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ m ~ t t ~ ~ ~ f r ~ . ~ o o
As your company is one of China's well-known trademarks, I'm sure that you are concerned about this 
issue. I would be extremely grateful if you could complete a short questionnaire based on the experiences 
of your company in China. Completion of this questionnaire should only take 10 minutes. If you are 
unable to personally complete the questionnaire, I would be grateful if you could pass it to a 
colleague. Please go to w w w . n o t t i n g h a m . a c . u k l ~ l i x k m 6 6 in order to complete the questionnaire. If you 
prefer, please complete the attached document and return it to me either by email, post or fax. l Z 9 ; 7 ; ; f ~ ~ 1 § ' j j
~ ~ O O ~ ! b m ~ ~ - , , ~ - ~ t t . ~ ~ ~ a o ~ ~ ~ * m m l § ' j a ~ O O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - f f i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
- = P ~ O O ~ Q i ~ t = t t f : W j ? ~ i f t i j ~ f q J : ! f f i , , f t ~ ~ / F J f l ~ i M M 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ f f i f q J : ! f f i x f f f l { - t ~ ~ 10 7} f'Po f q J ~ a : :
w w w . n o t t i n g h a m . a c . u k l ~ l i x k m 6 6 ~ : 1 f i w ~ J V G G ~ ~ *I¥J ! , J : l l ~ . .
My research relies on your participation to succeed and your support would be very much 
appreciated. Any information provided will be treated in strictest confidence. All data provided will be 
made anonymous and no companies or individuals will be identifiable under any circumstances. Contact 
details will also be detached from the survey. 
f t l ¥ J i j f ~ * ~ ~ I ¥ J ~ ~ ~ ~ m ~ ~ ~ ~ J V G , , ~ 1 ¥ J ~ ~ ~ . ~ . / F ~ o ~ ~ m * I ¥ J ~ ~ m ~ m ~ . p p
m ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ m ~ ~ m ! b H ~ , , # ~ ~ f f M M ~ ~ , , ~ ~ 0 1 § ' j ~ ~ A m / F ~ . m ~ ~ * o ~ ~ E E
~ i l l ~ ~ * { X i f t i j ~ 7 t ~ . .
A summary of the final results will be sent to all participating companies, with a full copy available on 
request. If you have any concerns or questions about participating in this study, please do not hesitate to 
contact me using the contact details given below. Further details about me are available at: 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uklchinese-studies/StafflKristie.htm . ~ ~ ~ * I ¥ J ~ ~ ~ * ~ : i ! t I j J i J T ~ ~ l = j W J 1 i i
1 ¥ J 0 ~ , , ~ ~ ~ ~ i l l m ~ m - f f i ~ ~ I ¥ J ~ # o ~ ~ ~ ~ l = j ~ ~ i j f ~ ~ f f M ~ ~ , , ~ m ~ ~ m * l ¥ J ~ ~
~ ~ 7 J ~ 1 f . ~ ~ t] ftIl**, ~ : 1 f i w 7 i : : http://www.nottingham.ac.uklchinese-studies/StafflKristie.htm 
Thank you very much for your support. ~ ~ f f i ~ i M f ~ I ¥ J ~ ~ , , # : f f l - ~ ~ ¥ l & t l j f ~ l ¥ J m , ~ ~ 0 
Yours Sincerely, 1 t I ; J ~ ~ 1fiX; I¥J 
Kristie Thomas. 
PhD Researcher, tw: ± : u t f ~ ± , ,
Address: China House, Lenton Fields, 
University Park, 
The University of Nottingham, 
Nottingham, NG7 2RD. 
tm:tj[: C P O O T 1 ~ r % ~ r m 1 R * m * ~ ~
199 -i5" T r ~ i t T 1 ) ( * ~ ~ m G ~ : : 315100 
Fax w ~ - i 5 " W W : +44 (0)1158466324 
E-mail E£f:rmG*§:lixkm6@nottingham.ac.uk 
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Appendix 3- Questionnaire on Intellectual Property Protection in China 
X1 ~ ~ 00 ~ Q Q i R F ~ ~ ~ 1 ? ? 8<J iJWJ :ft 
The aim of this questionnaire is to evaluate the effectiveness of the intellectual property 
(IP) system in China and identify ways in which the system could be improved. Your 
cooperation with this survey is very much appreciated. Please answer the questions in as 
much detail as possible, according to your fifm's experiences in China. 
*iJi5J ~ ~ 1'6] ;ffi i¥J § i ¥ J ~ : R R 71,f1fl- ~ Q Q i J ~ F f X XiM It 1£ r:p 00 i¥J 1 f ~ ~ d i , * 1 m ml1t iJUJIJ JiHPJ #1J 
~ ~PJ a tf ~ i M I t t 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i M 1 ~ X 1 l 1 t i J i 5 J J ~ ~ i¥J irf'F 0 i N ~ 1 m ~ ~ P] 1£ r:p 00 B " J ~ } ~ , , ~ ~PJ 
f f ~ w w ~ : t m m@] ~ ~ 1'61 Jt2i 0 
All information given will be treated as strictly confidential and will be made 
anonymous. No names or company names will be used under any circumstances. 
w M m ~ ? m f f N ~ ~ @ ~ @ ~ # N r M & ~ # ~ m ~ B ~ o f t t t M M ~ ~ ~ ~ A A
Jt£i l ff] @ ~ ~ * ~ / F { t N f P l ! J o o
1. Please choose one of the following options to describe the goods or services that 
your company provides: ~ P ] ~ 1 ~ 1 P J ~ ~ F r f b E X : ~ ~ * ? ?
o Agriculture- t < ~ ~
o A viation- * 1 L ~ ~
o Banking, Finance, Insurance- f N i j ~ ' ' ~ P M ! ' ' 1 : * ~ ~
o Education & Training- ¥X1f ' tg-U!l 
o Energy, Utilities, Environment - ~ g £ £ ' 0;; m ~ ~ ~ , , f f ~ ~
o Fashion & Luxury Goods- 1 J r E i j A * ~ ~ , ~ 1 ~ J l t : l l
o Food & Beverage- ~ t o / ] , , t 5 \ ~ q · ·
o Leisure, Tourism, Hospitality- I * 1 B ~ j , , m H j ~ ~
o Manufacturing- F f f U ~ ~ ~
o Media & Advertising- w 1 - l ~ J i t j [ ' - , , r E-
D Professional & Business Services- ~ ~ B ' j , , P J j ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i j ~ ~
o Technology, Telecommunications- I Z ~ , , Et31§ 
o Wholesale, Retail- :t1t6tpaj, ~ ~ F f f i i
o Other (please specify)- ~ 1 - t l 1 1 ( i ~ i ~ f f i ! t a H r l n n
2. How many offices does your company have in China a ~ ~ : ' ; h i c h h cities are they 
located? ~ ~ §J ft r:p 0 0 1 f ~ y ~ 1 J - * ~ , , ' t f n 1 f t - T P J j ~ ~ -.ljJy" J IJ? 
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3. If applicable, how many offices does your company have worldwide and in which 
countries are they located? ~ l J ! l ~ f f l l l : t ' t ~ 7 f J , , } j f P F F f ~ d > ~ ~ j ~ t n 1 } ¥ ~ , , B 
ffJ W 53\. :til fr P ] ~ ~ Jf:f:. ~ ~ ~ ~ ? 
Where are the headquarters of your company? }jf P] tn Je, $ f r P ] ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ? ?
D China cpOO 
D Worldwide ~ - t t t W E r S S
4. How long has your company been operating in China? N P] fr ~ ~ ~ ~ 7f1';t T ~ ~Y 
if? 
D 0-2 years; 0-2 if 
D 2-5 years; 2-5 if 
D 5-10 years; 5-10 if 
D More than 10 years; 10 if lj 1: 
5. Is your company invo lved with intellectual property in China? N P] ~ ~ ~ 1 & & tU 
fr ~ ~ 00 I¥J ~ l J J i J ~ F ~ ~ ? 
DYes; ~ ~
D N o ; ~ ~
D Don't Know ; : : f ~ D i l i i
6. If yes, what types ofIP do you deal with? (Please choose all that are applicable): 
~ * ~ , , ~ M ~ & t n ~ W # ~ W F ~ ? ~ ~ ~ m ~ ~ ~ t n ~ ~ ) )
D Patent; ~ 5 f U ~ ~ D Copyright; ~ f ' F ~ ~
D Utility Model; ~ f f l ¥ J T ~ ~ 0 Other e.g. Trade secrets; ;t:t 
D Industrial Design; I ~ ~ i t t 1 t B ~ l J f € f i ~ f M ~ ~
D Trademark; f € f i ; f j } ~ ~
7. Have you noticed any changes in IP protection in China over the past five years? 
1 ~ ~ ~ f r g t u r l l ~ ~ 1 i i f ~ l J i ~ F ~ p J T t t ~ t n 1 f f a r ~ 1 t ? ?
DYes: ~ ~
D N o : ~ ~
D Don't Know: ~ ~ l J : @ : :
8. If you have noticed a change, would you characterize the change as positive or 
negative? (-2= negative change, 0= no change, 2= positive change) 
~ ! l ~ B f r g ~ ~ ~ ~ , , ~ m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t n ~ ~ m ~ t n ? ?
( - 2 = ~ ~ ; f ' & 1 ¥ J ~ 1 t , , 0 = 1 X ~ ~ 1 t , , 2 = f 5 H l k t n ~ 1 t ) )
D -2 D -1 DoD 1 0 2 
9. Would you please give details on any changes observed: i W l $ ~ m : i £ 1 ~ p J T ~ . ! R . ~ t l j j
1 ¥ J ~ 1 t : :
312 
10. What do you think prompted these changes? 1 f J \ i A . J g ~ 1 t i , . { J E P X : T J K ! I t ~ 1 { : ? ?
11. In your opinion, how effective is the current system ofIP protection in China? 
(1= completely ineffective; 6= entirely effective) t E 1 ~ ~ * , , ~ ~ f J t ! . 1 T I ¥ J ~ Q i , J ~ F F
f J ( 1 * 1 ? 1 * * U ~ : t 7 J ~ Q 1 D J ? ? ( 1 = ~ ~ & 1 f ~ ~ $ , , 6 = ~ ~ 1 f ~ ~ ) )
01 02 03 04 05 06 
12. Has your company ever experienced any problems with protecting IP in China? 
~ ~ & ~ t E ~ O O ~ ~ M ~ m F f J ( I ¥ J ~ ~ ~ . ? ?
DYes; £ 
o No; ~ ~
o Don't Know; ::f ~ Q m m
13. In your opinion, how serious are the problems you have experienced? (1= not at 
all serious; 6= extremely serious) f ~ ; i I ! ~ U l ¥ J f Q ] . 1 f ~ F £ ? ? (l=;ftt*::fF£, 
6 = ; f ) 1 ~ F : m ) )
01 02 03 04 05 06 
14. In your opinion, what is the main cause of any problems that you have 
experienced? f r 1 ~ : H * , , I b l . F j : I ¥ J 3 : . ~ J j j H ~ I ~ 1 t i , . ? ?
o Poor legislation- : l L 1 ! ~ ~ ~ ~
o Poor enforcement- f J L 1 ! ~ 1 J J
o Both- 1m51§ 
o N e i t h e r - 1 m 5 ~ ~ ~
o Not sure- / f r r r ~ ~
15. To what extent do you think the following factors contribute to the current state of 
the IP protection system in China? f r 1 D J ~ ~ ~ l I L o c L , , 1 ~ 1 A J g g ~ ~ r ~ ~ m p x T T ~ Q Q
i ~ F f J ( ( 1 * 1 ? 1 ¥ J ~ ~ ? ?
(0= no contribution; 6= major contribution) (O=&1ffftlW\, 6 = 3 : . ~ f f t l W \ ) )
Lack of the concept of individual rights in 00 10 20 30 40 50 
China: l £ t p O O ~ z 1 ' ' A i f ~ f r j ~ f ~ ~
Influence of Confucianism: { ~ ~ I ¥ J ~ O i o J J 00 10 20 30 40 50 
Influence of socialism ; J J d : : E t ± X 8 ' S ~ O i o J J 00 10 20 30 40 50 
Lack of public awareness of IP rights: f f r R z ~ D i ~ ~ 00 10 20 30 40 50 
~ ~ ;f I¥.( ± L:>...F\.±£:. ~ ~ 'C1 } ~ ~ 'lIT :z:;::L\ /" J ~ ' '1/\ 
The role of the government in the economy ; 1£ 00 10 
~ ~ 1 ] H i ~ j j tpi&ml¥J1'P m 
20 3D 40 50 
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60 
60 
6C 
6L 
6C 
Perception that IP only benefits foreigners ~ W : : 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 ~ O i f U f t * x f 5 f d p p 7 t ~ 1 ) 1 i - O O A ~ f l J J
Local protectionism; 15 f5f?Jp 1:X 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Over-reliance on public enforcement 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 
mechanisms ; tiN f ~ i 1 0 J t ~ D f f i * ) 1 f M M
Lack of consistency in enforcement ; ~ D f f i f i j j ( z z
~ ¥ ! L ' t l l
00 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Lack of a unified agency for dealing with IP ; fijj( 
z ~ J J . ~ O i Q QF * x g j ~ J C - * ) 1 * t ] ]
00 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Weak judicial enforcement; 1 * ~ f A A1J /f 1J 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Lack of trained & experienced legal personnel ; 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 W f ( Z l J I [ ~ * ~ * £ L ~ £ ~ i i $ M g j 1 * 1 ' } A ~ A m m
Lack of transparency ; f i j j ( y ~ S ) j N N 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Length of the process ; tifE:::t * 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Inadequate penalties ; T&frJ /f ~ ~ 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Lack of powers to enforce court judgments ; fA 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 
1 = r ~ ~ * U { j ( B 1 * x 1 J f i j j ( ~ ~
16. Could you identify any other factors, apart from those listed above, which also 
contribute to the current state of the IP protection system in China? ~ ~ ftlJ ~ ~
15 ?JT jU I¥J ~ . L H ~ ~ IZ9 ~ ~ j ~ ~ , If!] ~ ~ N N tI<: tB -@ 3& ~ ~ 00 ~ u u i ~ F 1 X X f ~ j ? ? ~ ~ ~ I¥J ~ 1 t ! ? ! ! I ~ ? ?
1 7. How do you think IP protection in China could be improved? 1 ~ ~1A 7'1:tE ~ ~ 00 , 
~ O i R F 1 X Xf*jp ~ t F FPI I2A 1 ~ ~ttl a t'f ? 
o More money dedicated to IP protection; ~ A J ! ~ I ¥ J ~ u i ~ F t ( i ~ J ? ~ J ~ ~ ~ ~
o Campaigns for greater public awareness; : D U 5 $ 0 A ~ i ~ I ¥ J ' § § { ~ r n Z 9 J J
o Better training for legal personnel; ~ - = f ~ ! ~ ; A i l l ' . ~ J ! ~ f l ¥ J : l : i f i ) 1 1 1
o Better training for customs personnel; ~ - = f ~ * A J n n J ! ~ f l ¥ J : h t f i ) 1 1 1
o Better training for administrative personnel: ~ - = f 1 T l f & ~ 1 I A J n J ! : f f I ¥ J : h t f i ) 1 \ \
o Greater international cooperation; :Do 5$ 00 ~ i f 1 r f F F
o Stronger commitment from central government; * § ~ : k : l f & J # J ! : f f j ] 1 l 1 ¥ J * 1 ~ ~
o Other; ~ t : :
(Please give details i W W ~ 1 E 8 : i t ) )
18. What other comments do you have about IP protection in China? 
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This information will be detached from the survey to ensure confidentiality is 
maintained. No names or company details will be revealed under any circumstances. 
;1/; Inil. #jJ:g iJf/i/f fa] :fi:jll1! t;) 1ifI ti!Jl iff I!t 0 lEU (iil/if (fl F? 1'-AP!l 1; Jtf 4 \. it) ii/fJJJ $1-4 
1/f:f\#iltiff11 
Follow-up Interviews J8 ttijji! 
19. Would you be willing to take part in a follow-up interview? 1 ~ i } ~ ~ t J o J § ~ l ¥ J i j J i ~ ~
011? 
DYes J! 
DNo 1i 
20. If yes, please indicate which type of communication you would prefer for the follow-
up interview: gO *J!, iFf*= ~ ~ f t J § ~ i j J ~ ~ r:p 1 ~ ~ {AlU rPJ 1 ~ f f l 1 P J * ~ ~ I D ! ! 1 ¥ J ~ 1 ; l t t
(You can choose more than one P J ~ J . m : i & ~ ) )
D Telephone- Eg ii5 
D E-mail- E g ~ ! B ~ 1 4 4
D Face-to-face- OOX100 
D Mail- { ~ { 4 = =
D Fax-1-1ilt 
Contact Details I f * : ~ t j J J t t/." 
0 P J ~ f f J \ \ Company Name 
~ * * ) J 1 ~ ~ Contact Name 
1m:% Position 
f:-fuf:1I: Address 
E § . i 5 % ~ ~ ~ Telephone Number 
W ~ % u ~ ~ Fax Number 
E § . T f f I ~ * § § E-mail Address 
Thank you very much for your support- your response is invaluable to my research. 
~ ~ ~ ';i ~ ~ t 1 ~ ~ I¥J Jt ~ , , f J t . ) H ~ ; w w ~ , t R RL&¥V 1 ~ ~ I¥J @ ] ~ . .
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